Michigan Law Review
Volume 102

Issue 4

2004

Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs
Curtis A. Bradley
University of Virginia School of Law

Martin S. Flaherty
Fordham Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the President/Executive
Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV.
545 (2004).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol102/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

EXECUTIVE POWER ESSENTIALISM
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Curtis A. Bradley* and Martin S. Flaherty**

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
546
I. TEXTUAL UNCERTAINTY
.
.
.
.
553
II. THEORY AND HISTORY PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION . .
.
. .
.
560
A. Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Political Theory ..... 560
.
.
571
B . State Constitutional Experience
C. L essons from the Continental Congress
.
.
585
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING . .. .
.
592
A. The Federal Convention
..
.
.
592
B . The Federalist Papers .
. .
.
.
..
602
.
..
604
C. State Ratification Debates
IV. THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION
.
.
. 626
. . 626
A. The Senate's Role in Treatymaking
. . . .
627
1. Understanding of the Founders .
........................................................................................

..............

.

.....

...........

........

.................

..

.........

......

.................

.............

.....

....

........

.....

.........

......... . . . . . ........

......

..........

.

..........

........

........

...........

............

............

.............

...

.....

......

........

................

......... . . ....

...........................

.

........

..........

........................

..........................

....

...... ...............

....................

........

.

...................

.....

....

....

..

....

.......

2. Practices of the Washington Administration
631
B. Washington 's Control of Diplomacy ................................... 636
1. Oversight of the Old Department of Foreign Affairs 637
2. Creation of the State Department.
.
641
3. Management of the Diplomatic Corps .
.
.
644
648
4. The Diplomatic Salaries Dispute
C. The Removal Debate ............................................................. 656
D. Reception and Recall of Genet
.
664
.................

...

.......

...... ....................

..

......

......

.........

............... ....................

.....................

.......................

* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1985, University of
Colorado; J.D. 1988, Harvard. - Ed. In January 2004, after work on this Article had largely
been completed, Professor Bradley began serving in a one-year position as Counselor on
International Law at the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed in this Article are
not intended to reflect the views of either the Department of State or the U.S. government.
** Visiting Professor, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; Professor of Law & Co-Director,
Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights, Fordham Law School. B.A.
1981, Princeton; M.A. 1982, Yale; M. Phil. 1987, Yale; J.D. 1 988, Columbia. - Ed.
For their helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Kathryn Bradley, Barry
Friedman, Abner Greene, John Harrison, Thomas Lee, Caleb Nelson, William Nelson,
William Treanor, participants in the NYU Legal History Colloquium, and participants in
faculty workshops at the Duke, Fordham, Georgetown, Houston, and Virginia law schools.
We would also like to thank Robert Scheef for his excellent research assistance.

545

546

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:545

1. Chronology of Key Events and Statements ..... . .... .. .. . . ... 665
2. Assessment .. . .............. .. . . ... . ..... . .. .. . . . .. . .. .. .. . . ....... . ...... .. .. .. . . 676
E. The Pacificus-Helvidius Debate .. . .... . . .. ..... . . . . . ......... .. ... . ... ... . 679
CONCLUSION···························································································· 687
INTRODUCTION

Conflict abroad almost always enhances executive power at home.
This expectation has held true at least since the constitutions of
antiquity.1 It holds no less true for modern constitutions, including the
Constitution of the United States. 2 Constitutional arguments for
executive power likewise escalate with increased perceptions of
foreign threat. It is therefore hardly surprising that broad assertions of
presidential power have become commonplace after the events of
September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on international terrorism.
One perennial weapon in the executive arsenal is the so-called
"Vesting Clause" of Article II of the Constitution. This clause, which
provides that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America,"3 stands in apparent contrast with the
Article I Vesting Clause, which provides that "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . . "4
This textual difference, usually bolstered with historical materials, has
long undergirded the claim that the Article II Vesting Clause
implicitly grants the President a broad array of residual powers not
specified in the remainder of Article II. We will call this claim the
"Vesting Clause Thesis. "
The Vesting Clause Thesis was famously advanced b y Alexander
Hamilton in his first Pacificus essay defending President Washington's
1793 Neutrality Proclamation.5 The Thesis has had a checkered career
1. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 346 (T. A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981) ("The tyrant
is also very ready to make war; for this keeps his subjects occupied and in continued need of
a leader."); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, in 2 CAMBRIDGE LIBRARY OF LAW CLASSICS 27, 291
(Henry Davis trans. 1901) (describing the incentives tyrants have to make war abroad to
maintain power at home).
2. A number of constitutional Founders observed that leaders of other countries had
often initiated war for personal reasons. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 46 (John Jay)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations
are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for
military glory . . . . "); JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS No. 4 (Sept. 14, 1793),
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 108 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985)
[hereinafter LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS] ("War is in fact the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement."). See generally William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the
Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 ( 1997).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
5. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793),
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E.
Cooke eds., 1969) [hereinafter LETTERS OF PACIFICUS]; see also infra Part IV.E.
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in constitutional law and interpretation ever since. One ostensible high
point came in Myers v. United States,6 in which a majority of the
Supreme Court relied on the Vesting Clause Thesis in holding that the
President had an exclusive power of removing executive officers.7
Even in Myers, however, the Court's reliance on the Vesting Clause
Thesis was minimal, and the Court's analysis and holding have since
been severely qualified.8 An offsetting low point famously occurred in
the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,9 in
which the Court rejected President Truman's broad claim of executive
power, a claim that was based in part on the Article II Vesting
Clause.10 Although the majority in Youngstown did not specifically
address the Vesting Clause Thesis, Justice Jackson addressed it in his
influential concurrence and repudiated it. 1 1
6. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
7. See id. at 1 18.
8. The Vesting Clause Thesis takes up only one paragraph of the Court's long opinion.
Much of the opinion is focused instead on a 1789 debate in the House of Representatives
over the President's removal power. See id. at 1 1 1-18, 1 19-39, 1 74-75. As we discuss below,
those who supported a presidential removal power in that debate typically relied on the
Appointments Clause (which gives the President the power to appoint various officials with
the advice and consent of the Senate) or the Take Care Clause (which states that the
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed") rather than the Vesting
Clause. See infra Part IV.C. Three Justices - Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis dissented in Myers. Justice McReynolds's dissent argues, among other things, that the
Vesting Clause Thesis is unsupported by Founding history. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 193, 22837 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). In a subsequent decision, Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court upheld a statute restricting the power of the President
to remove a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. The Court in Humphrey's
Executor noted that the only point actually decided in Myers was that "the President had
power to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate
as required by act of Congress." Id. at 626. The Court also stated that it was disapproving of
any statements in Myers that were "out of harmony with the views here set forth." Id. The
decision in Myers was further qualified in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), in which
the Court held that Congress could impose a "good cause" limitation on the President's
power to remove an independent counsel. See id. at 686-87. In his lone dissent, Justice Scalia
invoked the Vesting Clause Thesis. See id. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In response, the
majority stated in a footnote that Justice Scalia's Vesting Clause argument for an absolute
power of removal "depends upon an extrapolation from general constitutional language
which we think is more than the text will bear." Id. at 690 n.29.
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
10. See id. at 587-88. For a recent decision rejecting a broad claim of executive power,
albeit one not expressly premised on the Vesting Clause Thesis, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
11. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 632
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("Article II which vests the 'executive Power' in the President
defines that power with particularity."). The dissenters in Youngstown invoked the Article II
Vesting Clause in passing, see id. at 681-82 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting), but ultimately rested
their argument on a "practical construction" of the Take Care Clause. See id. at 702. Perhaps
surprisingly, presidents have not always embraced the Vesting Clause Thesis. Compare
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1914) (embracing a version of the
Thesis, which he called the "stewardship" theory of executive power), with WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 1 39-40, 144-45 (H. Jefferson
Powell ed., 2002) (1916) (rejecting the stewardship theory and arguing that "the President
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In recent years, the Vesting Clause Thesis has gained newfound
popularity. White House officials were apparently prepared to deploy
the argument in support of the Bush Administration's authority to use
military force against Iraq had Congress not expressly granted such
authority. 12 The Administration's reliance on the Vesting Clause
Thesis is also evident in controversial memoranda concerning
treatment of detainees that were prepared by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Defense after September 1 1.13 In terms
of academic support, professors Saikrishna Prakash and Michael
Ramsey recently defended the Vesting Clause Thesis at length in an
important article in the Yale Law Journal.14 Professor John Yoo has
invoked the Thesis in a number of recent articles as support for a
variety of alleged presidential foreign affairs powers.15 The Thesis also
has received recent support from Professor Phillip Trimble, 16 and the
historical account that ostensibly supports it parallels an interpretation
can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of
power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its
exercise").
12. See Mike Allen & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Aides Say White House Needs No Hill Vote;
Some See Such Support as Politically Helpful, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at AL Congress
subsequently passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to use force against Iraq.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res.
114, 107th Cong., 1 16 Stat. 1498.
13. See Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel,
Department of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) at 14-15 ("Article II makes clear that the President is vested with all
of the federal executive power. . . . While Article II, § 1 of the Constitution grants the
President an undefined executive power, Article I, § 1 of the Constitution limits Congress to
'[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted' in the rest of Article I."), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
5025040/site/newsweek/; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel
of the Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002), at 1 1 (same), http://washingtonpost.com/wp
srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), at 37 ("[T]he structure of
the Constitution demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the
executive - which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation - unless
expressly assigned in the Constitution to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II,
Section 1 makes this clear by stating that the 'executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.' That sweeping grant vests in the President an
unenumerated 'executive power' and contrasts with the specific enumeration of powers those 'herein' - granted to Congress in Article I."), http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/
bybee80102mem.pdf; Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War
on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations
(April 4, 2003), at 23 (same), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
040403dod.pdf.
14. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
15. See infra notes 21-22.
16. See PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 10-46 (2002).
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advanced in a thoughtful recent book by Professor H. Jefferson
Powell.17
The principal attraction of the Vesting Clause Thesis is that it
provides a straightforward solution to what appears to be a paradox of
American constitutionalism: the specific grants of power in Article II
are few and limited, especially when compared with Congress's exten
sive list of powers in Article I, and yet the President has long been a
significant - some argue, dominant - institutional actor in American
government. 18 The President has been particularly dominant with
respect to foreign affairs, and indeed is sometimes referred to as the
"sole organ" for the United States in its international relations.19 The
Vesting Clause Thesis reconciles the text of the Constitution with the
breadth of presidential power by stipulating that the Article II Vesting
Clause grants the President all powers that are in their nature
"executive," subject only to the specific exceptions and qualifications
set forth in the rest of the Constitution.
In addition to the constitutional text, advocates of the Vesting
Clause Thesis rely heavily on history. Their historical claim is that
constitutional theorists in Britain and Europe had worked out a
common, comprehensive, and detailed conception of the natural
division of governmental power well before American independence,
17. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN
AFFA IRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002). In arguing that the
Constitution implicitly vests the President with "authority for the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy," id. at 7, Professor Powell relies primarily on the
functional goals of the Founders rather than on the Vesting Clause. See id. at 93-94. For
additional academic reliance on the Vesting Clause Thesis, see, for example, GARY LAWSON
& GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY ch. 1 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to
War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 237-38 (2002).
18. See, e.g. , EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984
(5th rev. ed. 1984) (chronicling the shift in power toward the Executive Branch since the
Founding); FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (1994) (same); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973) (same).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(referring to the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations"). The genesis of the
"sole organ" language is a speech made by John Marshall in 1800 while he was a member of
the House of Representatives. President Adams had ordered the extradition to Great
Britain of Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, who was accused of murder while aboard a
British ship. Although Adams acted pursuant to a treaty with Great Britain, he was criticized
on the ground that the extradition request from Great Britain should have been processed
by judicial action, not executive action. It was in this context that Marshall, defending
Adams, proclaimed: "The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations." John Marshall, Address Before the House
of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 613 (Washington, Gales and
Seaton 1851). Marshall went on to argue that the President "is charged to execute the laws,"
that a treaty "is declared to be a law," and that the President therefore has the power to
fulfill U.S. responsibilities under an extradition treaty. 10 id. at 613-14. Marshall therefore
was not making any claim about unspecified substantive powers.
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and that the Constitution of the United States - with discrete textual
exceptions
embodied this reigning separation of powers
understanding. When the Founders referred in the Article II Vesting
Clause to the "executive Power," the argument runs, they referred to
an understood bundle of powers and therefore had no need to
enumerate specific executive powers in the remainder of Article II.
Rather, such an enumeration became necessary only for those few
instances in which the Founders were deviating from the prevailing
understanding - for example, when they divided an executive power
between the President and the Senate. Proponents of this account line
up purported support from every relevant development leading to the
Constitution's ratification: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
political theory, the revolutionary and "critical" periods under the
Articles of Confederation, the Federal Convention, and the state
ratification debates. The most powerful evidence, however, allegedly
comes from the statements and practices of government officials
during the Washington Administration, which, it is claimed, confirm
the consensus underlying Article II.
Armed thus with text and history, scholars have relied on the
Vesting Clause Thesis to cash out a number of specific claims
concerning presidential power. Some argue, for example, that the
President has the power to terminate treaties because that power is
executive in nature and is not expressly delegated to Congress or the
Senate.20 Others assert that the President has broad unenumerated
war powers in situations not involving congressional declarations of
war, since the war power, too, is in its nature executive.2 1 And still
others have invoked the Vesting Clause Thesis in support of a power
of the President to conclude certain international agreements on his
own authority, notwithstanding the requirement in Article II of the
Constitution that the President obtain the advice and consent of two
thirds of the Senate in order to make treaties.22 The potential breadth
20. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 324-27.
21. See, e.g. , ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW JN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 53-55 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow,
"Once More unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
14-15 (1986); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676-78
(2002).
22. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 264; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 207-16 (1998). Through a
complex argument that involves characterizing treatymaking as executive in nature and
treaty implementation as legislative in nature, Professor Yoo has invoked the Vesting Clause
Thesis to argue that treaties generally should not be viewed as self-executing within the U.S.
legal system. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1966-67 (1999); John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2224 (1999). Professor Yoo also has relied on the Vesting Clause
Thesis as support for a broad presidential power to interpret treaties. See John C. Yoo,
Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1 320-22
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of the Vesting Clause Thesis is further illustrated by dicta in a recent
Supreme Court decision, A merican Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, in which the Court appeared to suggest that the President
might have the power to preempt state laws simply by articulating the
"foreign policy of the Executive Branch. "23
This Article challenges the Vesting Clause Thesis on both textual
and historical grounds. As for text, the difference in wording between
the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses can be explained in other
plausible ways and need not be read as distinguishing between a
limited grant of legislative powers and a plenary grant of executive
power. Familiar canons of construction, such as expressio unius, and
other interpretive principles further cut against the Vesting Clause
Thesis. That thesis, moreover, cannot explain some of Article H's
specific grants of foreign affairs authority, and it sits uneasily with the
Constitution's enumerated powers structure.
Given that the textual case for the Vesting Clause Thesis is at best
uncertain, the persuasiveness of the thesis ultimately depends on
history. Here there is a particular irony. Proponents of the Vesting
Clause Thesis are often also advocates of a classically originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation, pursuant to which the
understanding of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers controls
constitutional meaning. Yet, as we will show, the historical sources
that are most relevant to the Founding, such as the records of the
Federal Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state ratification
debates, contain almost nothing that supports the Vesting Clause
Thesis, and much that contradicts it.
Supporters of the Vesting Clause Thesis attempt to compensate for
the lack of direct Founding support by focusing on political theory and
practice both before and after the ratification of the Constitution.
Their historical narrative thus has two central features. First, it is a
story of continuity, whereby European political theory is carried
forward, relatively unblemished, into American constitutional design
and practice. Second, the narrative relies on what could be called
"executive power essentialism" - the proposition that the Founders
(2002); John C. Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 , 869 (2001) (book review).
23. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003). In that case, the
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a California statute was preempted by executive
agreements because, in the Court's view, the statute had created an obstacle to the
achievement of the President's foreign policy as articulated in the agreements. The Court
referred in passing to the Article II Vesting Clause, stating that "the historical gloss on the
'executive Power' vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's 'vast
share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.' " Id. (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Professors Prakash and Ramsey, by contrast, disavow any claim of presidential lawmaking
power in their defense of the Vesting Clause Thesis. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14,
at 235, 263, 340-46.
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had in mind, and intended the Constitution to reflect, a conception of
what is "naturally" or "essentially" within executive power. 24 We
argue that this historical narrative is wrong on both counts. Among
other things, the narrative fails to take account of complexity within
eighteenth-century political theory, the experience of state
constitutionalism before 1787, and the Founders' self-conscious
rejection of the British model of government. The narrative also
understates the degree to which the constitutional Founders were
functionalists, willing to deviate from pure political theory and
essentialist categories in order to design an effective government.
Moreover, as usually presented, the post-constitutional practice of
the Washington Administration provides only half the story.
Washington and his cabinet, perhaps unsurprisingly, tended to stake
out pro-executive positions with respect to the management of U.S.
diplomacy. To the extent that there was a consensus concerning these
positions, that consensus was based on functional considerations
related to specific constitutional grants, not the Vesting Clause. When
other, more substantive issues arose - such as the power to remove
executive officials (including the Secretary of State) and the power to
declare neutrality - the consensus broke down and there was
substantial disagreement about the sources and scope of executive
power. Moreover, with the partial exception of Alexander Hamilton,
neither Washington nor his cabinet actually articulated the Vesting
Clause Thesis, preferring instead to make more specific and modest
textual claims.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we show why the
constitutional text does not by itself establish the case for the Vesting
Clause Thesis. In Part III, we consider the views of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century political theorists, the practices of the states during
the Critical Period as they relate to the issue of executive power, and
lessons from the Continental Congress. In Part IV, we discuss the
constitutional Founding, with particular emphasis on the discussions
and debates relating to the presidency. In Part V, we consider some of
the most relevant practices and debates that occurred during the eight
years of the Washington Administration.

24. We are not implying that advocates of the Vesting Clause Thesis are making some
sort of Platonic claim about the meaning of executive power, but rather simply that they are
claiming that certain powers would have been understood by the Founders - for
theoretical, historical, or other reasons - as naturally or essentially belonging to the
executive. Cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253 n.91 (denying that executive power
has an inherent meaning in the abstract and instead "mak[ing] a claim about the meaning of
executive power at a particular time in history").
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TEXTUAL UNCERTAINTY

It is important to understand at the outset why the textual
arguments in support of the Vesting Clause Thesis are, at best,
indeterminate. As noted above, the principal textual argument is the
difference in wording between the Article I and Article II Vesting
Clauses. The Article I clause provides that " [a]ll legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested" in Congress, whereas the Article II
clause provides that " [t]he executive Power shall be vested" in the
President. This difference in wording, it is argued, suggests that
Congress's legislative powers were intended to be limited to the ones
listed in the Constitution, whereas the President's powers were to
include all those encompassed by the phrase "executive Power,"
without regard to whether those powers were listed in the
Constitution. 25
As an initial matter, even if this textual argument were correct, and
the Article II Vesting Clause were read as a power-conferring
provision, the argument would not tell us which powers the Clause
encompasses. It is possible, for example, that the phrase "executive
Power" confers simply a power to execute the laws. That would help
explain, for example, why it is written in the singular rather than the
plural. Indeed, to the extent that there are any Founding statements
ascribing substantive content to the Article II Vesting Clause, they are
all statements equating executive power with the power to execute the
laws.26 If this is what the Vesting Clause means, it could not serve as
the source of the foreign relations powers claimed by proponents of
the Vesting Clause Thesis. Thus, even on its own terms, the textual
argument for the Vesting Clause Thesis is inconclusive and depends
on history.
It is also worth noting that the textual argument assumes a level of
precision on the part of the Founders that may be unrealistic. As
Professor Christopher Eisgruber has noted, constitutional law scholars

25. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 256-57.
26. See infra Part III. In an article published after his above-referenced article with
Professor Ramsey, Professor Prakash argues that, "[a]t bottom, the executive power is the
power to execute the laws." Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 704 (2003). As he notes, one of the definitions of "executive" in the
Founding-era version of Samuel Johnson's dictionary included "having the power to put in
act the laws." Id. at 716 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 683 (Librairie du Liban ed., 1978) (1755)). Although that definition does not
refer in any way to foreign affairs powers, Professor Prakash continues to adhere to the
arguments he made with Professor Ramsey about presidential foreign affairs powers. See id.
at 704 & n.5, 714. As with the Johnson quotation, however, much of the historical evidence
that Professor Prakash cites in his more recent article suggests that any consensus about
executive power extended only to a power to execute the laws, and this evidence thereby
tends to undermine the broader claims he made with Professor Ramsey. For additional
examples of this point, see infra notes 61, 146, 574, 662.
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often fall prey to the aesthetic fallacy that "the constitutional text pos
sesses hidden harmonies that will reveal themselves to assiduous stu
dents" and, relatedly, that "we should be extremely reluctant ever to
conclude that it is redundant, clumsy, ambiguous, or incomplete."27 In
fact, it could be the case, as Professor David Currie has observed, that
the difference in the wording of the Article I and Article II Vesting
Clauses "may well have been accidental."28 Whether accidental or not,
however, there are other plausible explanations for this difference.
The Article II Vesting Clause states that the executive power shall
be vested "in a President of the United States of America." As
discussed later in this Article, a significant issue during the drafting of
the Constitution was whether to have a unitary or plural executive.
The Article II Vesting Clause may simply make clear where the
executive power is being vested - in a unitary President - not the
scope of that power.29 In other words, the Clause may have been
worded to address an issue that was specific to Article II. Conversely,
the "herein granted" language in the Article I Vesting Clause may
serve to emphasize the limits of federalism on the national legislative
power, a concern that would have been specific to Article 1.3° Another
possibility has been suggested by Professor Michael Froomkin. As he
notes, there was a Congress already in existence at the time of the
framing of the Constitution, so the "herein granted" language in
Article I might have been designed to make clear that, from now on,
Congress would have only the powers being listed. By contrast, the

27. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 1 13 (2001).
But see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 236 ("Our framework reveals that there are no
gaps in the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers.").
28. DA YID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801, at 177 (1997). As Currie notes, the "herein granted" language in Article I was
added late in the Federal Convention by the Committee of Style, which was not supposed to
make substantive changes (although it did so in some instances). See id.; 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 590 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Of course, even if the
drafters did not intend for the difference in wording to reflect a difference in meaning, the
difference might be constitutionally significant if those involved in ratifying the Constitution
would have perceived a difference in meaning. We address that historical question below in
Part III.C.
29. See, e.g. , Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1953) ("The records of the Constitutional Convention make it
clear that the purposes of [the Article II Vesting Clause) were simply to settle the question
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title.");
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 47-48 n.195 (1994) ('The [Article JI) Vesting Clause does nothing more than show
who . . . is to exercise the executive power, and not what that power is."). As noted below,
this interpretation appears to be consistent with the way in which the delegates at the
Federal Convention used the word "vesting." See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes
21 1-213.
30. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1993) ("This [language) seemed designed only to reflect the limits of federalism
on national regulatory power, not to ratify or to recognize substantive executive power.").
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Founders might not have thought it necessary to use that language for
the new executive and judicial branches.31 As a matter of text, these
alternative interpretations are at least as plausible as the Vesting
Clause Thesis.
Not only are there other explanations for the difference in wording
of the Vesting Clauses, there is also a significant textual problem with
construing the Article II Vesting Clause as conveying unenumerated
powers. Article II expressly grants the President the commander-in
chief power; the power to request written opinions from federal
executive officers; the power to grant pardons; the power to make
treaties; and the power to appoint a variety of officials.32 Article II also
directs (and thereby presumably empowers) the President to receive
ambassadors, and to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.33
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis concede that many if not all
of these specific grants and directives are encompassed within their
construction of the phrase "executive Power" in the Article II Vesting
Clause.34 Under their construction, however, the specific grants would
appear to be superfluous, in contravention of the general presumption
against redundancy.35 Furthermore, the Founders' decision to list what
they meant by "executive Power" would tend to suggest, pursuant to
the expressio unius canon, that their list was complete, rather than
merely illustrative.36
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis attempt to address this
textual problem by arguing that the delineation of some of the Article
II powers, such as the treaty power and the appointments power, can
be explained by the fact that the Constitution divides these powers
with the Senate. It was necessary to list these powers despite the
general grant of executive power in the Vesting Clause, the argument
goes, in order to make clear that the President was not receiving

31. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1346, 1363 (1994).
32. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
33. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
34. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 259-60.
35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 833 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing
presumption against redundancy); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000) (same).
36. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 824-25 (discussing expressio unius canon);
2A SINGER, supra note 35, §§ 47:23-47:25 (same). Professor Prakash has himself emphasized
the expressio unius canon in another coauthored article about executive power. See Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541 , 562-64 (1994). Although that article argues generally for applying the expressio
unius canon to the Constitution, it does not take a firm position on whether the canon
should be applied to the list of powers in Article II. See id. at 563-64 (stating that the canon
"arguably may also apply to the list in Article II").
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exclusive control over these functions. 37 Although not a divided
power, a similar argument is made with respect to the commander-in
chief power: the Constitution gives Congress a number of powers
relating to war, so the Founders needed to make clear that the
President still had the commander-in-chief power.38
This divided powers response is problematic, for several reasons.
First, the powers listed in Article II are not written as if they were
limits on divided powers. Article II does not state, for example, that
"the executive power to make treaties is subject to the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate," or that "the president's war
powers shall not extend to issuing declarations of war." Second,
proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis also maintain that any
executive powers not specifically delegated to other institutional
actors should be presumed to rest with the President. As Prakash and
Ramsey argue, "the Constitution has a simple default rule that we call
the 'residual principle': Foreign affairs powers not assigned elsewhere
belong to the President, by virtue of the President's executive power;
while foreign affairs powers specifically allocated elsewhere are not
presidential powers, in spite of the President's executive power."39 In
light of that purported default rule, it is not clear why delineation was
needed even of divided powers, since whatever was not given to the
Senate or to Congress would presumptively remain with the President.
Third, the divided powers response does not explain all of the Article
II grants. Most notably, the power to require written opinions, the
pardon power, and the ambassadorial receipt power all rest
exclusively with the President, and yet they too are specifically
delineated.40 Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis do not have a
convincing explanation for these specific grants.41 Finally, as discussed
37. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253 n.91.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 254.
40. The President also was granted the undivided powers of recommending legislation
to Congress, calling Congress into special session, and commissioning officers of the United
States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In addition, the President was granted, in Article I, the
power to veto legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
41. Prakash and Ramsey do not address either the power to require written opinions or
the pardon power. As for the ambassadorial receipt power, they simply call it a "small
redundancy." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 260. It is quite possible, of course, that
the Constitution contains redundancies. But if one is willing to accept imperfections of
constitutional drafting in this respect, the textual argument for the Vesting Clause Thesis which assumes precise drafting with respect to the differences in the Article I and Article II
Vesting Clauses - is also undermined. In his more recent article on executive power,
Professor Prakash contends that the pardon power is listed in Article II in order to define its
scope, i.e., to make clear that it is limited to federal offenses and that it does not apply to
impeachments. See Prakash, supra note 26, at 715. But this shift from a divided powers
explanation to a definitional explanation serves to undermine the claim made by Vesting
Clause Thesis proponents that the phrase "executive Power" was shorthand for an
understood bundle of powers. Moreover, if the Pardon Clause had been intended as a
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below, even though there was only one branch of government under
the Articles of Confederation - and thus no need to list powers in
order to divide them - the foreign affairs powers of the government
(including powers claimed by the Vesting Clause Thesis proponents to
be "executive" in nature) were specified.42
The textual argument only becomes more complicated and
uncertain when one looks at the A rticle III Vesting Clause. This clause
provides that " [t]he Judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested" in the Supreme Court and whatever lower federal courts
Congress creates. This clause appears to be similar to the Article II
clause, in that it refers generally to a category of power instead of
referring to powers "herein granted." Nevertheless, it has long been
settled that the specific categories of cases and controversies
subsequently listed in Article III define the boundaries of the exercise
of the federal judicial power.43 In other words, the list of cases and
controversies is treated as exhaustive, not merely illustrative. As
Alexander Hamilton notes in Federalist No. 80, after he recites Article
Ill's list of cases and controversies, "This constitutes the entire mass of
the judicial authority of the Union."44 If Articles II and III are to be
treated the same, this may suggest that the powers referred to in
Article II should be construed as exhaustive, not illustrative, of the
President's authority.
To be sure, the Article III list is preceded by the phrase, "The
judicial Power shall extend to," whereas the list of powers in Article II
is not preceded by the phrase, "The executive Power shall extend to."
This difference might suggest that, despite the similarity of their
Vesting Clauses, Articles II and III should be treated differently with
respect to the issue of unspecified powers. But this response is not
entirely satisfactory. If the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses
by their terms convey a package of unspecified powers, it is not clear
why the language "shall extend to" in Article III is treated as
exhaustive. That language, unlike the "herein granted" language in
Article I, could easily be read to be illustrative, especially if it does not

limitation on an inherent executive power, one would expect it to have been phrased
differently, e.g., "The President's pardon power shall not extend to offenses against a state,
or to cases of impeachment."
42. See infra Part 11.C. In addition, essentially all of the foreign affairs powers listed in
the Articles of Confederation are specifically assigned somewhere in the Constitution. The
only slight exception is that there is no precise analogue in the Constitution to the
congressional power under the Articles of Confederation of "determining on peace." The
Constitution does assign to Congress, and not the President, the power to "declare War."
Whether Congress's power to declare war also gives it the exclusive power to determine
whether the United States will remain neutral in a military conflict was a central issue in the
1793 debate over President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. See infra Part IV.E.
43. See, e.g. , Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
44. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), at 479.

558

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:545

fully encompass the package of powers being granted in the Article III
Vesting Clause. If it is the very enumeration of the cases and
controversies that makes the Article III list exhaustive, that argument
would obviously apply as well to the enumeration of executive powers
in Article II.
Nevertheless, Professor Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes have
argued at length that the phrase "shall extend to" in Article III is not a
grant of power but rather is simply a description of the situations in
which a particular power can be exercised. The Article III Vesting
Clause must be a grant of power, they contend, because it is the "only
explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary's authority to
act."45 Professor Froomkin has contested this argument, arguing that
the judiciary's power to act can be derived either from the structure of
the Constitution or from Article Ill's list of cases and controversies.46
It is unnecessary to resolve this debate for present purposes because,
even if Calabresi and Rhodes were correct, their argument would not
provide support for the Vesting Clause Thesis. Under their analysis,
the Article III Vesting Clause simply conveys a power to decide cases
(with perhaps related powers to protect the process of
decisionmaking), 47 without defining the circumstances under which
that power may be exercised. Extending that argument to Article II at
most suggests that the Article II Vesting Clause conveys something
like a "power to execute the laws" (with perhaps a related power to
control executive subordinates), and not that it conveys unspecified
foreign relations powers, as maintained by the proponents of the
Vesting Clause Thesis. Indeed, Calabresi and Rhodes themselves
suggest skepticism about whether the Article II Vesting Clause
conveys unspecified substantive powers.48
In addition to these textual difficulties, the Vesting Clause Thesis
is at least in tension with the enumerated powers structure of the

45. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 155, 1 176 (1992); see also Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81-82 (1907) (distinguishing between the Article I and Article III
Vesting Clauses and stating that "the entire judicial power of the Nation" is granted by the
Article III clause); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1377 (1994).
46. See Froomkin, supra note 31, at 1352-53.
47. The Supreme Court has stated that "[c]ourts invested with the judicial power of the
United States have certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in
the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S.
820, 823 (1996) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991)); see also Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (reasoning that "a 'judicial Power' is one
to render dispositive judgments" (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))).
48. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1 177 n.119. But cf Prakash & Ramsey,
supra note 14, at 257 & n.104 (citing the Calabresi & Rhodes article as support for their
argument).
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Constitution. The Constitution lists the powers of the three federal
branches in great detail, and the Founders emphasized that they were
creating a national government with limited and defined powers.
James Madison stated in the Federalist Papers, for example, that the
national government "is limited to certain enumerated objects,"49 and
that "[t]he powers delegated to the federal government are . . . few
and defined." 50 The proponents of the Constitution thought this
proposition so evident that it precluded the need for a Bill of Rights.51
Indeed, they argued that a Bill of Rights might be dangerous because
it could be construed as implying governmental powers that had not in
fact been granted.52 And, when the Bill of Rights was subsequently
adopted, it contained the Tenth Amendment, which reaffirms that the
national government has only the powers that have been delegated to
it.53 The idea of an unspecified residuum of substantive powers in the
President does not fit well with this structural feature of the
Constitution.54
Our claim here is not that these textual and structural points
clearly refute the Vesting Clause Thesis. Rather, our claim is simply
that the legitimacy of the Vesting Clause Thesis cannot be determined
simply by looking at what the Constitution says. The case for the
Vesting Clause Thesis, therefore, must lie elsewhere. According to its
proponents, the Vesting Clause Thesis is confirmed by history. The
meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause may not be obvious to us, it
is argued, but to the Founding generation it was simply shorthand for
an acknowledged array of powers.55 As we will show, not only does the
relevant historical evidence fail to confirm the thesis, it actually
provides a powerful case against it.
49. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 14 (James Madison), at 102.
50. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292.
51. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 288-338 (1996).
52. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), at 513
(making this argument); Charles C. Pinckney, Speech in South Carolina House of
Representatives (Jan. 18, 1778), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 28, at 256 (same).
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."). For a discussion of the tension between the Tenth Amendment and broad
claims of executive war power, see D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn't True? The
Tenth Amendment and Executive War Power, 5 1 CATH. U. L. REV. 135 (2001).
54. For recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the enumerated powers structure
of the Constitution, see, for example, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); and New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 155 (1992). Even Chief Justice Marshall's famous national power decision, McCulloch v.
Maryland, emphasized this structural feature. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This
[federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.").
55. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253.
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THEORY AND H I STORY PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

A. Seventeenth- and Eighteenth- Century Political Theory
As noted, proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis typically place
significant weight on the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
political theorists, especially the writings of John Locke, William
Blackstone, and Baron de Montesquieu. These writings, the
proponents contend, show that foreign affairs powers were viewed by
theorists as inherently executive in nature and thus as at least
presumptively assigned to the executive branch of any government.
The Founders would have been familiar with and likely influenced by
these writings, the argument goes, and thus the writings shed light on
what the Founders understood with respect to the Article II Vesting
Clause.56
As we discuss later in this Article, the purported continuity
between the views of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
theorists concerning the proper scope of executive power and the
understandings of the constitutional Founders is highly questionable.
Among other things, when discussing executive power these theorists
primarily used the British monarchy as their model, a model
consciously rejected by the constitutional Founders when thinking
about executive power. For now, we focus on what the theorists
actually said. It turns out that, even on their own terms, the theorists
provide no more than weak support for the idea that foreign relations
powers are inherently executive in nature.
Locke, for example, far from claiming that foreign relations powers
are inherently executive, actually distinguishes executive power from
foreign relations power. In a chapter of the second book of his Two
Treatises of Government, Locke describes three classes of power "legislative," "executive," and "federative." 57 Here he defines
"executive" power as simply the power of "the Execution of the Laws
that are made, and remain in force," a power that he argues should
be separated from the power to make laws.58 Importantly, Locke
distinguishes this executive power from the "federative" power, which
he says encompasses "the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and
Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities
without the Commonwealth."59 He makes clear that these two classes

56. See, e.g., id. at 265-72.
57. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 409-12 (Peter Laslett ed., rev.
ed. 1960) (1690).
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id.
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of power - executive and federative - are "really distinct in
themselves. "60
Locke does observe that the executive and federative powers "are
always almost united," and he argues that if the two powers are
separated it "would be apt sometime or other to cause disorder and
ruin[]."61 But he bases his analysis here not on essentialist reasoning
about the nature of executive power, but rather on functional
differences between the legislative and executive branches. In
particular, Locke contends that the federative power, unlike the
regulation of domestic affairs, "is much less capable to be directed by
antecedent, standing, positive Laws."62 In his view, the functional
features of the executive branch - for example, its ability to make
case-by-case judgments in response to changing circumstances argue for assigning it the federative power.63 Assigning it elsewhere, he
contends, would be "almost impracticable."64 As Professor Rakove has
noted, Locke is clearly basing his argument about assigning the
federative power to the executive "on considerations of prudence,
convenience, and efficiency, not right."65 Furthermore, Locke makes
clear elsewhere in his treatise that the legislative power is supreme,
even with respect to the federative power, a proposition at odds with
the Vesting Clause Thesis.66
Blackstone provides even less support than Locke for the
proposition that foreign relations powers are inherently executive in
nature. Principally an expositor of English law rather than a political
theorist, Blackstone analyzed the English Constitution primarily in
terms of Whig "mixed government" theory as opposed to separation

60. Id.; see also id. at 412 (stating that "the Executive and Federative Power of every
Community be really distinct in themselves").
61. Id. at 411-12; see also Prakash, supra note 26, at 745 (observing that Locke deemed
powers other than law execution to be "executive" "only because they typically belong to
the entity charged with law execution").
62. LOCKE, supra note 57, at 411.
63. See id. at 412 ("[W]hat is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much
upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the
Prudence of those who have this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of
their Skill, for the advantage of the Commonwealth.").
64.

Id.

65. Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case
Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 261 (1984).
66. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 57, at 401 (referring to the legislative power as the
"supream power of the Common-wealth"); id. at 415 (describing both the executive power
and the federative power as "Ministerial and subordinate to the Legislative, which as has
been shew'd in a Constituted Commonwealth, is the Supream"). Prakash and Ramsey are
thus incorrect in suggesting that under Locke's analysis the federative power is not subject to
legislative constraint. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 267.
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of powers. 67 Under the mixed government analysis, the English
Constitution balanced governmental institutions associated with social
orders rather than with basic governmental functions. Specifically, the
King, Lords, and Commons respectively embodied monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy, and through mutual checks prevented the
respective horribles of tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy.68 This is not to
say that aspects of the English Constitution could not also be
understood through a separation of powers framework.69 It is to say,
however, that the triad of King, Lords, and Commons did not
obviously translate into the executive, judicial, and legislative
categories. Accordingly, Blackstone's focus on mixed government as
an initial matter means that references to the powers of the monarch
or to specific prerogative powers cannot automatically be translated as
executive power.
Although Blackstone on occasion refers generally to the Crown as
exercising executive power,70 he makes no effort to define the meaning
of executive power, and still less to delineate the boundaries between
executive and legislative authority in systematic or categorical terms.
Moreover, although Blackstone contends that the prerogatives of the
Crown include particular foreign relations powers, he justifies these
assignments of power by a combination of functional arguments and
arguments relating to the nature of the British monarchy. As an
example of the latter, he contends that the King's prerogative includes
the power to make treaties because under international law treaties
are to be made by sovereign powers "and in England the sovereign
power, quoad hoc, is vested in the person of the king."71 Blackstone
gives a similar sovereign power justification for the King's
"prerogative of making war and peace."72 As we discuss later, the
constitutional Founders expressly rejected this sort of "royal
prerogative" reasoning when thinking about the U.S. presidency. In
any event, even Blackstone's royal prerogative arguments are specific
to the structure of the British government and are not global claims
about the inherent meaning of executive power.73

67 . See Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to Book I, in 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND viii-ix (facsimile of First Edition, Stanley Katz,
ed., 1979) (1765).
68. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 18-21 (1969).
69. See Katz, supra note 67, at viii-ix.
70. See 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 67, at 183.
71. 1 id. at 249.
72. 1 id.
73. Prakash and Ramsey quote some of Blackstone's references to the foreign relations
prerogatives of the King as if they were definitions by Blackstone of "executive power," see
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Montesquieu provides more support than Locke or Blackstone for
the proposition that foreign relations powers are inherently executive,
but even here the picture is complicated and uncertain. As a French
theorist rather than an English empiricist, Montesquieu was certainly
more inclined than Locke or Blackstone towards essentialist
categories. But his essentialism primarily concerns the abstract
classification of power rather than the proper institutional assignment
of power. In addition, Montesquieu's dominant focus is on the
separation of categories of power in order to preserve liberty, and he
gives only passing attention to the relationship between executive
power and foreign relations power.
In purporting to describe the English constitution, Montesquieu
notes that in every government there are three classes of power: "the
legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of
nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil
law."74 By the first power, says Montesquieu, "the prince or magistrate
enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those
that have been already enacted."75 By the second power, "he makes
peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public
security, and provides against invasions."76 This category is thus similar
to Locke's category of federative power. By the third power, the
prince or magistrate "punishes criminals, or determines the disputes
that arise between individuals."77 Although initially labeling the third
power as a type of executive power, Montesquieu quickly relabels it
"the judiciary power," and he refers to the second power as "the
executive power of the state."78
Montesquieu's taxonomy is confusing, in part because he initially
refers to two categories of executive power. His subsequent relabeling
of the third category as the judiciary power does not eliminate
confusion because it seems to suggest that the second category fully
covers executive power, in which case executive power would be
limited to foreign relations powers and would not include the most
obvious executive power of all - executing domestic laws.79 But it is
clear from Montesquieu's subsequent discussion (which focuses

Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 269, but Blackstone does not himself use that phrase
when referring to the prerogatives.
74. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Hafner Pub. Co. 1 949) (1751).
75. 1 id.
76. 1 id.
77. 1 id.
78. 1 id.
79. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 95 (2d
ed. 1998) (explaining Montesquieu's initial taxonomy).
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primarily on the need for separating legislative, executive, and judicial
power) that this was not his intent. Thus, for example, he refers to the
"three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public res
olutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."80 Here Montesquieu
equates executive power with executing the laws and makes no
specific reference to foreign relations powers.B1
In Montesquieu's subsequent discussion, there are only isolated
references to foreign relations powers, and they do not shed much
additional light on the relationship between executive power and
foreign relations power. In the section of the book containing
Montesquieu's taxonomy, there is only one subsequent reference to a
foreign relations power. In asserting that the executive should manage
the army, Montesquieu argues that this follows "from the very nature
of the thing, its business consisting more in action than in
deliberation."82 The word "nature" here might suggest essentialism,
but the core of the argument appears ultimately to be functional,
grounded in the executive's (i.e., monarch's) ability to act with speed.
In a later section of the book, in discussing the executive power in
ancient Rome, Montesquieu observes that the Roman Senate
exercised most of the executive power, and he includes within his
description of the Senate's powers various foreign relations functions
such as determining on peace and war, regulating the army, and
receiving and sending ambassadors.B3 Obviously, Montesquieu is here
assigning foreign relations powers to his executive category, but even
in this context he is referring to specific powers rather than globally
equating executive authority with foreign relations authority.
Given Montesquieu's limited (and confusing) treatment of the
linkage between executive power and foreign relations powers, it is at
least an overstatement to suggest, as proponents of the Vesting Clause
Thesis have suggested, that his treatise provides conclusive support for
the proposition that foreign relations powers were conceived of in the
middle to late 1700s as inherently executive.84 In addition, proponents
of the Vesting Clause Thesis have tended to ignore the functionalist

80. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 152.
81. As William Gwyn notes, Montesquieu "gets off to a faltering start" with his initial
taxonomy, since the taxonomy he "actually went on to employ is of a rather different
nature." W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 101 (1965); see also Rakove, supra note 65, at 262 ("In attempting to define
legislative, executive, and judicial power . . . Montesquieu betrayed some confusion.").
82. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 161.
83. 1 id. at 173.
84. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 268 ("The influential Charles Louis
de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, confirmed that Locke's federative power had become a
branch of the executive power by the mid-eighteenth century.").
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strands of Montesquieu's reasoning. While more abstract than the
arguments made by Locke and Blackstone, functionalist arguments
nevertheless play an important role in Montesquieu's discussion of the
proper assignment of governmental powers. As noted above, this was
evident in his brief reference to regulation of the army. In addition,
when arguing that the executive power should be exercised by a
monarch, Montesquieu contends that "this branch of government,
having need of despatch, is better administered by one than by
many."85 Montesquieu's functionalism is also evident in his arguments
in favor of dividing powers that otherwise would fall exclusively into a
particular category. Perhaps most famously, he argues for giving the
executive a veto power over legislation in order to avoid the accretion
of too much power in the legislature, even though this means mixing
the executive and legislative categories.86 As we will document below,
the constitutional Founders were much more influenced by this sort of
functionalist reasoning than by Montesquieu's abstract essentialism.
The writings of other, less-prominent domestic legal theorists are
no more helpful to the Vesting Clause Thesis. Although the English
legal theorist Thomas Rutherforth might appear to expressly endorse
the foreign-affairs/executive-power equation, his support for the
Thesis is more apparent than real. As an initial matter, Rutherforth
divides all government power into two rather than three categories
and then does so in a unique fashion. In his typology, all government
power is either "legislative" - basically the power, by common
understanding, to define rights, duties, and membership in the
community87 - or "executive" - society's "power to act with its j oint
or common force for defense and security. "88 Rutherforth next divides
the executive power into the "internal," "external," and "mixed." The
internal, or "civil," executive power operates upon objects within a
society.89 It follows that the external power, which includes most
notably "military power," applies to matters outside a society. 90
Rutherforth's unique dualist scheme, which appeared after the more
familiar tripartite theses of Locke and Montesquieu, may call into
question the extent of his influence in America. More generally, the
85. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 156.
86. 1 id. at 159.
87. 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 43-50 (Cambridge, J.
Bentham 1756).
88. 2 id. at 50-61.
89. 2 id. at 50-54. Internal executive power, according to Rutherforth, included the
"Judicial power," which is "the internal or civil branch of executive power exerting itself
under such checks and controls, as the legislative power has subjected it to, in order to
prevent its deviating from the purposes, for which it was formed." 2 id. at 51.
90. 2 id. at 50-56. Rutherforth gave as an example of "mixed" powers the appointment
of magistrates. 2 id. at 59-60.
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emergence of yet another take on governmental structure belies the
notion that a settled consensus on separation of powers theory
prevailed in the years leading up to the American Revolution.
As to foreign affairs, moreover, Rutherforth makes clear that the
executive wields external authority out of practical considerations, not
because foreign affairs powers are by their nature executive. As a
descriptive matter, Rutherforth observes that "where the legislative
and executive power are lodged in different hands," especially when
the membership of the legislature is large, "the usual practice is to
allow some degree of discretionary power in respect of war and peace
to him or them, who are entrusted with the right of putting the
military force in motion."91 This is especially so, he continues, "where
the legislative body cannot act with such readiness and expedition,
as the occasions or opportunities of war require."92 Nonetheless,
Rutherforth concludes, though such an arrangement "may be
convenient, it is not necessary."93
To the contrary, Rutherforth expressly asserts that most foreign
affairs powers are in essence legislative and therefore subject to
substantial legislative limitation. Rutherforth begins his account of
external executive power with a conventional discussion of military
defense.94 To this he adds a list of non-military foreign affairs powers,
including the authority to make peace, grant rights to foreigners, make
alliances, make treaties, and adjust navigation rights. But are any of
these powers fundamentally executive? Rutherforth answers no:
However, though these several powers are usually connected with
external executive power by being lodged in the same hands, they are not
naturally essential parts of it. These several powers are rather acts of the
common understanding, than of the common force; and therefore seem,
in their own nature, to be parts rather of the legislative than the executive
power.95

Despite the practical wisdom of lodging foreign affairs powers in the
executive, Rutherforth remains careful to assert their legislative
character, at times in surprising ways. For example, the ostensible
champion of executive foreign affairs authority argues that the
legislative authorities can be within their rights to communicate with
other countries on their own, to make war and peace, and to send
deputies with a military "to control its operations even in war. "96

91. 2 id. at 56.
92. 2 id.
93. 2 id. at 57.
94. 2 id. at 54-55.
95. 2 id. at 56 (emphasis added).
96. 2 id. at 57.
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Like Montesquieu, Jean De Lolme was a French theorist who
examined the English Constitution for lessons about structuring a
government of ordered liberty, though like Rutherforth, he was both
subsequent and secondary to his more celebrated countryman. Also as
with Montesquieu, De Lolme provides more support for the idea that
foreign affairs are executive in nature than any of the Englishmen who
lived under the framework he describes. Perhaps more importantly,
De Lolme further echoes Montesquieu in considering the connection
between the executive and foreign affairs in a manner that is at best
cursory and at worst garbled. Appearing in English in 1775, De
Lolme's uncritical acceptance of broad royal prerogative likely made
this portion of his analysis less appealing to an American audience,
however often he may have been quoted generally.
In the manner of Rutherforth, De Lolme divides government
power between the legislative and the executive, rather than add
either the judicial or federative as a coordinate building block.97 His
main chapter examining executive power, however, quickly shifts to
speaking in terms of the "prerogative of the King."98 This move means
that, in contrast to both Rutherforth and Blackstone, De Lolme in
effect simply equates executive authority, a component of separation
of powers analysis, with the royal prerogative, in many ways a unique
set of powers retained by the English monarchy. What then follows is
a standard, though broadly interpreted, list of English prerogative
powers, including the King's role as: the "source of all judicial power";
the "fountain of honor"; the "superintendent of Commerce"; the
"Supreme head of the Church"; the " Generalissimo of all sea or land
forces whatever"; and as a ruler who "CAN DO NO WRONG."99
Tucked away in this enumeration comes De Lolme's most extensive
consideration of the monarch's foreign affairs authorities:
He is, with regard to foreign Nations, the representative, and the
depository, of all the power and collective majesty of the Nation: he
sends and receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the
prerogative of declaring war, and of making peace, on whatever
conditions he thinks proper.100

Precisely because De Lolme follows the royal prerogative, a careful
reading of this passage indicates that he does not simply equate
foreign affairs powers with executive authority. Rather, like
Blackstone, De Lolme references the monarch's functional role in
discussing specific powers. As noted, however, Blackstone is careful to
distinguish the pairings, so that the King's role as sovereign, for
97. See J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1784) (1711).
98. Id. at 72.
99. Id. at 72-73.
100. Id. at 73.
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example, accounts for the prerogative to make war, while his capacity
as the nation's representative explains the prerogative to receive
ambassadors. 101 De Lolme, by contrast, lumps them together, clouding
the functional origins of his conclusions.
In any case, De Lolme's actual influence on the foreign affairs
provisions of the Constitution remains unclear. Although he was
among leading eighteenth-century thinkers whom Americans
frequently cited,102 we are unaware of any instance in which De Lolme
was cited for the proposition that foreign affairs authority was
executive, much less cited with approval. Given De Lolme's fulsome
description of such prerogatives as head of the established church and
doing no wrong, together with Americans' rejection of British royal
authority, the lack of such citations is perhaps not surprising.
It is not only the theories about the British constitutional system
that are unsupportive of the Vesting Clause Thesis. Actual British
practice in the years leading up to the U.S. Constitution further
undercuts the story of continuity and executive power essentialism
posited by the Thesis. English historians generally agree that the
eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of a governmental system
not readily captured by either mixed government or separation of
powers conceptions. With the Glorious Revolution of 1688, power
fundamentally shifted from the Stuart monarchs to Parliament.103 It
was not, however, until the accession of George I, the German-born
Elector of Hanover, that Parliament consolidated this shift into a
stable form of supremacy that lasted most of the eighteenth century.
Displaying far less concern for British policy than his Stuart
predecessors, George I mainly concerned himself with the security of
his principality on the Continent. Government initiative fell to the
King's ministers, who by the early 1720s themselves deferred to the
"prime minister," Robert Walpole.104

101. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
102. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REV
OLUTION 27 (1967) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS]; Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity
Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1598 (1997).
103. Older "Whig" interpretations emphasized the extent to which the Revolution itself
produced this shift. See GEORGE TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688-1689, at
175 (1954). More recent views argue that while the Revolution clearly resulted in a transfer
of real power to Parliament, many issues concerning the boundaries between royal and
parliamentary power remained unresolved. See J.P. KENYON, STUART ENGLAND 262 (1978);
J.G.A. Pocock, Introduction in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 13
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980).
104. See BETTY KEMP, SIR ROBERT WALPOLE 45 (1976) ("In William Ill's reign, the
initiative in policy lay with the King; in Anne's reign it lay with those who could command
her favour; in the 1720s and 1730s, it lay with Walpole."). For a summary of the rise of
Parliamentary supremacy during this era, see Martin Stephen Flaherty, Note, The Empire
Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial Parliamentary Supremacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 612-13, 620-21 (1987).
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The system Walpole devised in essence vested control of the
British government in ministers who could command stable majorities
in Parliament, especially the House of Commons, while retaining the
monarch's favor. Walpole and his ministry could control Parliament in
part because both the Revolution and the new dynasty had settled
many of the divisive issues that had plagued England in the previous
century, but also in part because of the accepted practice of
"corruption," whereby the ministry would grant lucrative government
posts and titles to Members of Parliament in exchange for their
loyalty. Since the appointment of such posts formally remained with
the King - as did other prerogatives and forms of influence Walpole also needed royal approval to keep these majorities in place.
Walpole was able to obtain such approval because the monarch was
generally disengaged and cared mainly that a stable Parliament vote to
approve adequate funds. This mutually reinforcing circle sustained
Walpole and his successors through the reigns of both George I and
his son, George 11.105 Importantly, ministerial initiative extended to
foreign policy, although here two acting secretaries of state - along
with somewhat independent ambassadors and other diplomats played a greater role than the "prime" minister.106 Not until George III
ascended to the throne in 1760 did a more assertive monarch put
pressure on the system.107 By that time, however, the monarchy had
ceded too much power for too long to have any hope of dismantling
the framework that remains in recognizable form to this day.
For present purposes, what matters here is that the ministerial
approach that Walpole pioneered bears little relation to the royal
executive touted by Vesting Clause advocates. In separation of powers
terms, functional executive power, especially the authority to
determine both domestic and foreign policy, lay less with the monarch
than with a collection of legislators in Parliament who principally
comprised the ministry. Real executive and legislative power, in other
words, was concentrated in Parliament. Certain contemporaries,
moreover, recognized this state of affairs and decried it, mainly in

105. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 24-32 (1968)
[hereinafter BAILYN, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PoLmcs] ; BETIY KEMP, KING AND
COMMONS 1660-1832, at 85-103, 1 13-30 (1957); KEMP, supra note 104, at 3-9, 72-80; J.H.
PLUMB, ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 60-73 (1992) (1950). See also RAKOVE,
supra note 51, at 209-11 (1996) (summarizing British practice). For a classic account of
Walpole's life as "prime minister," see 2 J.H. PLUMB, SIR ROBERT WALPOLE: THE KING'S
MINISTER (1960).
106. See JEREMY A. BLACK, A SYSTEM OF AMBmON? BRmSH FOREIGN POLICY 16601783, at 12-21, 32-79, 175-282 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter BLACK, SYSTEM OF AMBITION?] ;
JEREMY A BLACK, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE 49-89 (1985).
107. See BLACK, SYSTEM OF AMBITION?, supra note 106, at 41-42, 234-54; KEMP, supra
note 104, at 124; H.M. SCOTT, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 10-28 (1990).
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mixed government terms. "Real" or "Old" Whigs, among others,
blasted the "robinocracy" of Walpole as a perversion under which
certain ministerial oligarchs employed corruption behind the
monarch's back to pervert the democracy in Parliament.108 As many
leading historians have pointed out, this literature was especially
influential to Americans who came to resist and then rebel again
Parliament's encroachments on the colonies after 1764. 109 This
resistance, however, was against the perceived corruption of the
legislative process, not the shift away from the royal executive. 110 In
sum, the reality of the ministerial system, as well as the principal
critique of it, make it even more unlikely that the Founders would
have settled upon a single, widely held conception of executive power,
especially one illustrated by a common understanding of the British
monarchy.
In addition to the writings of domestic legal theorists, the Founders
were familiar with the writings of prominent international law
publicists. These writings can be more briefly described because of
their relative silence on the relevant issue. To the extent that
European thinkers influenced the Founders, historians and legal
scholars commonly reference Grotius, Vattel, B urlamaqui, and
Puffendorf as comparable to Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu.111
On the relationship between the executive and foreign affairs,
however, these writers had little to say. Instead, they generally
distinguished between domestic law and the law of nations, declared
that they would do no more than note the many different ways nations
arranged their legal orders, including who conducted foreign affairs,
and that they would devote their attention to international law.
Foreign affairs powers, under their analysis, were simply linked
generically to the "sovereigns" or "rulers" - that is, to the particular
108. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 47-54; BAILYN, ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 32-52; WOOD, supra note 68, at 10-17. The still
standard general account of English opposition literature is CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION,
DEVELOPMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE
RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES (1959).
109. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 52-58; BAILYN, ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 34-47; WOOD, supra note 68, at 14-18.
110. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 45-52; BAILYN, ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 94-143; WOOD, supra note 68, at 1 8-43.
1 11. See J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW (Thomas
Nugent trans., 2d ed. 1763) (1752); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES
(Francis Kelsey trans., 1925) (photo reprint 1964) (1646); SAMUEL PUFFENDORF, DE JURE
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (photo. reprint 1934) (1688); EMMERICH DE VATTEL,
LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE
ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916)
(1758); see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 27 ( In pamphlet after
pamphlet the American writers cited . . . Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the
laws of nature and of nations, and on the principles of civil government.").
"
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governments of the individual nations.1 12 With respect to the power to
conduct war, for example, Vattel notes that:
[A]s the various rights constituting that power, which ultimately resides
in the body of the Nation, can be separated or limited, according to the
will of the Nation, it is in the individual constitution of each State that we
must look to find where is located the authority to make war in the name
of the State. 113

By itself, this agnosticism about domestic constitutional
arrangements simply means that these international law publicists
offer no support for the executive foreign affairs power thesis. In a
larger context, however, this silence may work to undermine the
thesis. These writers centrally concerned themselves with how
governments should interact with one another in international affairs.
If there existed a consensus that the domestic executive by definition
had to conduct foreign affairs, one would expect some mention of this
assumption, especially given the eighteenth-century tendency to
attribute decisiveness to the executive and deliberation to the
legislature. This expectation, however, goes unfulfilled, which in turn
calls into question the idea that an executive foreign affairs baseline in
fact existed.
B.

State Constitutional Experience

In seeking guidance when drafting and debating the Constitution,
the Founders looked most directly to the experience of the state
governments during the revolutionary and "critical" periods. 1 14 As
Professor Rakove has explained, " [t]he states had served, in effect, as
the great political laboratory upon whose experiments the framers of
1787 drew to revise the theory of republican government. "115 Thus,
" [c]onscious as they were of the fate of other republics and
confederacies, ancient and modern, the lessons of the past that [the

1 12. See, e.g. , VATIEL, supra note 1 1 1 , at 69, 160, 235, 393. But see Prakash & Ramsey,
supra note 14, at 269-71 (suggesting that the publicists assigned foreign affairs powers to the
executive branch of governments).
113. VATIEL, supra note 1 1 1 , at 235-36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1 14. The term "critical period" was used by John Quincy Adams in a commencement
address at Harvard College in 1787, in which he spoke of "this critical period" in which the
nation was "groaning under the intolerable burden of accumulated evils." ROBERT A. EAST,
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE CRITICAL YEARS, 1785-1794, at 85 (1962) (quoting Adams); see
also WOOD, supra note 68, at 393 (discussing use of the term). The term has come to refer to
the period in the 1780s between the revolutionary war and the ratification of the
Constitution. See, e.g. , JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 178389 (1898).
1 15. RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 31.
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framers] weighed most heavily were drawn from their own
experience. " 1 16
Advocates of the Vesting Clause Thesis suggest that in designing
the state constitutions Americans simply applied the wisdom of
European j urists and thinkers without significant modification.
Prakash and Ramsey, for example, while conceding the need for
further research, "presume that the ordinary understanding of
executive power established by Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone
should be used to construe the analogous phrases in [the first] state
constitutions" framed after independence. 1 17 As we have shown,
executive-power essentialists have painted too simplistic a picture of
the relevant eighteenth-century political, constitutional, and legal
thought. But even were this portrait accurate, the essentialist account
errs more dramatically in its presumption that America's
constitutional practitioners mechanically applied European political
and legal theory.
As an initial matter, the essentialist story of continuity and
consensus is historically counterintuitive. Historians, in contrast to
lawyers, assume change over time. 1 1 8 This is especially true over
extended periods characterized by upheaval, such as revolution and
nation-building. A thoroughly-worked-out framework of executive
power over foreign affairs that endured nearly unaltered for over a
century, and survived periods of radical political change, may be
possible, but it is hardly probable. More specifically, the essentialist
thesis stands at odds with the prevailing professional narrative about
the period, which stresses discontinuity and ferment. At the very least,
there should be a presumption in favor of such a prevailing narrative.
With sufficient historical evidence, such a presumption can of course
be rebutted. For various reasons, however, legal scholars rarely have

1 16. Id. at 21; see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 290 (expanded ed. 2001) ("The state constitutions' profound
influence on the drafting of the federal Constitution and the ratification debates was taken
for granted by contemporaries."); Donald S. Lutz, The First American Constitutions, in THE
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 70 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J.
Mahoney eds., 1987) ("By the summer of 1787, the framers of our national constitution,
many of whom had helped write state constitutions, could draw upon a rich experience in the
design of institutions and the practical effects of these institutions.").
117. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278-79 n.209. Somewhat surprisingly for an
exhaustive historical account, Prakash and Ramsey devote only one long footnote to the
early state constitutions, even though these constitutions were the initial focus of
constitutional thought in the United States, and even though they touched upon matters
relating to foreign affairs, such as embargoes and control of the military.
1 18. See BERNARD BAILYN, ON THE TEACHING AND WRITING OF HISTORY 50-51
(1994).
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the time or resources to overturn the prevailing historical
understanding.119
Unlike proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis, the leading
historians of the period have emphasized the dramatic discontinuity
and conflict in American constitutional thinking, as the British Empire
gave way to independent state frameworks j oined under the Articles
of Confederation, which in tum gave way to the Constitution of the
United States. This story conventionally begins with the English
"Whig" or "mixed" Constitution that the colonists paradoxically
internalized and venerated even as they resisted Britain's attempts to
establish its imperial authority over them. Within a decade, resistance
led to independence, which forced the King's former subjects to
experiment with radically different, "republican" constitutions on the
state level, and the sui generis Articles of Confederation at the
national level. Perceived democratic excess at home and weakness
abroad led to a reform movement that reflected a fundamental
reevaluation of several first principles. This rethinking led to what
Gordon Wood has famously characterized as a new "American
science of politics,"120 the chief legacy of which was the Federal
Constitution. With the shift from the English mixed Constitution, to
the republican state constitutions, to the United States Constitution,
there has rarely in constitutional history been such a degree of
transformation or innovation in such a concentrated period.121
The most relevant break with received constitutional wisdom
followed closely upon independence, as the mixed government

1 19. One of us has developed these themes at length. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1745-55 (1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Most
Dangerous Branch]; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern A merican
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 551-54 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History
"Lite"]. See also Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing credible use of constitutional
history with regard to recent foreign affairs scholarship).
120. WOOD, supra note 68, at 593.
121. This account has emerged in a series of now classic studies written after World War
II. Any list of essentials would include, in rough order of the periods covered: J.G.A
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note
102; JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRmSH EMPIRE AND UNITED STATES, 1607-1788 (1986);
EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION (1953); 1-4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986-93); ADAMS, supra note 116; WOOD, supra note 68;
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1985). Also useful is a recent and somewhat revisionist account by Marc
Kruman, who argues, among other things, that the new "American science of politics" had
emerged as early as the first state constitutions, rather than with the Federal Constitution.
See MARC w. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997). For a historiographical overview, see
Flaherty, History "Lite", supra note 119, at 535-49.
.
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conception gave way to an emphasis on republicanism. This shift
reflected a belief that legislatures were the primary guardians of
liberty, and it involved both an outright rejection of royal prerogative
powers as a model for republican executives and a suspicion of chief
magistrates more generally.122 As Edward Corwin has explained, "The
colonial period ended with the belief prevalent that 'the executive
magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural
friend of liberty, a sentiment strengthened by the contemporary
spectacle of George Ill's domination of Parliament."123
This distrust of executive authority was evident in the writings of
leading revolutionary thinkers. The executive, John Adams wrote in
his influential essay Thoughts on Government, must be "stripped of
most of those badges of domination called prerogatives." 124 In a
similar vein, Thomas Jefferson, in his 1783 "Draft of a Fundamental
Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia," emphasized that
"[b]y Executive powers,"
we mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former
government by the crown as of it's prerogative; nor that these shall be
the standard of what may or may not be deemed the rightful powers of
the Governor. We give him those powers only which are necessary to
carry into execution the laws, and which are not in their nature [either
legislative or] Judiciary . 1 25

Jefferson, moreover, expressly extended this thinking to foreign
affairs. His draft constitution delegated the usual array of external
powers - that is, " of declaring war and concluding peace, of con
tracting alliances, of issuing letters of marque and reprisal, of raising
or introducing armed forces" - to the Continental Congress.126 Where
the Congress did not exercise these powers, they were to be exercised
by the governor "under the regulation of such laws as the legislature
may think it expedient to pass."127 The royal prerogative, it was clear,
would no longer serve as the benchmark for executive power.
The state constitutions drafted in the wake of independence
reflected this shift in thinking. By 1777, ten of the thirteen states, as
well as Vermont, had adopted new constitutions. As Allan Nevins
notes, this "was the first time in the world's history that a large group

122. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1796, at
27 (1922).
123. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 5-6.
124. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS 65, 89 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979).
125. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 294, 298-99 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952).
126. 6 id. at 299.
127. 6 id.
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of communities had begun the formation of their own governments
under written constitutions." 128 Thereafter the states' constitutional
creativity slowed, but did not cease. In a second, more prolonged spate
of constitution-making, Massachusetts drafted its first state
constitution, while South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Vermont
each adopted a second or revised constitution. By the opening of the
Federal Convention, fifteen state constitutions had been drafted.
In drafting the state constitutions, Americans rejected the English
mixed government model, and instead embraced republican
government as the leading alternative that classical theory had to
offer. In purest form this would mean concentrating governmental
authority in a single deliberative assembly that would remain
accountable to the people, and so protect their liberty, by insuring that
it would be as representative and responsive as practicable. At least
two early constitutions, Pennsylvania and Vermont, came close to this
ideal, and nearly all of the early republican frameworks would
approach it in some degree.129 Yet even at this early stage, other
considerations directed Americans away from republicanism in its
most simple form. In particular, one additional consequence of mixed
government passing from the scene was that separation of powers
analysis could come out of its shadow and provide what would become
a complementary framework for allocating governmental authority.
Four of the initial state constitutions contained express separation of
powers clauses, with three following suit several years later. Typical
was the language of Maryland's 1776 constitution, which declared,
"the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to
be forever and distinct from each other."130
The initial state commitment to separation of powers, however,
was largely rhetorical. The reality of the first state constitutions was a

128. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION,
1775-1789, at 117 (1924).
129. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 83-90, 163. The Pennsylvania and Vermont
Constitutions were nearly identical. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3081 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE
CONSTITUTIONS]; VT. CONST. OF 1777, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3737.
130. See Mo. CONST. OF 1776, art. VI, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 1686, 1687. In all, eight of the fifteen state constitutions during this period contained
such clauses. The other states were North Carolina, N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. IV, reprinted
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2787; Virginia, VA. CONST. OF 1776, §
5, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3813; Georgia, GA. CONST.
OF 1777, art. I, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 778; and later
Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XXX, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 1888, 1893; New Hampshire, N.H. CONST. OF 1784, art. XXXV II, reprinted in 4
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2457; and the second Vermont constitution,
VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. II, art. VI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
3749, 3755.
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concentration of extensive authority in the legislatures, in keeping
with the republican ideal. Echoing a chorus of authorities, Willi Paul
Adams has observed that after 1776 the state assemblies "became the
most powerful political institutions in the states. . . . In the
metaphorical language of the day, the legislature was 'the soul, the
source of life and movement' in the body of the state."131 Thus, for
example, many of the first state assemblies could appoint judges,132
and had either express or implicit power to alter their constitutions. 133
The corollary of supreme legislatures was subordinate executives.
As an initial matter, the state constitutions were united in rejecting the
royal model. Two states, Virginia and Maryland, expressly rejected
prerogative powers as the template for their executives, declaring that
the governor in exercising executive powers "shall not, under any
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law,
statute, or custom of England or Great Britain."134 Even when left
unstated, a similar repudiation was plain nearly everywhere else. Thus,
for example, the Pennsylvania constitution created a plural rather than
unitary executive, and New Hampshire's 1776 constitution omitted an

131. ADAMS, supra note 1 16, at 229 (quoting The American Whig, No. III, PROVIDENCE
GAZETTE, April 3, 1779, at 1); see also, e.g. , Lutz, supra note 1 16, at 75 ("The executive was
invariably quite weak [under the early state constitutions) and a creature of the
legislature.").
132. Four of the relevant state constitutions vested the appointment of the judges in the
legislature. See N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XIII, XXXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791, 2793; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XIX, XX,
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3246; VA. CONST. OF 1776,
para. 35, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817. New York
vested judicial appointments in a special council chosen by the assembly in which the
governor had one vote. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2633. In Georgia, intermediate appointments were
vested in the governor, with appointments generally being left to whatever process the
legislature would establish by law. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXI, reprinted in 2 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781.
133. Two constitutions expressly allowed the legislature to enact amendments. See DEL.
CONST. OF 1776, art. 30, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 568
(providing for constitutional amendment by legislative supermajorities); MD. CONST. OF
1776, art. LIX, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1701
(requiring intervening election prior to legislative amendments going into effect). In other
states, the constitution technically amounted to no more than a statute. See N.J. CONST. OF
1776, pmbl., reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2595; S.C.
CONST. OF 1778, pmbl., reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3248;
S.C. CONST. OF 1776, pmbl., reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241,
3243; VA. CONST. OF 1776, pmbl., reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
3812, 3814. Among the defects of the Virginia Constitution, Jefferson famously included the
fact "that the ordinary legislature may alter the constitution itself." Thomas Jefferson, Notes
on the State of Virginia, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85, 225 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., 1894).
134. See MO. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIll, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 1686, 1696; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 3812, 3816-17.
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executive altogether.135 Furthermore, aside from New York, each of
the twelve constitutions that did provide for a single governor or chief
executive further made provision for some sort of executive or privy
council. In contrast to the English Privy Council, however, these
bodies were selected by the legislature as an independent check, and
were thus accorded the express power to advise, or (in several states)
make decisions with, the chief executive.136 Perhaps most striking, the
new republican governors could not exercise a veto, and could not
adjourn or prorogue the legislature as could their royal
predecessors.137
135. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 3081, 3084; N.H. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
2451; see also NEVINS, supra note 128, at 166 (describing the "subordination of the executive
branch to the legislature" in the state constitutions).
136. In Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, the councils in certain matters had the
power of consent; in the other states the power of the councils was advisory. See DEL.
CONST. OF 1776, arts. 8-9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 56364; GA. CONST. OF 1777, arts. II, XIX-XXV, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 777, 778-81; MD. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XXVI, XXXIIl-XXXIX, reprinted in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1695-97; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch.
II, § I, arts. III, IV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1900-01;
id. at pt. II, ch. II, § 3, arts. I-IV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
1888, 1904-05; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 2453, 2463-66; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV, reprinted in 5 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. V, VIII-IX,
XXXl-XXXII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3249, 3255;
S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. V, XII-XIV, XXV,. reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 3241, 3244, 3246-47; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 31, reprinted in 7 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817.
137. Under nine of the state constitutions adopted during this period, the governor had
no power to prorogue, dissolve, or adjourn, and seven of the constitutions lacked any
provision for a veto. The first South Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided for a veto but
did not provide for a power to prorogue, dissolve, or adjourn; the New York constitution
allowed the other powers, but lacked a genuine gubernatorial veto, instead creating a council
of revision, of which the governor was a part, which could veto legislation subject to an
override by two-thirds of each house of the legislature. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 10,
reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 564; GA. CONST. OF 1777, art.
XIX-XX, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781; MD. CONST. OF
1776, art. XXXIll, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1697; N.Y.
CONST. OF 1777, arts III, XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
2623, 2628-29, 2632-33; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XVIII-XX, reprinted in 5 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791-92; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. XVI-XVII,
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3252-53; S.C. CONST. OF 1776,
arts. VII-VIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3244; VA.
CONST. OF 1776, para. 30, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812,
3817; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, § XIV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 3737, 3744. The second Vermont Constitution provided for a provisional veto that
put a bill over to the next session. See Vt. CONST. OF 1786, ch. 2, § XVI, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3757. Pennsylvania, which had a plural executive
council with a nominal president instead of a true governor, likewise made no provision for
the executive council to prorogue, dissolve, adjourn, or veto. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3087-88. See also BAILYN,
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 66-70 (contrasting the power of royal and
republican governors); KRUMAN, supra note 121, at 123-26 (arguing that both the legacy of
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The republican state executive also lost out with regard to
government appointments, a process that the legislatures dominated.
Indeed, no governor had the exclusive power to appoint either judges
or certain officials that today would be termed executive, such as the
secretary of state, the comptroller, and military officers. In a number
of states the power to make such appointments was vested exclusively
in the legislatureY8 Moreover, in most of the constitutions adopted in
the first wave of state constitution-making, the election of the
governor himself was assigned to the legislature rather than to the
electorate.139
prerogative power as well as "the framers' sense of a functional separation of powers"
contributed to a denial of the veto power to the new republican governors); WOOD, supra
note 68, at 141 ("Even among those who desired a stronger magistrate than most, it seemed
abominable that a single person should have a negative over the voice of the whole
society.").

138. Delaware illustrated several approaches at once in providing that the chief
executive could appoint judges jointly with the Assembly, see DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 12,
reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 564-65; and could appoint civil
officers unless otherwise directed by the Assembly, see art. 16, 1 id. at 565; yet mandating
that the Assembly itself appoint all military officers, see 1 id. Several states emphasized the
council as a check, with Maryland subjecting the governor's appointments to council
approval, see MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XLVIII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 1686, 1699; and Vermont vesting the power in the chief executive and council
jointly, see VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. II, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 3737, 3745. Somewhat surprisingly, New York placed most appointments
in a council of appointment, a body in which the governor had only one vote, and vested
selection of the state treasurer in the Assembly. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2633-34. A number of states
went still further and vested either all, or at least significant, j udicial, civil, and military
appointments in the legislature. See, e.g. , VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 13, reprinted in 7 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817 (vesting appointment of Supreme Court,
Chancery, and Admiralty judges, as well as the Attorney General, in the Assembly).
139. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 562, 563; GA . CONST. OF 1 777, arts. II, XIII, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 777, 778-781; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1695; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 5
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XV,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; S.C. CONST. OF 1778,
art. III, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3249; S.C. CONST. OF
1776, art. III, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3243; VA.
CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812,
3817. The two exceptions were Vermont, which provided for public election of the governor
to a one-year term, see VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. II, § XVII, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3744; and New York, which provided for public
election of the governor to a three-year term, see N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVII, reprinted
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632. As has widely been noted, the
New York constitution was ahead of its time in terms of separation of powers and executive
authority. In contrast to other constitutions adopted immediately after independence, New
York provided for a substantially more powerful governor through such mechanisms as a
qualified veto, the authority to convene and prorogue the assembly, and the authority to
appoint judges. In its different realization of executive authority, New York anticipated the
"second wave" of reform constitutions such as the Massachusetts and New Hampshire
constitutions, as well as the Federal Constitution. For a discussion of the New York
Constitution in the constitutional development of the period, see Flaherty, Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 1 19, at 1768-70.
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Contrary to what essentialist theory might predict, none of the
constitutions adopted during this period simply granted the "executive
power," or, having done so, proceeded to specify what inherently
executive powers would be shared with the other branches - the
strategy that essentialist scholars attribute to Article II of the federal
Constitution. About half of the early state constitutions did preface
their treatment of the executive branch with some general provision
concerning executive power. 140 Such texts, however, were always
followed by specific grants of powers, such as the power to pardon, the
commander-in-chief power, and the power to appoint civil and
military officials, that would have been superfluous if the general
clause were expected to encompass the universe of executive authority
that modern essentialists assume.141 This pattern indicates that, to the
extent these general executive power provisions conveyed anything,

140 . Four state constitutions expressly employed the term "vest," though in
Pennsylvania and Vermont, the latter of which produced two constitutions during the period
under consideration, the term was applied to a plural executive. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. XVII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632 ("(T]he
supreme executive power and authority of this State shall be vested in a governor."); PA.
CONST. OF 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3084
("The supreme executive power shall be vested in a president and council."); VT. CONST. OF
1786, ch. 2, § 3, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3754 ("The
supreme executive power shall be vested in a Governor (or, in his absence, a Lieutenant
Governor) and Council."); VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, § 3, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3743 ("The supreme executive power shall be
vested in a Governor and Council."). Five other state constitutions arguably employed the
equivalent of vesting language with such formulations as the governor, chief magistrate, or
president "shall exercise" or "have" executive power, or "shall execute" the laws. See GA.
CONST. OF 1777, art. XIX, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781
("The governor shall, with the advice of the executive council, exercise the executive powers
of government, according to the laws of this State and the constitution thereof . . . . "); N.J.
CONST. OF 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594,
2596 ("(T]he Governor, or in his absence, the Vice-President of the Council, shall have the
supreme executive power . . . . "); S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3250 ("(T]he executive authority be vested in the
governor and commander-in-chief, in the manner herein mentioned."); S.C. CONST. OF 1776,
art. XXX, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247 ("(T]he
executive authority be vested in the president and commander-in-chief, limited and
restrained as aforesaid."); VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3816 ("A Governor, or chief magistrate . . . shall,
with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of government according
to the laws of this Commonwealth.").
141 . See GA. CONST. OF 1777, arts. XIX, XX-XXII, reprinted in 2 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781 ; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, arts. VIII, XIX, reprinted
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, arts. VII
XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632-33; PA. CONST. OF
1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3087-88; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, arts. XVIII, XXIX-XXXIII, XXXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 3248, 3254-55; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XXII-XXVI, reprinted in 6
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3246-67; VT. CONST. OF 1786 art. XI,
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777,
art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745; VA. CONST.
OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3816-17.
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they conveyed no more than a general power of implementing and
enforcing the laws.
The other state constitutions dealt with executive authority in even
more guarded fashion. Two constitutions, in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, simply set up a governor or equivalent, listed discrete
powers, and refrained from any general language suggesting further
grants of authority.142 Several others set forth a detailed list of discrete
executive powers, followed by a catch-all phrase declaring that the
chief magistrate could also exercise "other" executive powers. These
phrases, however, were always qualified with language that made clear
that the exercise of executive authority had to be consistent with the
constitution, the laws, or both.143
Notably, language mandating that executive power accord with the
constitution or laws appeared even in some constitutions that prefaced
their treatment of executive power with the more general provisions.
Virginia, for example, required that executive powers had to be
exercised "according to the laws of this Commonwealth." 144 The
second South Carolina constitution was particularly explicit in this
regard, stating that "the executive authority be vested in the governor
and commander-in-chief, in manner herein mentioned."145
The prevailing state approach, therefore, may be summarized as
follows. In no instance did a state constitution list executive powers
simply for the purpose of specifying exceptions to some general grant
of authority. Instead, the early state constitutions adopted an array of
strategies with respect to executive power, which in and of itself
should give pause to anyone who would make ready generalizations
about what the Founding generation thought as a whole on the nature
of executive power. Common to all approaches, however, was an
emphasis on specific delegations of authority. General language was
used to delegate only the power to implement the laws, and in any
case was invariably followed with additional grants of ostensibly
executive powers, and often was further limited with language
142 See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 1888, 1899-1903; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2462-65.
143. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 562, 563 (subjecting the exercise of executive power to the constitution and laws);
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
1686, 1696 (subjecting the exercise of executive power to the laws); N.C. CONST. OF 1776,
art. XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791-92 (subjecting
executive power to constitution and laws).
144. VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 3812, 3816.
145. S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 3248, 3250 (emphasis added). See also S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 6
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247 (granting executive authority "limited
and restrained as aforesaid").
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requiring the exercise of executive authority to accord with the state
constitution, laws, or both. In short, nothing in the state constitutions
indicates that American constitutionmakers sought to vest executive
officials with broad powers that were not otherwise specified.146
This pattern - strong legislatures and limited and defined execu
tive powers - extended to foreign affairs. Contrary to popular per
ception,147 the first state constitutions necessarily addressed external
powers, in part because they were drafted amidst the uncertainties of
war and in part because the national government lacked an operative
written framework until the Articles of Confederation were rati
fied in 1781. 148 Accordingly, all fifteen of the constitutions under
consideration addressed the militia,149 and ten specified additional
146. In contrast to his article written with Professor Ramsey, Professor Prakash's
subsequent study on executive power does examine the early state constitutions in some
detail and comes to conclusions similar to our own concerning the dominance of the
legislatures. As he puts it:
[M]ost states adopted constitutions that, although they paid lip service to the separation
adage, nonetheless made their executive powers appendages of the legislature. With notable
exceptions, executives were appointed by the legislature, faced term limits, could not
appoint executive officers, and lacked the veto authority. To top it off, the few constitutional
powers they did enjoy were often subject to legislative alteration.
Prakash, supra note 26, at 756-57. Professor Prakash goes on to argue, however, that the
weak executives that characterized the state constitutions became a sort of anti-template
that ignored the wisdom of Montesquieu, wisdom that was rediscovered by the time of the
Federal Convention. See id. at 768-79. As noted above, see supra note 27, we do not
necessarily disagree with Professor Prakash that the term "executive power" might have
been understood by the Founders to refer generically to the authority to implement the laws.
We disagree with Professor Prakash's suggestion, however, of a settled and specific
understanding of executive power, and we particularly disagree with the claim by Professors
Prakash and Ramsey that such a settled and specific understanding extended to foreign
affairs.
147. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278-79 n.209 ("For the most part,
state constitutions said little specific about foreign affairs.").
148. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF
(1987).

THE

UNION, 1781-1789, at 80-91

149. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 562, 563; GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 777, 782; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art.
VIII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1901; N.H. CONST. OF
1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2463-64; N.H.
CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 245 1 , 2453; N.J.
CONST. OF 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594,
2596; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 2623, 2632-33; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted in 5
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXIII,
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776,
art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST.
OF 1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756;
VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 3737, 3745; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 33, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 3812, 3817.
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powers concerning external relations such as the power to lay
embargoes.150 To the extent that the executives were granted foreign
affairs powers, those powers were often shared with the advisory
council or the legislature. Both the 1776 and 1778 South Carolina
constitutions, for example, prohibited the governor from commencing
war, concluding peace, or entering into treaties without the consent
of the legislature. 151 Furthermore, although the state constitutions
typically made the executive the commander in chief of the state's
armed forces, a number of the constitutions required approval of the
executive council, or even the legislature, to exercise the commander
in-chief power, even to the point of restricting the governor's ability to
assume command in person.152 In addition, the states typically either
made the appointment of military officers subject to legislative
approval, or mandated that the legislature alone make military
appointments, or otherwise placed appointment outside the
governor's control, as in election of officers by militia companies
themselves.153
150. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 562, 564; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. X, reprinted in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. 2, reprinted
in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2463-64; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art.
XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; PA. CONST. OF
1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts.
XXXIII, XXXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C.
CONST. OF 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241,
3247; VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745.
151. See S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247.
152. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 562, 563; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. VIII, reprinted in
3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1901; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 121, at 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art.
XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST. OF
1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT.
CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
3737, 3745. Although the North Carolina and Virginia constitutions did not expressly subject
aspects of the commander-in-chief power to the consent of the legislature or council, the
North Carolina constitution provided that the governor could "embody," or call up, the
militia only during the recess of the legislature, see N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVIII,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791, while the Virginia
constitution stated that the governor would have the power to direct the militia "according
to the laws of the country," VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 34, reprinted in 7 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817.
153. Five state constitutions expressly lodged the appointment of either high-ranking or
all military officers in the legislature. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 16, reprinted in 1 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 565; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, art. X,
reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1776
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Significantly, these examples of ongoing supervision of the
executive appeared in later constitutions that were adopted during the
1780s. Not long after independence, leading observers came to
conclude that the nation's first experiments in framing government
were flawed. Rethinking separation of powers would prove to be a
prominent feature of constitutional reform. Fundamental among the
insights that experience under the state constitutions suggested was
the sobering possibility that the people could tyrannize themselves.
Where classical theory indicated that republican government typically
descended into anarchy, in effect too much liberty, state laws
infringing rights of property, contract, and trial by jury appeared to
demonstrate that concentrating power in the legislatures had instead
resulted in the oxymoron that John Adams famously dubbed
"democratic despotism."154 Madison also referred to this phenomenon
during the debates in the Federal Convention, when he noted that,
"Experience has proved a tendency in our governments to throw all
power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in

reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2451 , 2453; N.J. CONST. OF 1776,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776,
art. XIV, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,' at 2787, 2791. In addition,
both South Carolina constitutions, as well as the Virginia constitution, while initially vesting
military appointments elsewhere, indicated that the legislature could alter the procedures
regarding the military and presumably accord the appointment power to itself. See S.C.
CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248,
3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 3241, 3247; VA. CONST. OF 1776, paras. 33-34, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 3812, 3817. Seven constitutions placed the authority to appoint either all or high
ranking military officers in the governor, subject to the approval of the executive council. See
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XL VII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
1686, 1699; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 2453, 2464-65; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 3081, 3087; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in
6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. II, art. XI,
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch.
II, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745. Four
constitutions specified that the appointment of inferior officers would rest with their
individual companies. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, art. X, reprinted in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2464-65; N.H. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in
4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2451, 2453; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. X,
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596. The New York
constitution vested appointments generally in the governor and a council constituted for that
purpose. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 2623, 2633. The Georgia constitution provided that the governor, with the advice
of the council, would fill all intermediate appointments until the next general election, at
least implying that the ultimate authority to determine appointment procedures rested with
the legislature. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXI, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 129, at 777, 781. No state constitution expressly vested the appointment of
military officers in the governor alone.
154. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 404.
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general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent."155 This
discovery that the people could tyrannize themselves, and the ensuing
return to the constitutional drawing board, remain perhaps the central
episodes in the narrative that constitutional historians have
reconstructed over the past several generations. 156
In response to these perceived abuses by the legislatures, some
states moved to make the executive more independent of the
legislature. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for example, made
the governor subject to popular election and gave him, along with an
advice council, powers of appointment and a veto power over
legislation subject to an override by two-thirds of each house of the
legislature. 157 His specific, substantive powers, however, were still
limited and defined. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution
goes into great detail about what exactly the governor's commander
in-chief power entails, stating, for example, that the governor would
have the power "to take and surprise, by all ways and means
whatsoever, all and every such person or persons, with their ships,
arms, ammunition, and other goods, as shall, in a hostile manner,
invade, or attempt the invading, conquering, or annoying this
commonwealth." 158 It also states that the governor's specifically
enumerated commander-in-chief powers had to be "exercised
agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws
of the land, and not otherwise."159 So, even here, the legislature was
given significant, and ultimately controlling, authority. The
Massachusetts Constitution also gave the legislature power to make
significant appointments, including appointment of various military
officials.160
In sum, the state constitutions reflected a sharp break from the
royal prerogative model of executive power, even with respect to
foreign affairs. As the Critical Period progressed, some states moved
to enhance the independence and authority of the executive branch,
155. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 35.
156. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 237-62 (1988); MCDONALD, supra note 121, at
143-83; WOOD, supra note 68, at 391-467; Rakove, supra note 65, at 35-56.
157. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 11, ch. II, § I, arts. II-III, reprinted in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1900 (making governor subject to popular
election); id. at pt. II, ch. I, § I, art. II, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,
at 1888, 1893 (giving governor veto power); id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I, arts. IX-X, reprinted in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902 (giving governor appointment power).
158. See id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. VII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 1888, 1901.
159. Id.
160. See id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I , art. X, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
129, at 1888, 1902; id. at pt. II, ch. II, § IV, art. I, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 129, at 1888, 1905.
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but they did so in order to provide a check on the legislature, not
because of some essentialist conception of executive power.
Moreover, the actual allocation of executive power remained specific
and functional rather than categorical and essentialist.
C.

L essons from the Continental Congress

The experience at the national level during this period further
contradicts the story of continuity posited by executive power
essentialists. The Continental Congress, made up of delegates from
the colonies, first met in September 1774 to discuss and seek redress of
American grievances against the British. Fighting subsequently broke
out between American and British forces at Lexington and Concord in
April 1775, and a second Continental Congress met the next month.
At that point, Congress began to manage American foreign affairs,
including, most notably, the conduct of the revolutionary war.161
For its first seven years, Congress operated without a ratified
constitutive document. To justify the separation of the thirteen states
from England, Congress did of course issue the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration observed that, with their separation,
the states had "full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances, establish Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do."162 The Declaration did not
tie these foreign relations powers to any particular governmental
structure, and it certainly did not suggest that these powers inherently
had to be exercised by an executive branch. Nor, as explained above,
did the state constitutions being developed at this point reflect an
understanding that foreign affairs powers had to be assigned to the
executive.
Congress agreed on the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union in 1777, but the Articles did not take effect until 1781, after
they had been ratified by all the states. There is nothing in Congress's
experience, either before or after the adoption of the Articles, that
suggests an understanding that foreign affairs powers had to be vested
in an executive branch. As an initial matter, it is worth noting the
obvious: the national government did not have an executive branch
prior to the Constitution, and thus exercised its foreign affairs powers
through Congress. Furthermore, under the Articles, the exercise of
161. See generally EDMUND CODY BURNETI, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1941);
JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 206-23 (1987); PETER S. 0NUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787 (1983);
JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1 774-1789, at 38-49 (1935).
162. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 429, 432 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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many important foreign affairs powers, including going to war,
entering into treaties, and appointing military commanders, required
the concurrence of at least nine of the thirteen states, and the
appointment of state representatives in Congress was determined by
the state legislatures.163 Furthermore, during this period, a number of
states engaged in their own foreign affairs activities, frequently
through their legislatures.164 These facts, by themselves, would seem to
substantially undermine the claim that foreign affairs powers were
viewed as inherently associated with an executive.
The Continental Congress did handle many foreign affairs issues
through committees, and subsequently through departments. For
example, in November 1775, Congress established a Committee of
Correspondence to communicate with and seek support from
sympathizers in Europe. This committee was eventually succeeded by
a more general Committee for Foreign Affairs. These committees,
however, reported back to the full Congress and were subject to
Congress's direction and control. 165 In the early 1780s, Congress
moved to establish departments, including a Department of Foreign
Affairs, that would be headed by a single secretary. The heads of these
departments, however, were appointed by and controlled by Congress.
As John Jay noted when he was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, "I am
to be governed by the Instructions, and it is my Duty faithfully to
execute the Orders of Congress. " 166 Moreover, the duties of the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs were largely ministerial, and "all matters
of great importance were referred to Congress."167 Furthermore, the
justifications Congress gave for creating the foreign affairs department
were purely functional rather than essentialist. In particular, a
congressional committee determined that "a fixed and permanent
Office for the department of foreign affairs ought forthwith to be
established as a remedy against the fluctuation, the delay and
163. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para.

l; id.

at art. IX, para. 6.

164. See, e.g. , NEVINS, supra note 128, at 658-60; Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the
American Revolution: An Historical Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907). We take no
position here on whether the national government's foreign relations powers were originally
derived from the states, a matter of significant historical debate. See GREENE, supra note
121, at 178-80 (discussing this debate).
165. See, e.g. , SANDERS, supra note 161, at 40-41, 45-46.
166. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (Aug. 3, 1786), in 3 THE
EMERGING NATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1780-1789, at 247, 255 (Mary
A. Giunta et al. eds., 1996).
167 . SANDERS, supra note 161, at 1 14; see also 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE CREATION OF A
REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 55 (1993) (noting that Congress kept the Department
"on a very short leash"); ELMER PLISCHKE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 11 (1999)
(explaining that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was "regarded as little more than a
congressional clerk").
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indecision to which the present mode of managing our foreign affairs
must be exposed."168 There is no hint of executive power essentialism
in this reasoning.
The list of powers in the Articles of Confederation is also
revealing. Like the later Constitution, the Articles assigned specific
foreign affairs powers to the national government, and expressly
prohibited the states from engaging in specified foreign affairs
activities. Thus, for example, the national government was assigned
the powers of "determining on peace and war," sending and re
ceiving ambassadors, and entering into treaties.169 The states were,
correspondingly, prohibited from entering into treaties, sending and
receiving ambassadors, and engaging in war, unless they obtained
Congress's consent.170 The Articles never used the word "executive" to
refer to foreign affairs powers, and they certainly did not use that
word as a shorthand for an unspecified package of foreign affairs
powers. Instead, they listed and defined the foreign affairs powers of
the Continental Congress with great specificity. Prakash and Ramsey
seek to explain away this feature of the Articles by suggesting that
"the drafters of the Articles did not employ the most economical
phrasing." 171 The phrasing of the Articles, however, is perfectly
economical with respect to the assignment of foreign affairs powers,
once one rejects the Vesting Clause Thesis. Furthermore, it is
important to note that essentially all of the foreign affairs powers
referred to in the Articles are also referred to in the Constitution.172
That the Constitution specifically carries forward the foreign affairs
powers listed in the Articles of Confederation (and, in fact, adds to
them), further undercuts the assertion that the Founders would have
perceived some undefined package of foreign affairs powers that had
to be encompassed by the Article II Vesting Clause.173 In fact, James

168. Congressional Committee Report and Resolution (Jan. 10, 1781), in 1 THE
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 139, 140.
169. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
170. Id. at art. VI.
171. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 275 n.191.
172 . Unlike the Articles of Confederation, however, the Constitution does not
specifically refer to a power of "determining on peace." The lack of such a specific reference
became an issue in the Neutrality Controversy of 1793, discussed below in Part IV.E.
173. Prakash and Ramsey could be read to suggest that the Continental Congress was
granted unspecified executive powers by virtue of Article IX, paragraph 5, of the Articles of
Confederation, which provided that Congress would have the power to "appoint such other
committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the
united states under their direction." See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 275 & n.191.
This appointment power, however, did not by its terms suggest any additional substantive
powers, and we know of no support during the Critical Period for construing it as granting
such powers. Furthermore, the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states
"every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States," thereby making clear that the Articles were not delegating unspecified
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Madison made clear in the Federalist Papers that, other than adding
the commerce power, the Constitution "does not enlarge" the foreign
affairs powers listed in the Articles of Confederation, but rather
simply "substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them."174
Prakash and Ramsey note correctly, although vaguely, that the
national government had difficulty managing foreign affairs under
the Articles.175 The Federalist Papers begin, in fact, by noting the
"inefficacy of the subsisting federal government,"176 and it is clear from
subsequent essays that Publius had foreign affairs concerns
prominently in mind. Similarly, early in the Federal Convention,
Edmund Randolph began by listing the defects of the Confederation,
many of which concerned the conduct of foreign affairs. 177 These
defects, suggest Prakash and Ramsey, persuaded the Founders to
incorporate the purported Locke/Blackstone/Montesquieu conception
of executive power essentialism into the Constitution, through the
Article II Vesting Clause.
The difficulties under the Articles, however, and the efforts by the
constitutional Founders to respond to them, are at best unconnected
to the Vesting Clause Thesis, and at worst substantially in tension with
it. By the time of the Federal Convention, it was perceived that the
Articles were deficient in at least three respects concerning the
management of foreign affairs.178 First, there was no clear indication in
the Articles that treaties operated as supreme law of the land. This
omission, combined with the lack of a national court system, meant
that the national government had difficulty preventing states from
violating treaty provisions, especially the peace treaty with Great

powers. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II (emphasis added); see also
MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 130
(1940) ("[T]he final draft of the Articles of Confederation was a pact between thirteen
sovereign states which agreed to delegate certain powers for specific purposes, while they
retained all powers not expressly delegated by them to the central government.").
174. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 45 (James Madison), at 293.
175. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278.
176. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), at 33.
177. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 19.
1 78. See Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy - The View from 1 787, in FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 2-4 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990);
see also FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (discussing inadequacies in the Articles of
Confederation); PERKINS, supra note 167, at 17-53 (same); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 342-52 (1979) (same). There were other deficiencies in the Articles that did not
directly concern foreign affairs but that nevertheless implicated foreign affairs, such as the
lack of a power to regulate directly on the people, see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No.
15 (Alexander Hamilton), at 108, and the lack of a taxing power, see id. N o. 30 (Alexander
Hamilton), at 188-91.
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Britain. In turn, Great Britain used the state violations as an excuse
for continuing to occupy its northwestern forts in the United States. It
was in this context that John Jay expressed the view that the states
had, "by express delegation of Power, formed and vested in Congress a
perfect though limited Sovereignty for the general and National pur
poses specified in the [Articles of] Confederation."179 This experience
of state violation of treaty commitments obviously was on the minds of
the constitutional Founders, and they addressed it directly by
including a Supremacy Clause in the Constitution that refers to
treaties, and also by providing for the creation of a national court
system.180 This federalism problem, however, has nothing to do with
the Vesting Clause Thesis.
A second foreign affairs problem under the Articles was that the
Continental Congress had not been given the power to regulate
commerce, including foreign commerce. As a result, it lacked leverage
in negotiating trade concessions from other countries, especially from
Britain and France. Threats by the Continental Congress to restrict
access to U.S. markets were ineffectual, since each state could set its
own foreign trade policy, and at least some states would tend to
deviate from the purported national policy. The constitutional
Founders addressed this problem as well in the Constitution, by
assigning to Congress the power to regulate commerce. 181 This
experience - which showed the need to increase Congress 's foreign
affairs powers - hardly shows that foreign affairs authority inherently
was associated with an executive branch.
The third foreign affairs problem has at least some connection to
the U.S. presidency, but it too is unsupportive of the Vesting Clause
Thesis. The problem was that the United States had trouble
negotiating with foreign nations through a legislative body rather than
through an independent executive branch. John Jay's efforts to
negotiate with Spain over navigation rights on the lower Mississippi
were the most prominent example of this problem. Jay's efforts were
repeatedly hampered by the fact that Congress, as a plural body
representing different regional interests, had difficulty agreeing on the
U.S. negotiating position, and by the fact that, when it could agree,
it often micromanaged Jay's efforts. 182 Thus, for example, Jay
179. John Jay's Report on State Laws Contrary to the Treaty of Peace (Oct. 13, 1786), in
3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 334 (emphasis added). Echoing Jay's views,
the President of Congress subsequently sent a letter to the state governors stating that "the
Thirteen Independent Sovereign States have by express delegation of power formed and
Vested in us a general, though limited Sovereignty, for the general and National purposes
specified in the Confederation." Letter from the President of Congress to the State
Governors (April 13, 1787), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 472, 473.
180. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 3 (John Jay), at 43-45.
181. See id. No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
182. See SANDERS, supra note 161, at 124.
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complained to Congress that he found "exceedingly embarrassing" its
directive that, in negotiating with Spain, he was required to
communicate in advance to Congress every proposition he would
make to the Spanish representative, and also to report back to
Congress on every proposition that the representative made to him
during the negotiations.183 Jay also wrote to Jefferson, complaining
that he would "often experience unreasonable Delays and successive
Obstacles in obtaining the Decision and Sentiments of Congress, even
on points which require Dispatch."184 The situation was so problematic
that Jay eventually suggested that Congress consider appointing a
committee "with power to instruct and direct me on every point and
Subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain. " 185
Once again, the constitutional Founders addressed this problem
with specific text: they assigned the treaty power to an independent
President who could negotiate more effectively than a legislative body.
It was through such specific assignments of power, and through the
structure of the presidency, that the Founders sought to achieve what
Hamilton referred to in the Federalist Papers as "energy in the

183. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (August 15, 1785), in 1 THE
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 744; see also Letter from John Jay to the President of
Congress (Aug. 10, 1785), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 257, 257-58
(stating that it was impossible for him instantly to execute Congress's order that he convey
to Congress "without Delay" any information he received concerning France's views of U.S.
rights of navigation on the Mississippi and Spain's territorial claims on the east side of the
Mississippi). In response to Jay's complaint about having to report back to Congress on
every proposition made or received during the negotiations, Congress changed his
instructions to eliminate that requirement. See Congressional Resolution Changing John
Jay's Instructions for Negotiating a Treaty with Spain (Aug. 25, 1785), in 2 THE EMERGING
NATION, supra note 166, at 768-69.
184. Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in 3 THE EMERGING
NATION, supra note 166, at 266, 266-67; see also Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson
(Jan. 19, 1786), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 69, 69-70 (complaining
about Congress's failure to pay sufficient attention to foreign affairs). Jay also noted in some
of his correspondence that, in order for the government to operate effectively, the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the government should be separated, albeit
with checks on each other. As he explained in a letter to Washington, "Let Congress
legislate - let others execute - let others judge." Letter from John Jay to George
Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY
226, 227 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, Putnam 1891); see also Letter from John Jay to
Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY, supra, at 210, 210 (stating that the "three great departments of sovereignty should
be forever separated, and so distributed as to serve as checks on each other"); Letter from
John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1786), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra, at 222, 223 (stating that "government should be divided into
executive, legislative, and judicial departments"). This separation, Jay further explained,
would not itself answer the question of which powers should be assigned to the government,
"a question which deserves much thought." 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS
OF JOHN JAY, supra, at 227-28. Jay thus appeared to conceive of "executive power" as the
power to execute the laws.
185. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (May 29, 1786), in 3 THE
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 190, 190.
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executive."186 Even on the treaty-power issue, however, the Founders
limited executive power by requiring the President to obtain the
advice and consent of the Senate, the smaller of the two houses of the
new national legislature.187 The Founders' decision that, for functional
reasons, it would be better to have an independent executive rather
than the legislature negotiate U.S. treaties hardly shows that they
intended to delegate to the President a package of unspecified
additional powers out of some notion of executive power essentialism.
There are statements during this period, as Prakash and Ramsey
emphasize, referring to the foreign affairs department and other
congressional departments as "executive." 188 This label, however,
appears to have been used simply to refer to the role of the
departments in executing congressional policy. Robert Morris had
complained, for example, that so long as Congress attempted "to
execute as well as deliberate on their business it never will be done as
it ought."189 And the Continental Congress made clear its intention
that when it referred a matter to a department, the matter would be
"carried into execution." 190 There is no evidence that the label
"executive" referred to an understood bundle of foreign affairs or
other substantive powers. Indeed, as noted above, the key foreign
relations powers granted by the Articles of Confederation were
retained and exercised by Congress as a whole even after the
establishment of the "executive" departments.191

186. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), at 423.
187. As discussed below, the delegates at the Federal Convention initially contemplated
that the Senate alone would have the treaty power, and only late in the Convention decided
to divide the treaty power between the Senate and President. See infra Parts III.A., IV.A.
188. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 274-76; see also, e.g., Letter from Robert
R. Livingston to Benjamin Franklin (Oct. 20, 1781), in 1 THE EMERGING NATION, supra
note 166, at 257, 257 (referring to the "great Executive Departments").
189. MARSTON, supra note 161, at 307.
190. 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 722 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1914).
191. Prakash and Ramsey also rely on the 1778 pamphlet, Essex Result. Apparently
written by Theophilus Parsons (a leading Massachusetts lawyer and subsequently chief
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court), this pamphlet called for rejection of a draft
Massachusetts constitution because, among other things, the executive was given insufficient
power. See ESSEX RESULT (1778), reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359 (1859); see also THACH, supra note 122, at 44-49 (discussing this
pamphlet). The pamphlet thus proposed, for example, that the executive be given a veto
power over legislation and full command over the state's military forces, proposals that were
subsequently included in the constitution adopted by Massachusetts in 1780. As discussed
above, however, the 1780 constitution also defined the governor's commander-in-chief
powers in great detail, and stated that these powers had to be "exercised agreeably to the
rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land, and not otherwise." See
supra text accompanying notes 157-160. In discussing executive power, Essex Result noted
that this power "is sometimes divided into the external executive, and internal executive,"
and that "[t]he former comprehends war, peace, the sending and receiving ambassadors, and
whatever concerns the transactions of the state with any other independent state." ESSEX
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Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING
A.

The Federal Convention

Far from supporting the Vesting Clause Thesis, the records of the
Federal Convention all but devastate it. The records show that as the
delegates drafted and negotiated the constitutional text, they
attempted to specify the powers being granted to the executive
branch. Although there were occasional references to the concept of
executive power in the abstract, the records make clear that there was
no consensus on what was encompassed by that concept, with
delegates disagreeing, for example, over whether powers relating to
war, peace, and treatymaking were executive in nature. Furthermore,
although one should always be cautious about making inferences from
silence, it is telling that there is not a single reference to the Vesting
Clause Thesis in all of the records of the Federal Convention. The oft
expressed opposition of many delegates to creating an executive that
resembled the British monarch further weighs against the Thesis.
The story begins on May 29, 1787. On that date, Edmund
Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, which consisted of fifteen
resolutions. The seventh resolution called for the establishment of a
national executive, to be chosen by the national legislature.192 The
resolution also stated that "besides a general authority to execute the
National laws, [the national executive] ought to enjoy the Executive
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation."193 If this resolution
had been adopted by the Convention, it might support the Vesting
Clause Thesis, because it suggests a conception of "executive power"
as a defined category that can be distinguished from legislative
powers, albeit one limited by reference to the Articles of
Confederation. Even this is not entirely clear, though, since the
Virginia Plan was proposing general ideas, not constitutional
language. As a result, it would have been consistent with this plan to
specify the foreign affairs powers of the Executive, just as the Articles
of Confederation had specified the foreign affairs powers of the
Continental Congress. In any event, this resolution was not adopted

RESULT, supra, at 373. The U.S. confederation, explained the pamphlet, had "lopped off this
branch of the executive, and placed it in Congress." Id. Although these statements do appear
to borrow from the taxonomy developed by some of the European theorists, it is notable
that the pamphlet also recognizes that the "external executive power" can be divided from
the "internal executive power" and can be exercised by a legislature, such as the Continental
Congress. In this way the Essex Result echoes Locke properly understood, insofar as Locke
distinguished between domestic executive power and foreign federative power, and
acknowledged that these powers do not necessarily have to be vested in the same hands. See
supra Part II.A.
192. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 21.
193. 1 id.
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by the Convention. In fact, the conception of executive power
reflected in this resolution was quickly rejected by the delegates, and
all subsequent discussions of executive power by the delegates were in
terms of specific grants of executive power rather than in terms of a
collection of powers.
On June 1, the delegates began considering Randolph's seventh
resolution. There was general agreement with the idea of establishing
a national executive. There was significant concern, however, about
vesting too much power in the executive, and about using the British
model as a benchmark for executive power. Charles Pinckney stated
that he "was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of (the existing) Congress might extend to peace & war &c
which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind,
towit an elective one."194 John Rutledge similarly stated that "he was
for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for
giving him the power of war and peace. "195 Roger Sherman stated even
more strongly that "he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing
more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect."196 And James Wilson emphasized the impropriety of using the
British monarchy as a model for executive power:
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper
guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were
of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only
powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws,
and appointing officers, not (appertaining to and) appointed by the
Legislature.1 97

Among other things, it is clear from these statements that the speakers
did not equate the concept of executive power with an accepted
bundle of foreign relations powers.
This concern about creating an executive that resembled the
British monarch was part of the reason for some delegates' opposition
to a singular, as opposed to a plural, executive. Randolph, for
example, expressed the view that a singular executive would be the
"fetus of Monarchy."198 Supporters of a singular executive denied that
it would be similar to the British monarchy. Thus, Wilson "repeated
that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable
to the situation of this Country."199

194. 1 id. at 64-65.
195. 1 id.
196. 1 id.
197. 1 id. at 65-66.
198. 1 id. at 66; see also 1 id. at 88 (statement by Randolph on June 2 that "the
permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy").
1 99. 1 id. at 66.
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At this point in the debate, Madison suggested that the delegates
"fix the extent of the Executive authority" because "as certain powers
were in their nature Executive, . . . a definition of their extent would
assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely
entrusted to a single officer."200 Madison agreed with Wilson that
executive powers "do not include the Rights of war & peace &c." and
that "the powers should be confined and defined" because "if large we
shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies. "201 He therefore moved
that the national executive be vested with three powers - "to carry
into execution the national laws," "to appoint to offices in cases not
otherwise provided for," and "to execute such powers, not legislative
or j udiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated by
the national legislature. "202 The Committee of the Whole agreed to the
motion but deleted the third listed power as "unnecessary, the object
of them being included in the 'power to carry into effect the nation
al laws.' "203
Thus, in their first consideration of the issue, the delegates sharply
rejected the purported Locke/Montesquieu/Blackstone assignment of
powers. They disagreed, for example, that the powers over war and
peace should be vested with the executive. As Professor Rakove has
noted, "the remarks of June 1 demonstrate that the framers believed
that questions of war and peace - that is, the most critical subjects of
foreign policy
were appropriate subjects for legislative
determination rather than an inherent prerogative of executive
power."204 Moreover, instead of relying on the British model or even
the Continental Congress as a categorical reference, the delegates
moved to, in Madison's words, "confine[] and define[]" the executive's
powers. All subsequent discussions in the Federal Convention are
consistent with this theme: the delegates continued to define the
executive's powers, including his foreign affairs powers, and they
never suggested that they were vesting him with unspecified residual
powers. Moreover, to the extent that this discussion reveals any
consensus about what is inherently part of executive power, it was
simply that executive power entails the power to execute the laws.
After the June 1 deliberations, there were a number of discussions
concerning the manner of electing the executive, whether the
executive should be plural or singular, whether the executive should
have a veto power over legislation, and the executive's term of
200. 1 id. at 66-67. John Dickinson similarly stated that "the powers of the Executive
ought to be defined before we say in whom the power shall vest." 1 id. at 74.
201. 1 id. at 70 (emphasis added).
202. 1 id. at 63.
203. 1 id. at 67.
204. Rakove, supra note 65, at 239.

February 2004]

Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs

595

office. 205 These discussions were complicated and contentious. As
George Mason noted at one point, "In every Stage of the Question
relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity
of the opinions concerning it have appeared. " 206 In these discussions,
however, there was repeated agreement that the only powers being
granted to the executive were those of executing the laws, making
certain appointments, and (after additional discussion) vetoing
legislation.207 This agreement is also reflected in the Report of the
Committee of the Whole on June 13, which delineates these, and only
these, executive powers. 208 There were also repeated, uncontested
statements in these discussions that the U.S. executive should not
resemble a monarchy.
The alternative constitutional plans presented to the delegates
were fully consistent with this approach. On June 15, William Paterson
presented the New Jersey Plan. Under this plan, the executive would
be elected by Congress, would be plural rather than singular, and
would have "general authority to execute the federal acts" as well as
the power "to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for,
& to direct all military operations."209 Like Madison's amendment of
the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan spelled out the powers that
would be vested in the executive. As for other foreign affairs powers,
the Plan stated that Congress would have the powers specified in the
Articles of Confederation, as well as a number of additional powers,
such as the power to regulate international trade.210 Under this plan,
205. In discussing the Federal Convention, Prakash and Ramsey move immediately
from Madison's motion on June 1 to the considerations of the Committee of Detail, in late
July, noting that "[a]fter this modification of the Virginia Plan, there was no sustained
consideration of foreign affairs until the Committee of Detail." Prakash & Ramsey, supra
note 14, at 283. In doing so, Prakash and Ramsey fail to give sufficient attention to a number
of relevant discussions and proposals that occurred during this period.
206. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 1 18. In
a letter to Thomas Jefferson in October 1787, James Madison recounted that "[o]n the
question whether [the executive] should consist of a single person, or a plurality of co
ordinate members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of
power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place." Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 131, 132.
207. See, e.g. , 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28,
at 101; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 32-33,
1 16. But cf 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 113
(comment by George Mason on June 4 that "[w]e have not yet been able to define the
powers of the Executive").
208. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28,
at 236.
209. 1 id. at 244. Given the Plan's reference to directing military operations, Prakash
and Ramsey are incorrect in describing the executive under this Plan as "bereft of foreign
affairs authority." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.214.
210. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28,
at 243.
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therefore, the executive's foreign affairs powers were to be very
limited and defined, and most foreign affairs powers were to be
granted to Congress.
The obviously limited nature of executive power under the
modified Virginia plan and the New Jersey plan helps shed light on
what the delegates understood when they referred to the "vesting" of
executive power. On June 4, there were repeated references to
"vesting the executive powers in a single person,"211 even though the
proposal before the convention at this point was for an executive that
would have only the powers of executing the laws and making
appointments.212 On June 16, in contrasting the Committee of the
Whale's modified Virginia Plan with the New Jersey Plan, James
Wilson noted that the Committee's plan "vested the Executive powers
in a single Magistrate" whereas " [t]he plan of N. Jersey, vested them
in a plurality."213 In other words, constitutional plans that clearly did
not incorporate the Vesting Clause Thesis were nevertheless viewed as
"vesting the executive powers. " Vesting, under this conception, simply
meant assigning the specified powers, not granting unspecified resid
ual powers. To put it differently, a general vesting clause described
where powers were being vested, not what those powers were.
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton presented his own constitutional
plan. Already displaying a pro-executive inclination for which he
would later become famous, Hamilton proposed:
The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a
Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour - the election
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts
aforesaid - The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as
follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the
Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of
the heads or chief officers or the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all officers (Ambassadors to
foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the
Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason;
which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.214

Hamilton's plan obviously proposed a broader package of
executive power than what was reflected in either the modified
Virginia Plan or the New Jersey Plan. But even under Hamilton's
more expansive proposal, the powers of the executive, including
211. See, e.g. , 1 id. at 101, 106-07, 1 10.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203.
213. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 254.
214. 1 id. at 292.

supra

note 28,
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powers relating to foreign affairs, were spelled out in detail. Hamilton
does not appear to have been relying on some undefined residuum of
executive power. Prakash and Ramsey assert the contrary, claiming
(without explanation) that the beginning of the first sentence quoted
above - "The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected during good behaviour" - was
implicitly a grant of "residual foreign affairs authorities not vested
elsewhere."215 But this is pure assertion, and it is contradicted by the
language that immediately precedes Hamilton's list of executive
powers - "The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as
follows." It is also undermined by the fact that Hamilton used similar
language with respect to the vesting of legislative power,216 yet Prakash
and Ramsey do not contend that he was proposing to grant
unspecified residual powers to Congress. Finally, their claim is
undermined by Hamilton's assignment to the Senate, rather than to
the Governor, of "the sole power of declaring war" and "the power of
advising and approving all Treaties,"217 significant foreign relations
powers that Prakash and Ramsey claim are executive in nature.
Still another constitutional proposal was the Pinckney Plan,
proposed by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and evidently
considered by the Committee of Detail. This plan provides that "the
executive Authority of the U.S. shall be vested" in the President, and
it then lists a variety of presidential duties and powers, including
duties and powers relating to foreign affairs.218 Prakash and Ramsey
assert that the vesting clause in the Pinckney Plan implied that the
executive would have residual foreign affairs powers.219 Again, this
begs the question, since the meaning of such a vesting clause is
precisely what is at issue. Moreover, as Prakash and Ramsey
acknowledge, Pinckney's comments in response to the Virginia Plan
(described above), in which he opposed assigning the foreign affairs
powers exercised by the Continental Congress to the executive,
suggest that he did not believe that the executive should have residual
foreign affairs powers. Prakash and Ramsey simply note that
Pinckney's comments "contradicted his own plan."220 There is no

215. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 280.
216. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 291
("The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested . . . . ").
217. 1 id. at 292.
218. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 606.

supra

note 28,

219. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.215. Pinckney's plan stated that, "In
the Presid[ent) 'the executive Authority of the U.S. shall be vested.' " 3 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 606.
220. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.215.
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contradiction, however, if the vesting clause is not read as granting
residual powers.221
The Committee of Detail was appointed on July 23. 222 The
Committee's drafts show that it attempted to enumerate the
executive's powers, including ultimately some foreign affairs powers,
just as the various plans had attempted to do.223 As Prakash and
Ramsey concede, "At this stage, the executive lacked the residual
executive power."224 Prakash and Ramsey assert, however, that the
Committee's final report, presented on August 6, included such a
residual power. In other words, they claim that the Committee of
Detail substantially modified the nature of the executive's power in a
way inconsistent with all of the Convention's discussions up to that
point. The only evidence they provide for this assertion is that the
portion of the report addressing executive power begins with the
clause, "The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a
single person."225 The language of this clause, however, can easily be
read j ust as addressing the issue of whether the executive power that is
specified will be vested in a "single person" or a plural body, an issue
discussed at length in earlier stages of the Convention. And this is
exactly how Madison's record of the Convention describes the clause
when it was voted on by the Committee of the Whole on August 24.226
Furthermore, the Committee of Detail's report spells out in great
detail the executive's powers and duties, including those relating to
foreign affairs, and it expressly gives other foreign affairs powers to
the Senate or to Congress. 227 Indeed, all of the foreign affairs powers
221 . As discussed below, Pinckney also stated at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
that the Senate and President "form together a body in whom can be best and most safely
vested the diplomatic power of the United States." See infra text accompanying note 411. In
an 1818 letter to John Quincy Adams, Pinckney recalled that his constitutional plan was
"substantially adopted . . . except as to the Senate & giving more power to the Executive
than I intended." Letter from Charles Pickney to John Quincy Adams (Dec. 30, 1818), in 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 427, 427. With
respect to the enhancement of executive power, Pinckney gives the example of the decision
late in the Convention to divide the treaty power between the Senate and President rather
than assign it exclusively to the Senate. 3 id.
222. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 95.
223. See, e.g. , 2 id. at 132, 145, 171; SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
224. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 283.
225. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 185.
226. See 2 id. at 401 ("On the question for vesting the power in a single person
It was
agreed to nem: con: So also on the Stile and title."). The "stile" and "title" were addressed in
the next sentence of this portion of the Committee's report: "His stile shall be 'The President
of the United States of America;' and his title shall be, 'His Excellency'." 2 id. at 185.
-

227. For additional discussion of this point, see Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of the
Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original Intent of the
Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 87 (1979):
The [Vesting Clause] could not possibly have had [residual power] meaning in the report of
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that had been discussed in the Convention are mentioned expressly
somewhere in the Committee's report, making it even less likely that
the Committee intended the executive Vesting Clause to convey
additional foreign affairs powers. 228 Finally, the Committee used
similar vesting language for the legislative and judicial branches,
suggesting, as Abraham Sofaer has noted, "that the committee . . . had
no specific pro-executive plan in mind."229
It is also worth noting that Committee of Detail's report
envisioned that the Senate would have the dominant power over U.S.
foreign relations. Accordingly, it assigned to the Senate the sole power
of making treaties, as well as the power of appointing ambassadors.230
In commenting on the report, Pinckney noted that "the Senate is to
have the power of making treaties & managing our foreign
affairs . . . . "231 In the closing weeks of the Convention, some of the
Senate's foreign affairs power was shifted to the President. But, again,
the story is one of assignment of particular powers to particular
institutional actors, not one of an essentialist conception of executive
power or of granting unspecified powers. More specifically, the
debates strongly suggest that power was being shifted to the President
not because of some sort of executive power essentialism, but rather
because of mistrust of the Senate.232
Consider, for example, the power to make treaties. When the
Committee of the Whole addressed the proposal to assign the treaty
power to the Senate, Madison "observed that the Senate represented

the Committee of Detail, for the essential powers in the realm of diplomacy were specifically
bestowed elsewhere - that is to say, on the Senate exclusively. In their use of general terms
like 'Executive Power,' the framers obviously intended that the meaning should be arrived at
by observing the particular powers actually enumerated in the relevant article of the
Constitution.

Id. See also Rakove, supra note 65, at 264 ("Given the evidence that a doctrine of inherent
executive power over war and peace was not influential at the outset of the Convention - as
the proceedings of June 1 conclusively prove - it hardly seems likely that it would have
become more attractive as the debates wore on.").
228. Prakash and Ramsey's discussion of this point - the linchpin of their argument
about the Federal Convention - is entirely conclusory. They assert that the Committee of
Detail's use of the Vesting Clause was a reintroduction of the idea of residual executive
power, and they remark that "no one sought to strike the language or complained." Prakash
& Ramsey, supra note 14, at 286. It would be important - and, indeed, surprising - that no
one would comment on the reintroduction of an idea that had generated substantial
opposition at the beginning of the Convention. Of course, the most likely reason why no one
commented on it is that Prakash and Ramsey's assertion about the Vesting Clause is
incorrect.
229. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 30 (1976).
230. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28,
at 183.
231. 2 id. at 235 (emphasis added).
232. For a detailed explanation of this point, see RAKOVE, supra note 5 1 , at 263-67.
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the States alone, and for this as well as other obvious reasons it
was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties."233
Gouverneur Morris also expressed concern about giving the Senate
the treaty power, and he proposed an amendment whereby treaties
would not be binding on the United States until ratified by federal
legislation. 234 Madison and others disagreed with that amendment,
however, on the grounds that it would be too inconvenient and would
put the United States at a disadvantage in international negotiations,
and the amendment was defeated.235 This debate was resumed on
September 7, with James Wilson moving to amend the treaty clause to
require the consent of the House of Representatives. 236 Sherman
responded that "the power could be safely trusted to the Senate" and
that "the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a
reference of them to the whole Legislature."237 Wilson's motion was
defeated. Madison subsequently moved, unsuccessfully, to allow two
thirds of the Senate to make peace treaties without the President's
consent.238 What is noteworthy about these discussions is that at no
point was there a claim that the treaty power inherently belonged to
the executive. The only issues were whether, for functional reasons,
the power should be divided between the Senate and some other
institutional body, and, if so, which institutional body would be best.
The Convention finally turned to the executive branch part of the
Committee of Detail's report on August 24. The discussion here is,
once again, revealing for what it does not show. Delegates quibbled
with the specific grants of authority and responsibility and thus, for
example, modified the language of the appointments provision and the
provision giving the President command of the state militia.239 They
also added in certain presidential powers and responsibilities, such as
the responsibility for receiving ambassadors. 240 But there was no
discussion of whether the list of powers and responsibilities matched
some preconception of what should be executive, and there was no
suggestion that the Vesting Clause was granting unspecified powers.
Indeed, if the delegates had been assuming the Vesting Clause Thesis,
much of their quibbling about specific executive powers would have
been beside the point.

233. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 392.
234. 2 id.
235. 2 id. at 392-94.
236. See 2 id. at 538.
237. 2 id.
238. See 2 id. at 540-41.
239. See 2 id. at 405-06, 422.
240. 2 id. at 419.
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The Convention's brief discussion of Congress's power relating to
war is not to the contrary. The Committee of Detail had proposed to
give Congress the power " [t]o make war."241 Pinckney objected to that
proposal, arguing that the House of Representatives would be "too
numerous for such deliberations," and that the power should rest with
the Senate alone because it would be "more acquainted with foreign
affairs."242 Pierce Butler, by contrast, thought that the Senate would
have the same institutional problems as the full Congress, and he
proposed that the power to make war be given to the President.243 A
number of delegates expressed concern, however, about giving the
President the power to commence war. Madison moved to amend the
Committee of Detail's proposal to give Congress the power to
"declare" rather than "make" war, which he said would "leav[e] to the
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."244 Roger Sherman did
not think this amendment necessary, since he believed that the
President would already have the power to repel attacks. 245 The
delegates apparently agreed, initially voting against the motion. Rufus
King, however, noted that the word "make" could be understood to
include conducting the war, "which was an Executive function,'' and at
that point the delegates voted in favor of the motion.
There are obviously statements in this discussion suggesting that
certain war-related powers belong to the executive - namely the
power to repel attacks and the power to conduct the operations of
war. The basis for this assumption is not entirely clear, but it easily
could have been based on the President's assigned power as
Commander in Chief.246 What is clear is that, when considering where

241. See 2 id. at 182.
242. 2 id. at 318.
243. 2 id.
244. 2 id.
245. 2 id.
246. The New Jersey Plan, for example, specifically referred to a presidential power to
"direct all military operations." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 28, at 244; see also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 69 (Alexander
Hamilton), at 418 (stating that the President, as Commander in Chief, has "the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces"). And the Hamilton Plan gave the
President the power of "direction of the war when authorized or begun." 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 292 (emphasis added). The
phrase "or begun" in Hamilton's Plan presumably included situations in which a war was
initiated against the United States and it acted to repel the attack. See JOHN HART ELY,
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
142 n.22 (1993); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1543 (2002) (explaining that the Founders understood that war could be "declared" by
an attack on the United States and that this would trigger the President's commander-in
chief powers). But see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 285 (arguing that the reference
in the Convention debate to a power to repel attacks proves that the delegates assumed that
the President would have residual foreign affairs powers).
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to assign the foreign relations power of declaring war, the delegates
agreed not to vest it with the President, and no one claimed that this
violated some sort of essentialist conception of executive power.
B.

The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers likewise repudiate the Vesting Clause
Thesis. As in the Federal Convention debates, the discussions of
executive power in the Federalist Papers are premised on the
assumption that the President is being granted only the powers
specified in Article II. This assumption is evident, for example, in the
comparisons between the proposed U.S. executive and the British
monarch. In Federalist No. 48, Madison acknowledges that, " [i]n a
government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in
the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very
justly regarded as the source of danger."247 But he contrasts that
situation from "a representative republic where the executive
magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of
its power. "248
Similarly, in Federalist No. 67, Hamilton acknowledges the
"aversion of the people to monarchy," and he proceeds to go through
the President's enumerated Article II powers to show that they are
much less extensive than those of the British monarch.249 Nowhere in
this essay does he suggest that the Vesting Clause is an independent
source of power. Moreover, the structure of his discussion - going
through the enumerated powers in Article II to show that they are
sufficiently limited - would make little sense if there were also an
unspecified residuum of "executive Power." Hamilton repeats this
approach in Federalist No. 69, again going through the President's
enumerated powers, and arguing that the limitation of the President to
these powers means that "there is no pretense for the parallel which
has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. "250
The Federalist Papers also repeatedly suggest that Congress's
powers will be much greater than those of the President. In doing so,
the Papers point to the limited list of powers in Article II, Section 2.
These statements, like those contrasting the President with the British
monarch, would make little sense if there were an unspecified
residuum of presidential power. For example, in Federalist No. 48,

247. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 48 (James Madison), at 309.
248. Id.
249. Id.

No.

67 (Alexander Hamilton), at 407.

250. Id. No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at 422; see also id. No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton),
at 442 (considering the powers "which are proposed to be vested in the President of the

United States").
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Madison states that Congress's powers are "more extensive, and less
susceptible of precise limits" than those of the President, and he
describes the executive power as "being restrained within a narrower
compass and being more simple in its nature. "251
Another inconsistency between the Federalist Papers and the
Vesting Clause Thesis is that the Papers generally employ functional
arguments for the assignment of powers, not essentialist labels like
"legislative" or "executive." In Federalist No. 64, for example, Jay
argues that, even though the treaty power could be viewed as
legislative in nature, it nevertheless made sense to vest it in the
President and Senate. He suggests that one should not place too much
emphasis on formal labels: " [W]hatever name be given to the power of
making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made,
certain it is that the people may, with much propriety, commit the
power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the
judicial."252 When the Federalist Papers invoke essentialist labels, they
tend to eschew the traditional categories used by Locke, Blackstone,
and Montesquieu. In Federalist No. 75, for example, Hamilton
acknowledges that treatise writers had classified the treaty power as
properly belonging to the executive, but he calls this "an arbitrary
disposition" and rejects it.253
The Federalist Papers also emphasize a more general background
point that, as noted in Part I, is in tension with the Vesting Clause
Thesis. Specially, they emphasize that the Constitution is establishing
a government of limited and defined powers. Most famously, Madison
states in Federalist No. 45 that " [t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. "254 An unspecified residuum of executive power does not sit
comfortably with this general structural feature of the Constitution.
Another background point made in the Federalist Papers is that
there is nothing inherently problematic, from a separation of powers
standpoint, with mixing powers among branches of government.
Madison makes this point most clearly in Federalist No. 47, where he
responds to the Anti-Federalist charge that "the Constitution is [in]
supposed violation of the political maxim that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and
distinct."255 Turning to Montesquieu (upon whom the Anti-Federalists
frequently relied), Madison explains that the relevant political maxim

251. Id. No. 48 (James Madison), at 310; see also id. No. 51 (James Madison), at 322
("In a republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.").
252. Id. No. 64 (John Jay), at 394.
253. Id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 450.
254. Id. No. 45 (James Madison), at 292.
255. Id. No. 47 (James Madison), at 301.
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is instead that "the accumulation of all powers . . . in the same
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny,"256
and that the Constitution's mixing of powers does not violate this
maxim. Even under the British Constitution - "to Montesquieu what
Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry" - Madison
notes that there was a mixing of powers.257 Madison also looks in detail
at the state constitutions in the Critical Period and finds that "there is
not a single instance in which the several departments of power have
been kept absolutely separate and distinct."258
The only Federalist Paper that offers even superficial support to
the Vesting Clause Thesis is Federalist No. 72. There, Hamilton notes
that the "administration of government . . . falls peculiarly within the
province of the executive department." 259 Hamilton makes this
observation in order to j ustify giving the President the power to
nominate appointments. He does not appear to be arguing that
"administration" is a separate, unspecified executive power; rather, he
seems to think that it is part of the President's role in executing the
laws and carrying out his specified powers. In any event, the foreign
affairs administrative functions he mentions - negotiating with
foreign governments, the arrangement of the armed forces, and the
direction of war - can all be justified from the specific grants of
power, such as the treaty power and the commander-in-chief power.260
C.

State Ratification Debates

With the state ratification debates - the final component of the
usual originalist trinity - the Vesting Clause Thesis continues down
the path from historical claim to present-day wishful thinking. At least
for originalists, the constitutional understanding reflected in the state
conventions merits particular weight. As Chief Justice Marshall
famously asserted in one of his own, if infrequent, originalist forays,
the Constitution "was a mere proposal," which "the people were at
perfect liberty to accept or reject."261 It followed that " [f]rom these
[ratifying] Conventions the constitution derives its whole authority."262
Similarly, James Madison noted, many years after the Constitution's

256. Id.
257. Id. at 301-02.
258. Id. at 304. The state constitutions are discussed above in Part Il.B.
259. Id. No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), at 435.
260. See also id. No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), at 519 (noting that the "management of
foreign negotiations will naturally devolve" on the President, subject to the consent of the
Senate).
261. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819).
262. Id. at 403.
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ratification, that it was in the "respective State Conventions, where
[the Constitution] received all the authority which it possesses."263
It is puzzling, therefore, that proponents of the Vesting Clause
Thesis have devoted relatively little attention to the state ratification
debates. Prakash and Ramsey's ostensibly originalist account, for
example, devotes only a few short pages to the subject.264 A possible
reason for this omission is that the state ratification debates offer little
evidence for executive power essentialism with regard to foreign
affairs and no instances that articulate the Vesting Clause Thesis. Such
silence is particularly striking in light of the sheer volume of the state
debates.265 Instead of assuming the Vesting Clause Thesis, the state
ratification debates, like the Federal Convention debates and the
Federalist Papers, proceed on the assumption that the President is
being granted only the powers specified in Article II. To support this
claim, we consider in detail the six most significant convention debates
- Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
and South Carolina.
Virginia. Virginia produced arguably the most significant
ratification debates for several reasons. First, Virginia was the most
important state in terms of size and leadership. Even though the
requisite eight states had ratified the Constitution when the Virginia
ratifying convention met, few thought the ratification process could
succeed without the Old Dominion.266 Second, Virginia unquestionably
produced the most comprehensive debates in terms of quality and
quantity. The Virginia ratification materials account for over 1700
pages in the authoritative Documentary History of the Ratification of
the Constitution , and more than 600 of those pages reflect the con-

263. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228, 228 (1865); see also 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 374 (recording Madison's statement in
the House of Representatives on April 6, 1796: "If we were to look, therefore, for the
meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the
General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and
ratified the Constitution.").
264. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 287-95.
265. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution is approaching
twenty volumes. That said, it should be noted that the quality of the documentary record
varies wildly, and that the accounts of many of the convention debates are plagued by
partisanship and poor recording. See James H. Hutson, The Creation ofthe Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1986). The unevenness of the
record should caution those who seek to discern constitutional meaning from the debates
without more. Poor parliamentary reporting, however, does not explain the relative absence
of a position central to issues concerning which a wide array of other positions were
documented.
266. Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 261, 262 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989).
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vention debates.267 The caliber of debate, moreover, was exceptionally
high, featuring James Madison, Edmund Randolph, George Mason,
John Marshall, Patrick Henry, James Monroe, among other notables.
Perhaps most important of all, for present purposes, the Virginia
convention addressed foreign affairs issues in greater detail than any
other state, in part out of its paternalistic concern for the fate of
Kentucky and what was then the Southwest, especially with regard to
the treaty power and U.S. navigation rights on the Mississippi. 268 For
these reasons, foreign affairs scholars have typically, and rightly,
focused upon the discussions that Virginia produced. The telling
exception proving this rule is the work of Vesting Clause Thesis
proponents, where the Virginia debates are conspicuous by their
absence.269
The Virginia convention from the outset dispelled any notion that
conceptions of government that may have been celebrated in Europe
carried over without alteration to America. The convention opened
with the Anti-Federalists, led by Patrick Henry, seeking to portray the
Constitution as the reincarnation of the British imperial government
that Virginians had rejected in 1776. Prominent in this strategy were
attempts to equate the President with the British monarch. " (T]here is
to be," Henry declaimed, "a great and mighty President, with very
extensive powers; the powers of a King. "270 Henry pressed the analogy
by invoking the old Whig fear concerning the misuse of troops
ostensibly mustered to protect the nation from foreign enemies:
"Away with your President, we shall have a King: The army will salute
him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him
King, and fight against you: And what have you to oppose this
force?"271 Federalists, such as Edmund Randolph and John Marshall,
dismissed both the Anti-Federalists' horribles as well as the royal
comparison.272 Even before the convention, "An Impartial Citizen"
contrasted the U.S. and British Constitutions, citing the President's
merely contingent veto and commenting that " (t]he President in many

267. The Virginia debates take up volumes eight through ten of The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution. See 8-10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1988-90).
268. For an overview of the ratification struggle in Virginia, see Banning, supra note
266, at 261-99.
269. See, e.g. , Prakash
nn.271-72.

&

Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291-92

&

n.261; id. at 293

&

270. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 267, at 961. Note that even here, Henry does not speak in terms of executive or
royal power as a unitary abstraction, but instead refers to "powers" in the plural.
271. 9 id. at 964.
272. See, e.g. , 9 id. at 1019, 1 125.
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important cases, must have the concurrence of the Senate, wherein his
sole decision might be dangerous."273
In debating the war power, the comparison between King and
President merged into a discussion of the Constitution's assignment of
foreign affairs authority. Here the debate reflected a general pattern
whereby the participants concentrated on the allocation of specific
powers and the likely consequences of the allocation, rather than on
essentialist claims about what was truly "executive" or "legislative."
Specifically, Anti-Federalists objected to the combination in Congress
of the power to declare war with the authority to finance it, while
Federalists responded that the republic could only be safe with the
power to declare war vested in the legislative branch. As Henry put it,
"I find fault with the paper before you, because the same power that
declares war, has the power to carry it on."274 To him, this combination
was even worse than in Britain, since there " [t]he King declares war:
The House of Commons gives the means of carrying it on. This is a
strong check on the King."275 Yet, " [h]ow is it here? The Congress can
both declare war and carry it on; and levy your money, as long as you
have a shilling to pay."276 Note that Henry, not one to leave any
argument unspoken, does not object that affording Congress the
power to declare war violates a general understanding that such a
power is "executive." Rather, he attacks the combination of powers in
light of the results it will produce.
Federalists defended the war power in the same functionalist
terms. Randolph countered Henry, arguing that America compared
favorably to England because it imposed more of a popular check on
the exercise of the war power: "In England the King declares war. In
America, Congress must be consulted. - In England, Parliament
gives money. In America, Congress does it. There are consequently
more powers in the hands of the people, and greater checks upon the
Executive here, than in England."277 Marshall echoed Randolph in the
same functionalist terms, asking, "Are the people of England more
secure, if the Commons have no voice in declaring war, or are we less
secure, by having the Senate joined with the President?" 278 By
contrast, no Federalist asserted that the declare war power was
legislative in nature, or that the Constitution's allocation of the declare
war power to Congress was an exception to a general rule.
273. 8 id. at 295.
274. 9 id. at 1069.
275. 9 id.
276. 9 id.
277. 9 id. at 1098.
278. 9 id. at 1 125. Unless he was referring to the treaty power, Marshall should have
referred to the full Congress rather than the Senate, since the full Congress was given the
power under the proposed Constitution to declare war.
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The single most sustained foreign affairs debate in Virginia
concerned the treatymaking power, and that discussion produced
almost no essentialist rhetoric. This relative silence is striking given
the important role accorded the Senate in this purported executive
function. Instead of essentialism, the overwhelming majority of the
debate centered on whether the requirement that two-thirds of the
senators present give their advice and consent to a treaty would be a
sufficient check against regions bent on using the treaty authority to
undermine the interests of other regions, in particular, the South's
interest in maintaining free navigation of the Mississippi. When the
President does make an appearance, the issue is not whether the
executive should or should not be the exclusive repository of this
important foreign affairs power, but whether the characteristics of the
office would make it an additional check against a regional sell-out.
Especially noteworthy is the Anti-Federalist failure to make the
obvious objection that Senate approval, let alone by a supermajority,
is an infringement of executive foreign affairs authority. Instead, Anti
Federalists objected to the allocation of treatymaking authority on the
ground that it would not protect regional interests. In this context,
William Grayson argued that " [t)he consent of the President (is)
considered as a trivial check. "279 James Monroe concurred on the
ground that the President likely would not prevent a betrayal of
Southern interests since he probably would be elected by, and
beholden to, the Northeast.280 The Anti-Federalists further argued that
the Senate would not provide a sufficient safeguard. This critique
dominated the convention's two main discussions of treaties,281 and it
was rigorously explored in a table that George Mason provided
predicting likely Senate voting patterns.282
Federalists defended the treatymaking power primarily on the
ground that it would protect the interests of Virginia and the region to
which Virginians were likely to emigrate. At least one delegate,
Francis Corbin, addressed the possibility of vesting the power in the
President alone, and rejected it on solely functional grounds. Even
then, he did not make the point to justify a departure from an abstract
baseline, although he did note that it made U.S. practice diverge from
most governments elsewhere:
It would be dangerous to give this power to the President alone - as the
concession of such a power to one individual, is repugnant to Republican
principles. - It is therefore given to the President and the Senate (who

279. 10 id. at 1383.
280. 10 id. at 1371-73.
281. The Convention took up treatymaking from June 12-14, and again on June 18 and
19. See 10 id. at 1 1 84-1297, 1371-1410.
282. 10 id. at 1375.
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represent the states in their individual capacities) conjointly. - In this it
differs from every Government we know. - It steers with admirable
dexterity between the two extremes - neither leaving it to the
Executive, as in most other Governments, nor to the Legislature, which
would too much retard such negotiations.283

Virginia's emphasis on specific powers and likely results also
prevailed in considering Article II itself. If any topic should have
prompted discussion of what "executive" authority entailed as a
general, residual, or baseline matter, Article II would have been it.
But even though the debate was extensive, there was neither a
considered analysis of the Vesting Clause nor any assertion that the
text reflected a grant of unspecified powers. Instead, the delegates
repeatedly moved to consider the implications of the particular powers
specified in Article II. Even before the convention formally took up
Article II, James Monroe set the tone when he sought to demonstrate
that the President would be too powerful, but he did so with reference
only to specific textual grants rather than residual powers.284 Other
speakers followed Monroe by also decrying the President's power,
again only with reference to particular grants. Mason, for example,
"animadverting on the magnitude of the powers of the President, was
alarmed at the additional power of commanding the army in
person."285 While he admitted that the President should have the
power to "give orders, and have a general superintendency" over the
army, he feared that the commander-in-chief grant - not some
general ideal of executive power - further entailed command in the
field and that this could be abused. Likewise, Mason objected to the
pardon power on the ground that it might easily be abused and clear
the way for a monarchy.286
In theory, the Federalists could have defended against such
objections on the ground that personal command or the pardon power
were essentially executive in nature. They did not. Madison, for
instance, contended that it would be improper to vest the pardon
power in the House or Senate, "because numerous bodies were
actuated more or less by passion, and might in a moment of vengeance
forget humanity."287 Looking back, he also turned not to Montesquieu
but to the experience of Massachusetts, where the legislature's
exercise of the pardon power had resulted in inconsistent decisions.288
More generally, Edmund Randolph answered the Anti-Federalist
283. 10 id. at 1391-92.
284. See 9 id. at 1 1 15 (referring to the specific powers listed in Article 11).
285. 10 id. at 1378.
286. 10 id. at 1378-79.
287. 10 id. at 1 379-80.
288. 10 id. at 1380.
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attacks on the presidency by emphasizing the limited and divided
nature of the powers conferred on the President in Article II:
What are his powers? To see the laws executed. Every Executive in
America has that power. He is also to command the army - This power
also is enjoyed by the Executives of the different States. He can handle
no part of the public money except what is given him by law. . I cannot
conceive how his powers can be called formidable. Both Houses are a
check upon him. He can do no important act without the concurrence of
the Senate. 289
.

.

By contrast, the essentialist arguments that the Virginia convention
did produce were few and fleeting, especially with respect to foreign
affairs. As noted, no one asserted that foreign affairs authority was as
a class "executive,'' and no one claimed that the Article II Vesting
Clause accorded the President general foreign affairs authority. In a
handful of instances some Virginians did employ essentialist rhetoric
when analyzing specific foreign affairs powers. Outside the
Convention, "Cassius" defended the Constitution by arguing that,
"though the power of making treaties [has] been, always, considered a
part of the executive,'' the Senate provides an important check.290 "A
Native of Virginia" likewise commented that the powers vested in
Article II, sections 2 and 3, including the Commander in Chief Clause,
"belong from the nature of them, to the Executive branch of
government; and could be placed in no other hands with propriety. "291
Mason in passing referred to the President as " [t]his very executive
officer,'' en route to suggesting that he might receive pensions from
European potentates.292 If there are other examples, they are difficult
to find and all but eclipsed by the focus on powers and functions
already recounted.
Only a few essentialist comments crop up even when the frame is
expanded to encompass executive power in general. Arthur Lee,
for example, complained to John Adams that the Constitution
vested "legislative, executive & judicial Powers in the Senate."293
"Republicus" from Kentucky appeared to make a Vesting Clause
argument when stating that "supreme continental executive power" is
granted to the President, but then went on to discuss only those
powers that are specified.294 Mason at the convention asserted that the
President and Senate were united as "man and wife,'' and that " [t]he

289. 9 id. at 1098.
290. 9 id. at 645.
291. 9 id. at 681 .
292. 10 id. at 1365.
293. 8 id. at 34. Joseph Jones made the same general point in a letter to Madison. See 8
id. at 129.
294. 8 id. at 448.
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Executive and Legislative powers thus connected, will destroy all
balances. "295 Given the voluminous records, the paucity of essentialist
language, let alone sustained argument, is striking.
A number of express denials of executive power essentialism,
moreover, offset the rhetoric to the contrary. Two of these came from
the prominent Federalist Edmund Pendleton. Writing to Madison,
Pendleton declared that " [t]he President is indeed to be a great man,
but it is only in shew to represent the Federal dignity & Power, having
no latent Prerogatives, nor any Powers but such as are defined and
given him by law."296 To Richard Henry Lee he also wrote that the
President's "powers are defined, & not left to latent Prerogatives they none of them appear too large," with the possible exceptions of
pardoning treason before conviction and giving force to treaties.297 A
more complex and intriguing denial of essentialism came from
Randolph in a rejoinder to Madison's claim that the Necessary and
Proper Clause would simply permit Congress to enact necessarily
implied powers. Stating that Madison's narrow construction would
make the clause "superfluous,'' he continued:
Let us take an example of a single department: For instance that of the
President, who has certain things annexed to his office. Does it not
reasonably follow, that he must have some incidental powers? The
principle of incidental powers extends to all parts of the system. If you
then say, that the President has incidental powers, you reduce [the
Necessary and Proper Clause] to tautology.298

Randolph's discussion itself would have been superfluous if there
had been a general understanding that the Article II Vesting Clause
accorded all executive authority unless otherwise specified. Of course,
it might be argued that Randolph was referring to incidental powers
that the President might have that were not executive in nature,
whatever these might be. The more natural reading, however, is
simply that Randolph looked to Article II's specific grants of power as
the starting point, and then assumed that the President, like all parts
of the government, would possess additional implied powers for the
system to be workable even absent the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Randolph at one point went further, suggesting that Congress
should be the primary repository of foreign affairs authority. He began
by noting that, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress "had
nominally powers, powers on paper, which it could not use."299 He
recounted, for example, that " [t]he power of making peace and war is
295. 10 id. at 1376.
296. 8 id. at 47.
297. 10 id. at 1627.
298. 10 id. at 1348.
299. 9 id. at 985.
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expressly delegated to Congress; yet the power of granting passports,
though within that of making peace and war, was considered by
Virginia as belonging to herself." 300 To strengthen the national
government's foreign affairs powers, Randolph explained, Congress's
powers had to be enhanced: "Without adequate powers vested in
Congress," he argued, "America cannot be respectable in the eyes of
other nations. Congress, Sir, ought to be fully vested with the power to
support the Union - protect the interest of the United States,"
including the authority to "defend them from external invasions and
insults."301 If such an approach would have amounted to a revolution
in settled understandings equating foreign affairs power with the
executive, Randolph, no more than other Virginians, seems to have
discerned it.
Pennsylvania. Virginia's unparalleled foreign affairs discussion
earns it pride of place, but the Constitution's first significant test and
resulting debates occurred in Pennsylvania. Unlike Delaware, the first
convention to ratify, Pennsylvania boasted a substantial and vigorous
Anti-Federalist opposition that ensured thorough consideration. With
the exception of James Wilson, Pennsylvania's delegates did not rival
Virginia's in terms of sophistication or depth of knowledge, but the
leaders included able spokesmen, including Thomas McKean among
the Constitution's defenders, and William Findley and John Smilie
among the adversaries.302 The fact that the Constitution had been
framed in Pennsylvania gave the state's role in the ratification process
particular symbolic importance.
Unfortunately, poor and even politicized recording undermines the
usefulness of the resulting exchanges. With the significant exception of
speeches by McKean and Wilson, the account of proceedings within
the Convention are terse and only partially enhanced by outside
articles and commentaries. Moreover, the scope of the President's
proposed powers under the Constitution was not a significant
component of the debate in Pennsylvania. The debate focused instead
on the lack of a bill of rights and on the scope of Congress's and the
Senate's proposed powers.
Despite these limitations, the Pennsylvania debates serve to
further undermine the Vesting Clause Thesis. In particular, when the
President's powers were discussed in Pennsylvania, both the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists appeared to assume that the
President was being granted only the powers specified in Article II.

300. 9 id.
301. 9 id. at 985-86.
302. See RAKOYE, supra note 51, at 1 16-18; George J. Graham, Jr., Pennsylvania:
Representation and the Meaning of Republicanism, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 268, at 52, 52-69.
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Moreover, in defending against the charge that the Constitution
impermissibly mixed categories of power, the supporters of the
Constitution commonly resorted to functionalist rather than
essentialist explanations, further confirming that they were not
thinking of the Constitution's assignment of powers in the manner that
is assumed by the Vesting Clause Thesis.
In a widely circulated defense of the proposed Constitution,
published soon after the end of the Federal Convention, Tench Coxe
anticipated that there would be objections to the scope of the
President's powers. In his first "American Citizen" essay, he carefully
contrasted the proposed President with the British monarch, arguing
that the President would be much less powerful.3°3 For example, he
noted that the President "will have no authority to make a treaty
without two-thirds of the Senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or
other great officers without their approbation. "304 Coxe concluded by
stating that, "[f)rom such a servant with powers so limited and
transitory, there can be no danger. "305 This description, with its focus
on limited and defined powers, at least implicitly suggests that the
President was not being granted some general residuum of execu
tive power.
The sort of objection anticipated by Coxe was not in fact pressed
vigorously by opponents of the Constitution in Pennsylvania. Outside
of the convention, Anti-Federalists such as "Philadelphiensis" and
"An Officer of the Late Continental Army" did charge that the
President would have too much power and would be an "elective
king." In explaining this charge, the Anti-Federalists referred only to
powers specified in the Constitution, such as the commander-in-chief
power, pardon power, and veto power.306 In response, a Federalist
essay denied this charge, noting, among other things, that "the new
Constitution provides that [the President) shall act 'by and with the
advice and consent of the senate' (Article 2, Section 2), and can in no
instance act alone, except in the cause of humanity by granting
reprieves or pardons."307 This response, too, seems to envision the
President receiving only the powers specified in Article II, a number
of which are shared with the Senate.
303. See Tench Coxe, An American Citizen I, lNDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 26, 1787,
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
138, 140-41 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
304. 2 id. at 141.
305. 2 id. at 142.
306. See, e.g. , 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 303, at 210, 212; 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 136, 137
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
307 . Plain Truth: Reply to An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP.
GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 303, at 216, 221.
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From then on in the Pennsylvania debates, the Anti-Federalist
objections concerning the President's powers, although sometimes
framed in essentialist terms, were primarily that the President would
be too weak, not that he would resemble a monarch. During the
Pennsylvania convention, John Smilie contended that the Senate had
"an alarming share of the executive" power.308 Similarly, he stated:
"The balance of power is in the Senate. Their share in the executive
department will corrupt the legislature, and detracts from the proper
power of the President, and will make the President merely a tool to
the Senate. "309 And William Findley objected that " [o]nly a part of the
executive power is vested in the President. The most influential part is
in the Senate, and he only acts as primus inter pares of the Senate; only
he has the sole right of nomination. "310 As James Wilson subsequently
observed in describing the Anti-Federalist position in Pennsylvania,
"[t]he objection against the powers of the President is not that they
are too many or too great, but to state it in the gentleman's own
language [referring to John Smilie's comments], they are so trifling
that the President is no more than the tool of the Senate. "31 1
In responding to this criticism, defenders of the Constitution did
not suggest that the President would have powers not specified in
Article II, and they - unlike the critics - did not typically resort to
essentialist labels. Rather, they defended the Constitution's
assignment of powers in functional terms. In defending the Senate's
role in the treaty process, for example, Thomas McKean stated: "Is it
an objection that the President is bound to consult the Senate? This is
contending for his monarchy. But he clearly is responsible to the
people."312 Similarly, James Wilson argued that, even though treaties
"are to have the force of laws," it was proper to assign the treaty
power to the Senate and President rather than to Congress because
"sometimes secrecy may be necessary [during negotiations]" and
because Congress would not be able to be in session during a "long se
ries of negotiation."313 Wilson also famously defended the assignment
of the declare war power to Congress on the ground that more
numerous bodies would be slower to go to war than individuals.314
The Federalists, in other words, acknowledged the President's
limited powers and defended the limitations on functional grounds.
308. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
at 466.

supra note 303,

309. 2 id. at 508.
310. 2 id. at 512.
311. 2 id. at 566.
312. 2 id. at 544.
313. 2 id. at 562.
314. See 2 id. at 583.
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There are a couple of statements by Wilson that are slight, but only
slight, exceptions to this pattern. In denying that the President would
be the tool of the Senate, Wilson observed that he could "see that [the
President] may do a great many things independent of the Senate; and
with respect to the executive powers of government in which the
Senate participate, they can do nothing without him."315 The "great
many things" referred to by Wilson presumably would have included
the President's powers as Commander in Chief, his role in receiving
ambassadors, and his Take Care Clause responsibilities in executing
federal law; Wilson need not be read here as referring to unspecified
powers. Wilson further stated that the President "holds the helm, and
the vessel can proceed in neither one direction nor another, without
his concurrence."316 The reference to the President's "concurrence"
presumably was a reference to the President's veto power and the
requirement of his agreement to treaties, not a reference to some
residuum of unilateral presidential powers.
Although Prakash and Ramsey do not consider the Pennsylvania
debates in detail, they do quote comments by John Smilie and others
complaining about the Senate's role in the treaty process, an activity
that the complainants described as "executive" in nature.317 Statements
like these, argue Prakash and Ramsey, show that the participants in
the Pennsylvania debates had a conception of executive power,
something that Prakash and Ramsey assert " [i]n a roundabout way . . .
confirms the conventional view that the President enjoyed a residual
executive power over foreign affairs. "318
That some of the participants in these debates referred to
executive power in the abstract does not in fact show - in either a
straightforward or roundabout way - that they believed that the
Constitution was granting the President a residuum of unspecified
foreign affairs powers. There is no evidence, for example, that the
participants who made these statements believed that there were
executive powers, let alone foreign affairs powers, that had not
already been specified in the Constitution. Nor do these abstract
references, by critics of the Constitution, demonstrate that there was a
consensus about what was properly encompassed within the category
of executive power. Moreover, as noted above, these references were
in the context of complaints that the Constitution's grants of power to
the President were too limited, and that the President would be the
tool of the Senate. Neither the complainants nor the defenders of the
proposed Constitution suggested that the President would have
315. 2 id. at 566.
316. 2 id.
317. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291.
318. Id. at 290.
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powers unspecified in Article II, even though such residual power
might have alleviated the concerns about the weakness of the
President.
Massachusetts. Although comprising an extensive set of materials,
the Massachusetts ratification debates, like the Pennsylvania debates,
were of relatively low quality, especially when compared with those of
Virginia.319 Many of the state's most able leaders were effectively
missing in action: John Adams was in Europe; Samuel Adams had to
cope with the death of his son shortly after the start of the convention;
and John Hancock was in poor health and straddled the fence until the
eleventh hour.320 In addition, prominent in the debates were Anti
Federalists from the West who did not compare to the Southern
gentry with respect to learned political analysis. 321 Relatedly,
the specter of Shays's Rebellion still hung over the state, and led
to a preoccupation with internal affairs.322 Finally, the debates in
Massachusetts, both within and outside the state convention, focused
primarily on the scope of Congress's, rather than the President's,
powers.323
The debates over presidential power that did take place in
Massachusetts all concerned the powers listed in Article II. Thus, for
example, "Vox Populi," in arguing that the proposed Constitution
would deprive Massachusetts of its sovereignty (and thereby conflict
with the oath that Massachusetts's state officials were required to
take), referred to the President's treaty, appointment, pardon, and
commander-in-chief powers - all powers listed in Article II. 324
Similarly, the objections that were raised with respect to presidential
power in the brief discussion of Article II during the convention
concerned the treaty and pardon powers.325 Here and elsewhere, the
participants in the Massachusetts debates appeared to assume that the

319. The Massachusetts debates take up volumes four through seven of The Doc
umentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. See 4-7 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1997-2001).
320. See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 119-20; Michael A. Gillespie, Massachusetts:
Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 138, 138-67.
321. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON
STITUTION, supra note 319, at 1 108-09; RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 119.
322. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON
STITUTION, supra note 319, at xxxviii-xl.
323. The Massachusetts convention spent over two weeks debating Article I, but only
three days discussing Articles II and III. See 6 id. at 1 1 10-1 1 , 1 1 16.
324. See Vox Populi, To the PEOPLE of MASSA CHUSETTS, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov.
23, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 309, 311.
325 . See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 1362.
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President was being granted only the powers listed in Article II.
"Cornelius," for example, after reviewing the specific grants of power
in Articles I, II, and III, stated that the President is "vested with the
powers prescribed in the Constitution."326
Moreover, the defenders of the Constitution in Massachusetts
emphasized the limited nature of the grants of power in Article II,
again suggesting that the President was receiving only the powers
listed. "Cassius," for example, contended that "no more than
necessary powers are vested in the executive of the United States by
the new constitution," and that, in Article II, Section 3, " [v]ery little
more power is granted to the [P]resident of the United States . . . than
what is vested in the governours of the different states."327 Similarly,
Governor James Bowdoin stated during the convention debates that
" [t]he executive powers of the President[] are very similar to those of
the several States, except in those points, which relate more
particularly to the union; and respect ambassadours, publick ministers,
and consuls."328 In what may be the only reference to the Article II
Vesting Clause in the Massachusetts debates, Cassius observed as
follows: "Section one, of article second, provides, that the executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States. The
necessity of such a provision must appear reasonable to any one; any
further remarks, therefore, on this head, will be needless."329 Here,
Cassius almost certainly was treating the Vesting Clause as identifying
the recipient of the Article II powers, not as conveying a package of
unspecified powers.330
Although Massachusetts did feature some essentialist rhetoric,
such statements were few, in passing, and served more as labels than
as justifications for the allocation of given powers. For example,
Elbridge Gerry, who had served as a delegate to the Federal
Convention and had declined to sign the Constitution, objected that in
the Constitution "the executive is blended with & will have an undue

326. 4 id. at 416; see also 6 id. at 1436 (documenting a statement by William Cushing, in
an undelivered speech, that "the powers of ye president & Senate are Specified").
327. Cassius, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 1787, reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 319, at 500, 500-01 .
328. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY O F THE RATIFICATION O F THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 319, at 1392.
329. Cassius, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec 18, 1787, reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 319, at 479, 482.
.

330. See also 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 1363 (recording the statement by Nathaniel Gorham that
Article II, Section 1 "fixes the mode of appointment").
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influence on the legislature."331 Similarly, John DeWitt observed that,
"The Legislative is divided between the People, who are the
Democratic[,] and the Senate, who are the Aristocratical part, and the
Executive between the same Senate and the President who represents
the Monarchical branch."332 A further essentialist comment came from
Bowdoin, who defended the Senate by noting that it resembled the
upper house in most states in "having not only legislative, but
executive powers."333 Given that the upper houses of the states did not
have treatymaking authority, Bowdoin appears to have meant simply
that the Senate, as he immediately went on to explain, would act as
"an advising body" to the President.334
One of the few, if only, statements equating the executive with any
aspect of foreign affairs came from Daniel Taylor, who remarked that,
"When the [S]enate act as legislators they are countroulable at all
times by the [House of R ]epresentatives; and in their executive
capacity, in making treaties and conducting negociations, the consent
of two thirds is necessary."335 Importantly, the reference here is to a
foreign affairs power specifically listed in the Constitution
(treatymaking), and there is no suggestion of unspecified foreign
affairs powers. Moreover, there is no suggestion here or anywhere else
in the Massachusetts debates that foreign affairs powers inherently
had to be assigned to the executive branch. In fact, a few
commentators pointed to the other extreme to argue that foreign
affairs authority most naturally belonged to the legislative branch.
According to "Agrippa," for example, "the intercourse between us
and foreign nations, properly forms the department of Congress,"
including not just the authority to regulate trade, but also "the right of
war and peace."336 These stray statements no more establish legislative
foreign affairs essentialism than their counterparts prove the executive
variety. That, however, is exactly our point.

331. 4 id. at 98. In response to this objection, the other two Massachusetts delegates to
the Federal Convention, Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham, argued that "[t)he same
objection might be made [against) the constituti0n of this State . . . but as experience has not
proved that our Executive has an undue influence over the Legislature - we cannot think
the objection well founded." 4 id. at 188.
332. John De Witt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, AM.
HERALD, Nov. 5, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 194, 196.
333. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 319, at 1391.
334. 6 id.
335. 6 id. at 1326.
336. Agrippa, To the Massachusetts Convention, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788,
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 720, 724.
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New York. Although New York held its convention debates
relatively late and was the eleventh state to ratify the Constitution, its
debates were important for several reasons. New York City had been
serving as the national capital, and the state was geographically central
to the new nation. The state also had growing commercial importance,
and was the source of the Federalist Papers. Its debates also featured
prominent figures such as Alexander Hamilton and John Jay.
Outside of the convention, Anti-Federalists such as "Cato" pressed
the usual charge that the President would be an "elective king," and
they cited to the express grants of authority in the Constitution, not to
any unspecified residuum, in support of this charge.337 There was,
however, little discussion of the presidency in the convention debates.
By the time the convention had turned to Article II, the delegates
became aware that the Constitution had received its ninth ratification
(by New Hampshire) and therefore was approved. The scope and na
ture of the subsequent discussions were likely affected by this news.338
Much of the initial debates focused on the process provisions of
Article I, such as the provisions relating to the apportionment of
representatives and the frequency of congressional elections. There
was also debate over whether the Senate would be too powerful.
Gilbert Livingston complained, for example, that "too much is put in
their hands" and that there was "little or no check" on the Senate.339 In
addition, there was some debate over Congress's Necessary and
Proper power,340 and there was substantial discussion of Congress's
power to tax.341 But, as the records themselves state, there was "little
or no debate" about Article II of the Constitution.342
Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements in the New York
debates relating to foreign affairs primarily concerned the Senate.
These statements suggest an understanding that the Senate would
have substantial foreign relations power, perhaps equal to or greater
than the President's foreign relations power. For example, Robert
Livingston, in defending the Constitution's assignment of a long term
of office for senators, observed that the Senate is "to form treaties

337. See Cato, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted
in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 195,
197-98 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003).
338. See Cecil L. Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union,
in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 300, 300-40.
339. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 279 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS); see also 2 id. at 278 (statement by Gilbert Livingston
that the Senate was "a dangerous body").
340. 2 id. at 314-17.
341. See, e.g., 2 id. at 320-22.
342. 2 id. at 379.
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with foreign nations," and that this "requires a comprehensive
knowledge of foreign politics, and an extensive acquaintance with
characters, whom, in this capacity, they have to negotiate with."343
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton, in arguing against a proposal that
would give state legislatures the power to recall senators and limit the
ability of senators to be reelected, stated that the Senate, "together
with the [P]resident, are to manage all our concerns with foreign
nations."344 Robert Livingston went on to state, even more broadly,
that the Senate is " to transact all foreign business."345
These statements about the Senate are difficult to reconcile with
the Vesting Clause Thesis, which hypothesizes that the President will
manage foreign affairs by virtue of having the "executive Power. "
Prakash and Ramsey's only answer t o these statements i s t o assert that
the speakers were mistaken.346 It is noteworthy, however, that these
statements went uncontested in the recorded debates. By contrast,
when John Lansing suggested that the Senate also had the power to
declare war,347 Robert Livingston quickly corrected him, noting that
"the power could not be exercised except by the whole legislature. "348
When the New York convention proceeded to have its limited
discussion of Article II, Melancton Smith and Gilbert Livingston made
several unsuccessful motions to amend the Constitution to limit the
power of the presidency. Smith moved to change the President's term
to a single term of seven years.349 Livingston moved that the President
"should never command the army, militia, or navy of the United
States, in person, without the consent of the Congress; and that he
should not have the power to grant pardons for treason, without the
consent of the [C)ongress." 350 And Smith moved to have the
convention express the view that Congress could appoint a council of
advice to assist the President. 351 Given their concerns about the
343. 2 id. at 281.
344. 2 id. at 294.
345.

2

id. at 308.

346. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 289 & nn.253-54.
347. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 285.
348. 2 id. Other comments in the debates appear to confirm the understanding that
Congress would have power over war. For example, in arguing that there would be a
sufficient number of representatives in Congress, John Jay noted that the critics of the
apportionment provisions did not think a larger number of representatives was necessary for
"the important powers of war and peace," even though these powers "reach[] objects the
most dear to the people; and every man is concerned in them." 2 id. at 274. And both
Hamilton and Jay argued that the new Congress would be less susceptible to corruption than
the Continental Congress in making decisions concerning war and peace. See 2 id. at
254, 275.
349. 2 id. at 380.
350. 2 id.
351 . 2 id. at 381.
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presidency, it seems likely that Smith and Livingston would have
complained about unspecified presidential powers, if they had
believed that such powers were encompassed by the Article II Vesting
Clause. But neither they nor anyone else in the New York ratifying
convention mentioned that possibility.
North Carolina. The views expressed in the initial North Carolina
convention might be entitled to less weight due to the fact that the
convention voted against the Constitution. Nevertheless, the
statements made during the debates shed further light on how the
supporters and opponents of the Constitution understood Article II.
Almost all of the relevant comments in the North Carolina debates
suggest that the President's powers were specified in Article II. In
addition, the proponents of the Constitution typically relied on
functional rather than essentialist arguments to explain the
Constitution's assignment of powers. Although there are a few
statements in the debates that suggest essentialist thinking with
respect to the assignment of the treaty power, these statements are
specific to that power and, in any event, were contested and
contradictory. 352
As elsewhere, the convention discussed the Constitution section by
section. Early in the debate, in discussing the first section of Article I,
William Lenoir objected to giving the President the treaty power
because, in his view, that power is legislative in nature and the
Constitution says in Article I that the legislative power is being vested
in Congress. 353 Richard Spaight, Archibald Maclaine, and James
Iredell denied that the power was legislative. In this regard, Maclaine
argued that, unlike legislation, treaties act upon states rather than
individuals, such that the President acts "in his executive capacity"
when making treaties.354 Iredell explained, somewhat differently, that
there is nothing inherently objectionable about the President making
law, since every exercise of power operates as the law of the land, and
he gave the example of a pardon.355 Lenoir remained unpersuaded by
these responses.
Prakash and Ramsey rely heavily on this exchange,356 but it is not
clear that it helps them. First, Lenoir was relying on the statement in
the Constitution that the legislative power was being assigned to

352. For a general discussion of the unusual course of ratification in North Carolina, see
Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 268, at 343, 343-67.
353. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 56.
354. See 4 id.
355. 4 id. at 57.
356. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 292 n.262, 294-95.
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Congress, not on some pre-constitutional baseline.357 Second, to the
extent that the exchange shows essentialist thinking about what is
legislative and what is executive, it does so only with respect to a
power specifically listed in Article II, not some unspecified power or
foreign affairs powers more generally. No one in this exchange said,
for example, that foreign affairs powers must be vested with the
executive. Third, even for the specified power that was discussed, the
exchange demonstrates that there was substantial debate and
uncertainty concerning the proper categorization.
When the North Carolina convention reached Article II, and the
first section of that Article was read, there apparently was silence.
William Davie, a supporter of the Constitution, expressed
"astonishment at the precipitancy with which we go through this
business."358 He thought it "highly improper to pass over in silence any
part of the [C]onstitution which has been loudly objected to."359
Although the first section of Article II met his "entire approbation,"
he knew that some people objected to having a separate Executive
Branch and to the election provisions in this section. Importantly,
Davie made no mention of any objection concerning the assignment of
substantive power, suggesting that neither he nor the opponents of the
Constitution viewed the Clause as conferring substantive power.
When the convention proceeded to discuss the second section of
Article II, Iredell noted that " [i]t conveys very important powers, and
ought not to be passed by."360 This was the first time in the debate that
any portion of Article II was referred to as conveying substantive
power. Furthermore, Iredell's statement suggests that this section was
not viewed as merely illustrative of a more general grant of power in
the Vesting Clause. Iredell confirmed this understanding, observing: "I
believe that most of the governors of the different states have powers
similar to those of the [P)resident."361
Iredell then proceeded to defend the commander-in-chief power.
He noted that "(i)n almost every country, the executive has the
command of the military forces."362 He then argued that this is a
proper assignment, based on functional reasons, such as the need for
secrecy and dispatch. He further argued that the President's power is
357. Lenoir's reading of the Article I Vesting Clause also contradicts Prakash and
Ramsey's textual argument about the distinction between the Article I and Article II vesting
clauses. Lenoir appeared to read Article I 's clause as signifying that all legislative power had
to be vested in Congress, a construction at odds with the "herein granted" language as
construed by proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis. See supra Part I.
358. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 119.
359. 4 id.
360. 4 id. at 123.
361. 4 id.
362. 4 id.
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properly guarded by Congress's power to declare war.363 Again, there
is no hint of executive power essentialism.
Essentialism did creep in, however, in the convention's discussion
of the treaty power. Samuel Spencer, an opponent of the Constitution,
objected to giving the Senate a role in the treaty process, because "by
this clause they possess the chief of the executive power."364 Spencer
thus obviously thought that the treaty power was something that
should properly be vested with the Executive Branch, and his
statement could be read as reflecting essentialist thinking with respect
to this point.365 In response, Davie agreed that the treaty power "has,
in all countries and governments been placed in the executive
departments."366 This assignment, explained Davie, had been based on
functional considerations: the need for "secrecy, design, and dispatch,
which are always necessary in negotiations between nations,'' and the
danger of "violence, animosity, and heat of parties, which too
often infect numerous bodies."367 Davie further explained that the
Constitution included the Senate in the treaty process as a
compromise to take account of the interests of the small states.368 In
addition, Davie contended that Montesquieu had been misconstrued
as arguing against any blending of powers; in fact, explained Davie,
Montesquieu did not advocate " [a]n absolute and complete
separation."369 Iredell further defended the inclusion of state interests,
through the Senate, in the treaty process.370
At most, this exchange shows that the treaty power was considered
by the speakers to be a traditionally executive power, and that there
was some debate over whether this was justified by essentialist
reasoning or functional considerations. Interestingly, an earlier
exchange in the convention (between Lenoir and others, recounted
above) was based on the opposite claim that the treaty power was
legislative rather than executive, showing the uncertain nature of these
categories. In any event, Spencer's essentialist objection, like North
Carolina's initial decision not to ratify the Constitution, did not
prevail. Rather, the Constitution deviated from strict categorization
even with respect to what Spencer referred to as the "chief' of the
executive power, which would seem to undercut the claim that the

363. 4 id. at 124.
364. 4 id. at 131.
365. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291 n.257.
366. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 134.
367. 4 id.
368. 4 id. at 135.
369. 4 id.
370. 4 id. at 139.
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Vesting Clause incorporated some sort of well-understood package of
executive power.371
In the convention's discussion of the impeachment check on the
President, Iredell stated that the President "is to regulate all
intercourse with foreign powers, and it is his duty to impart to the
[S)enate every material intelligence he receives." 372 Prakash and
Ramsey rely on this statement as implying a dominant role for the
President in foreign relations.373 On its face, however, this statement
appears merely to be referring to the President's expected role as a
medium for communications with other nations. Moreover, Iredell
made no effort to tie his statement to the Vesting Clause, and it could
just as well have been based on implications from the President's
specified powers (such as the treaty power and the powers to appoint
and receive ambassadors). This narrower construction would be
consistent with a more general statement Iredell made later in the
convention, that "[t)he powers of the government are particularly
enumerated and defined: they can claim no others but such as are so
enumerated. "374
Near the end of the convention, there were some general speeches
for and against the Constitution. In describing some of the objections
to the Constitution, Lenoir complained about various presidential
powers, including the pardon power, the appointment power, and the
veto power. 375 He made no mention of unspecified presidential
powers, although one would have expected Lenoir and other
constitutional opponents to have objected to that idea if they thought
it was encompassed within the Vesting Clause. Again, the silence is
striking.
South Carolina. The debates in South Carolina similarly reflected
the view that the President would have only the powers specified in
Article Il.376 For example, Charles Pinckney, in commenting on the
proposed executive branch, noted that " [t)hough many objections had
been made to this part of the system, he was always at a loss to
371. It is not clear that Spencer's objection prevailed even at the North Carolina
convention. None of North Carolina's proposed amendments, even the ones relating to the
treaty power, addressed his objection concerning the Senate's role in the treaty process. See
4 id. at 240-43.
372. 4 id. at 140.
373. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 288. Prakash and Ramsey also rely on an
earlier hypothetical by Iredell about the President sending a spy overseas as suggesting
executive control over foreign affairs. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 128; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 288.
374. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 219.
375. 4 id. at 205-06.
376. For background on ratification in South Carolina, see Robert M. Weir, South
Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 268, at 201, 201-34.
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account for them."377 He explained that there was "nothing dangerous
in its powers," something "easily discerned from reviewing them."378
Pinckney then proceeded to discuss only powers enumerated in
Article II. Given the Constitution's assignments of power, Pinckney
explained, the only danger would come from a combination of the
President and Senate acting together. These comments suggest that
the Executive Branch was being granted only the powers enumerated
in Article II.
The other Pinckney - Charles Cotesworth Pinckney - explained
that some people had argued for vesting the treaty power with
Congress. But the need for secrecy and dispatch, he explained,
weighed against vesting it there.379 He also argued that, even though it
may have been proper for the British king to have the treaty power,
there were potential dangers with vesting the treaty power solely with
the President.380 His discussion of the proper placement of the treaty
power is entirely functional rather than essentialist, and, like other
participants in state ratification debates, Pinckney rejected the British
model of executive power. At one point, Pinckney stated more
generally that, for functional reasons, foreign relations authority is
properly shared between the Senate and President.381
Critics of the Constitution in South Carolina also rejected the
British model. Rawlins Lowndes, for example, repeatedly asserted in
the debates that the President's powers would be too great resembling a monarchy.382 To the extent this objection was explained,
or answered, the reference always was to powers enumerated in the
Constitution, such as the treaty power.383
Conclusion. The state ratification debates confirm the lack of
Founding-era support for the Vesting Clause Thesis. In the thousands
of pages recording these debates, the argument that the Vesting

377. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 253.
378. 4 id. (emphasis added).
379. 4 id. at 258.
380. 4 id. at 258-59.
381. 4 id. at 273. Prakash and Ramsey simply assert that Pinckney was mistaken on this
point. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 289 n.253.
382. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS,
260, 278, 298.

supra

note 339, at

383. In responding to Lowndes's concern about vesting the treaty power with the
President, John Pringle argued: "The making of treaties is justly a part of their prerogative
- it properly belongs to the executive part of government, because [treaties] must be
conducted with dispatch and secrecy; not to be expected in larger assemblies." 4 id. at 263.
Prakash and Ramsey rely on the first part of this statement as confirming an understanding
that the treaty power was executive in nature, see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 293,
but they ignore the fact that Pringle's explanation is entirely functional rather than
essentialist. It is telling that Prakash and Ramsey stop their quotation of Pringle right before
the word "because" and simply summarize the functional language.
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Clause grants the President a general foreign affairs power simply
does not appear. Rather, the arguments for and against executive
authority consistently focus on the specific powers listed in Article II.
Moreover, many statements in these debates expressly or impliedly
assume that these specific powers are the only ones being granted to
the President. Furthermore, the Constitution's supporters repeatedly
made clear that, in establishing the Executive, the Constitution had
rejected the model offered by the British monarch. Instead of relying
on essentialist categories, the supporters, and to a significant extent
the Constitution's opponents as well, emphasized the functional
reasons for granting, withholding, or dividing discrete powers among
the President, Senate, and Congress. Other than as rhetorical
embellishment, essentialist assertions did little or no work in any of
these debates.
IV. THE WA SHINGTON AD MINI STRATION
A.

The Senate's Role in Treatymaking

We begin our discussion of the Washington Administration
somewhat out of chronological order. The foreign affairs law
development that we discuss here - a change in the Senate's role in
the treaty process - was not the earliest foreign affairs law
development, but it was one of the most significant. It also provides a
vivid illustration of discontinuity, since it is likely that the change in
the Senate's role was inconsistent with the Founders' original
understanding of the Constitution. Furthermore, it offers a cautionary
lesson against too easily drawing inferences about the understanding
of the Founders from postratification practices.
In a nutshell, the Founders appeared to assume that the Senate's
power of "advice and consent" in the treaty process entailed not only
a veto power but also some sort of role in the formulation and
negotiation of treaties. Although the Washington Administration
initially shared this understanding, the Administration soon deviated
from it, often formulating and negotiating treaties without Senate
input and simply presenting the treaties to the Senate for an
affirmative or negative vote. This deviation from original understand
ing became common practice and remains the practice today.384

384. For detailed descriptions of this development, see Bestor, supra note 227, and
Rakove, supra note 65. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (1988) (discussing the original understanding on this issue).
Prakash and Ramsey's otherwise quite detailed account of the Washington Administration
makes no mention of this development. They do correctly observe in a footnote, however,
that "some envisioned that the Senate would be heavily involved with foreign negotiations."
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 290 n.255.
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Understanding of the Founders

The text of the Article II Treaty Clause, in referring to both
"advice" and "consent," appears to contemplate more than just a veto
role for the Senate, since such a role presumably would be
encompassed by the word "consent." Research concerning the historic
meaning of the phrase "advice and consent" provides further support
for this construction. As Howard Sklamberg has noted, the phrase had
been used in English statutes to signify Parliament's dominant role vis
a-vis the King in the legislative process.385 It also had been used in
state constitutions to signify a formal advice role for the state
legislatures, typically in situations in which the legislatures dominated
the executive.386 Thus, as Sklamberg explains:
[A]t the time of the Constitutional Convention, the term "advice and
consent" denoted a Parliament that exercised nearly plenary lawmaking
power and state councils that played a substantial role in the exercise of
executive power. This historical context suggests that the Constitution
assigns the Senate some active function in treatymaking and does not
limit it to the role of a ratifier.387

The records of the Federal Convention support this conclusion.
Until late in the Convention, the proposed Constitution would have
given the entire treaty power to the Senate. Thus, for example, the
draft of the Constitution issued by the Committee of Detail on August
6 provided that "The Senate of the United States shall have power to
make treaties" and made no mention of treaties in its list of the
President's powers.388 The Committee of Detail's draft also would
have given the Senate the sole power of appointing ambassadors and
judges.389 Although Hamilton had proposed in his plan on June 18 that
the "Governor" was "to have with the advice and approbation of the
Senate the power of making all treaties,"390 his plan was not discussed.
Furthermore, even his plan would have given the Senate "the power
of advising and approving all Treaties," thus extending the Senate's
role beyond mere approval.391
385. See Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of "Advice and Consent": The Senate's
Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 448 (1997).
386. Id. at 449; see also supra Part 11.C.
387. Sklamberg, supra note 385, at 450.
388. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at
183, 185.
389. See 2 id. at 183. As noted above in Part III.A, the Committee of Detail's draft
assigned these powers to the Senate even though the draft also stated that the "Executive
Power of the United States shall be vested" in the President. See 2 id. at 185. Thus, the
Committee of Detail apparently did not understand the Vesting Clause as encompassing the
powers of making treaties, appointing ambassadors, or appointing judges.
390. 1 id. at 292.
391. 1 id.
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When the proposed Treaty Clause was considered in late August,
concerns were expressed about giving the treaty power exclusively to
the Senate. By this point, it had been agreed at the Convention (in
what tas been called the "Great Compromise") that the states would
have equal representation in the Senate. Madison thus "observed that
the Senate represented the States alone, and that for this as well as
other obvious reasons it was proper that the President should be an
agent in Treaties."392 Other delegates expressed the view that there
should be a check against abuses of the treaty power. Gouverneur
Morris proposed an amendment whereby treaties would not be
binding on the United States until ratified by Congress.393 James
Wilson expressed concern that, "without the amendment, the Senate
alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be
sent to some one particular port."394 Along somewhat similar lines,
George Mason, in commenting in an earlier discussion about
senatorial powers, had observed that the Senate "could already sell
the whole Country by means of Treaties."395 Madison concluded the
discussion by "hint[ing] for consideration, whether a distinction might
not be made between different sorts of Treaties - Allowing the
President & Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for
limited terms - and requiring the concurrence of the whole
Legislature in other Treaties."396
In light of these objections, the Treaty Clause, along with certain
other provisions, was eventually sent to what has come to be called the
Committee of Postponed Parts. There is no record of the Committee's
deliberations. But in its report on September 4, the Committee
proposed that the President "by and with the advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties. "397 It also proposed
that the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"

392. 2 id. at 392. As Arthur Bestor notes, in suggesting that the President should be an
"agent" of the Senate, Madison may have had in mind the agency relationship that existed
for treaties between the Continental Congress and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
pursuant to which Congress exercised ultimate control over the treaty process. See Bestor,
supra note 227, at 109.
393. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 392.
394. 2 id. at 393.
395. 2 id. at 297. At this point, John Mercer expressed the view that "the Senate ought
not to have the power of treaties" because "[t]his power belonged to the Executive
department." 2 id. As others have noted, it is unlikely that Mercer's views were
representative of the views of the other delegates. See Bestor, supra note 227, at 103-06;
Rakove, supra note 65, at 240 n.12. Moreover, Mercer also believed that treaties "would not
be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority," a proposition
expressly rejected by the Convention. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 28, at 297; see also supra text accompanying notes 234-238.
396. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 394.
397. 2 id. at 498.
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would have the power of appointing ambassadors and j udges. 398
Obviously, there had been a shift at this point towards sharing some of
the Senate's powers with the executive.399
The modified Treaty Clause was considered on September 7 . As
noted, James Wilson at this point moved to include the House of
Representatives in the treaty process, observing that " [a]s treaties . . .
are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of
laws also."400 Sherman responded that the "necessity of secrecy in the
case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole
Legislature."401 Wilson's motion was subsequently defeated, and the
first portion of the Treaty Clause (mentioning the role of the President
and Senate) was approved.402 As Rakove has explained, it is difficult to
understand the concerns of secrecy expressed in this discussion unless
the Senate was envisioned as having a role beyond merely approving
or disapproving finished treaties.403 Furthermore, as Arthur Bestor has
argued, there probably would have been more concerns raised about
assigning the treaty power to the President if it were believed that the
Senate's role were limited in this way.404
The Federalist Papers that discuss the treaty power similarly
suggest that the Senate's role would be broader than voting on
finished treaties. In Federalist No. 64, Jay emphasized the need for
secrecy and dispatch in the negotiation of treaties, and noted that
"although the President must, in forming [treaties], act by the advice
and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business
of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest."405 Jay went
on to explain that the "preparatory and auxiliary measures" in treaty
negotiations often require the most secrecy and that "should any
398. 2 id.
399. As Rakove explains, this shift appears to have been driven by concerns about the
Senate rather than an essentialist view about the powers of the executive. See Rakove, supra
note 65, at 249.
400.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 538.

401. 2 id.
402. 2 id.
403. See Rakove, supra note 65, at 246-47.
404. See Bestor, supra note 227, at 93. After approval of the first part of the treaty
clause, there was discussion of the two-thirds senatorial consent requirement. Wilson and
King objected to this requirement because, as Wilson stated, it "puts it in the power of a
minority to controul the will of a majority." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 540. Madison moved successfully at this point to
exempt treaties of peace from the two-thirds requirement. 2 id. at 540-41. He also proposed,
unsuccessfully, to allow two-thirds of the Senate to make peace treaties without the
concurrence of the President. 2 id. The exception to the two-thirds requirement for peace
treaties was subsequently stricken after additional discussion. 2 id. at 547-49. Nothing in
these discussions suggests that the Senate's role would be limited to approving or
disapproving finished treaties.
405. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 64 (John Jay), at 393.
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circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the
Senate, he may at any time convene them. "406 These statements appear
to assume that the President will be consulting with the Senate when
negotiating treaties and not simply presenting the Senate with finished
treaties that have already been negotiated.
In Federalist No. 75, Hamilton argued that the treatymaking power
was neither wholly executive nor wholly legislative in nature and thus
should be shared between the legislative and executive branches:
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of
foreign negotiations point out the executive as the most fit agent in those
transactions; while the vast importance of the trust and the operation of
treaties as laws plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a
portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.407

In arguing against giving the treaty power to the Senate alone, he
emphasized "the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President
in the conduct of foreign negotiations" and the "additional security
which would result from the co-operation of the executive."408 In
arguing against inclusion of the House of Representatives in the treaty
process, Hamilton noted, among other things, the need for secrecy and
dispatch and refers to problems associated with "obtain[ing the
House's] sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty."409 Hamilton's
statements seem to envision that the President will consult with the
Senate in negotiating treaties. These statements can also be read to
suggest that the President would act as the Senate's agent in the treaty
process, something that Madison had suggested at the Federal
Convention.
The evidence from the state ratification conventions is less clear
but on the whole is consistent with the foregoing discussion. There are
statements in some of the conventions suggesting that the President
would have a dominant role in the treaty process. There are also
statements, however, suggesting that the Senate's role would not be
limited to mere approval or disapproval of finished treaties. In the
South Carolina convention, for example, although Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney refers at one point to the Senate's role in the treaty process
as a "power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed,"410 he
later explains that it is better to have the Senate rather than the House
involved in the treaty process because it is functionally better suited
for negotiation:

406. Id.
407. Id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 451 .
408. Id. a t 451-52.
409. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
410. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 259.
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Can secrecy be expected in sixty-five members [of the House of
Representatives]? The idea is absurd. Besides, their sessions will prob
ably last only two or three months in the year, therefore, on that account,
they would be a very unfit body for negotiation; whereas the [S]enate,
from the smallness of its numbers, from the equality of power which each
state has in it, from the length of time for which its members are elected,
from the long sessions they may have, without any great inconveniency
to themselves or constituents, joined with the president, who is the
federal head of the United States, form together a body in whom can be
best and most safely vested the diplomatic power of the union.411

James Wilson made similar statements at the Pennsylvania
convention. While remarking that " [t]he Senate can make no treaties"
and referring to Senators as "only auxiliaries to the President,"412
Wilson observed that "the Senate and President possess the power of
making [treaties]" and defended the exclusion of the House of
Representatives from the treaty process on the ground that
"sometimes secrecy may be necessary, and therefore it becomes an
argument against committing the knowledge of these transactions to
too many persons."413 Similarly, as we noted above in Part III.C,
Robert Livingston stated in the New York ratifying convention that
the Senate is "to form treaties with foreign nations," and that this
"requires a comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics, and an
extensive acquaintance with characters, whom, in this capacity, they
have to negotiate with."414
In sum, although the precise role envisioned for the Senate in the
treaty process is not entirely clear, the Founders appear to have
understood that the Senate would have an advice role that went
beyond a mere affirmative or negative vote.
2.

Practices of the Washington Administration

Initially, both the Washington Administration and the Senate
shared the understanding, discussed above, that the Senate would
have a substantial advice role in the treaty process. The first treaties
received by the Senate for its consideration - two Indian treaties and
a consular convention with France - had been negotiated before the
Senate began operating and thus did not squarely present the issue of
411. 4 id. at 272-73.
412. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 303, at 480, 491.
413. 2 id. at 562. Wilson also noted that the Senate and the President "are checks upon
each other and are so balanced, as to produce security to the people." 2 id. at 563; see also
supra text accompanying note 313 (describing a statement by Wilson expressing a preference
for the Senate over the House in the treaty process because it is more suited to a "long series
of negotiation").
414. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 281.

632

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:545

the Senate's role in the negotiation process. 415 Nevertheless, in
approving the consular convention, the Senate "explicitly gave advice
as well as consent, imparting not only its own imprimatur but also an
unequivocal suggestion as to how the President should exercise his
authority to perform the distinct act of final ratification."416
On August 6, 1789, the Senate appointed a committee to confer
with the President "on the mode of communication proper to be
pursued between him and the Senate, in the formation of Treaties, and
making appointments to Offices." 417 Two days later, Washington
conveyed his sentiments to the committee, stating that, " [i]n all
matters respecting Treaties,'' oral communications "seem indis
pensably necessary."418 In a subsequent meeting with the committee,
Washington expressed the view that the Senate acts as the President's
council when considering treaties and that therefore the President
should determine the time, place, and manner of the consultation.419
He noted, for example, that "in Treaties of a complicated nature, it
may happen that [the President] will send his propositions in writing
and consult the Senate in person after time shall have been allowed
for consideration."420 He therefore suggested that:
[T]he Senate should accommodate their rules to the uncertainty of the
particular mode and place that may be preferred; providing for the
reception of either oral [or] written propositions, and for giving their
consent and advice in either the presence or absence of the President,
leaving him free to use the mode and place that may be found most
eligible and accordant with other business which may be before him at
the time.421

In late August, the Senate considered the committee's report of its
discussions with the President.422 After considering the report, the
Senate passed a resolution governing the procedures to be followed
when meeting with the President. 423 At this point, Washington
delivered a message to the Senate announcing his intent of meeting

415. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 21-23.
416. Id. at 22.
417. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 24
(Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1974).
418. Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 8, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE w ASHINGTON 373, 373 (John c. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
419. Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 10, 1789), in 30 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 377, 377-78.
420. 30 id. at 378.
421. 30 id. at 378-79.
422. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 417, at
29 n.54.
423. 2 id. at 29.
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with them "to advise with them on the terms of the Treaty to be ne
gotiated with the Southern Indians."424 Washington and his Secretary
of War, Henry Knox, came to the Senate chamber the following day
and presented the Senate with a report and a list of seven questions
(concerning instructions to be given to the commissioners appointed
to negotiate the treaty).425
Senator Maclay notes in his diary that it was difficult to hear the
presentation of the President's report (which was delivered by Vice
President Adams), due to carriages driving past the Senate chamber.426
At the request of Senator Robert Morris, the report was read a second
time. Adams then immediately asked for the Senate's advice and
consent on the questions. After a pause, Maclay rose and stated that
" [t]he business is new to the Senate, it is of importance, it is our duty
to inform ourselves as well as possible on the Subject."427 As a result,
he asked for a "reading of the Treaties and other documents alluded
to in the paper now before Us."428 According to Maclay's diary,
Washington at this point "wore an aspect of Stern displeasure."429
Various documents were then read and discussed. The Senate
ultimately decided to postpone a decision on all but one of the
questions until the following Monday. Senator Morris also proposed
that the papers communicated by the President be given to a five
person committee that would report back to the full Senate. Senator
Butler objected, noting that the Senate was "acting as a Council" and
that "no Councils ever committed anything."430
Washington apparently was unhappy with the proposal to commit
the matter to a committee. According to Maclay, Washington "started
up in a Violent fret," stating that " [t]his defeats every purpose
of my coming here."431 Although Maclay reports that Washington
subsequently calmed down and indicated that he did not object to
reconvening on Monday, Maclay also states that Washington left the
Senate-chamber "with a discontented Air. "432 In his memoirs, John
Quincy Adams reports that he had heard that "when Washington left

424. 2 id. at 30.
425. 2 id. at 31-34; Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 22. 1789), in 30
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 385, 385-390.
426. William Maclay, Diary entry (Aug. 22, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 128, 128 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E.
Veit eds., 1988).
427. 9 id.
428. 9 id. at 128-29.
429. 9 id. at 129.
430. 9 id. at 130.
431. 9 id.
432. 9 id.
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the Senate chamber he said he would be damned if he ever went there
again."433 Maclay's otherwise colorful diary does not report such a
statement, however, and it may have been apocryphal.434 The Senate
met again with the President on Monday, at which point, according to
Maclay, the President was "placid and Serene and manifested a Spirit
of Accomodation." 435 After discussion, the Senate proceeded to
answer the President's questions.436 The instructions that Washington
subsequently gave to the treaty commissioners conformed to the
Senate's answers.437
These early events suggest that both the Senate and the President
understood that the Senate would consult with the President and give
the President advice before treaties were finalized. As Professor
Currie notes, both the Senate and President in the encounter over the
Southern Indians treaty "plainly interpreted the power to advise and
consent to include not merely approval of the finished product but
also discussion in advance of the course of action to be pursued. "438
Other early examples confirm this understanding.439
The Washington Administration, however, consciously moved
away from this understanding. Washington's two meetings with the
Senate concerning the Southern Indians treaty were the first and last
times he consulted with the Senate in person.440 To be sure, even after
this episode Washington frequently sought the Senate's advice
on treaties through written communications.441 But he did not do
so consistently. In connection with four Indian treaties, for exam
ple, Washington did not consult with the Senate before the treaties
were negotiated. 442 With respect to one of these treaties in 1793,

433. 6 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 427 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875).
434. See EDWARD s. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1 787-1984, at
488 n.116 (5th rev. ed. 1984). But see RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES,
1789-1817, at 23 (1920) (stating that it is "very likely" that Washington did make this
statement).
435. Maclay, supra note 426, at 1 31-32.
436. Id. at 131-32; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS,
1789-1797, supra note 417, at 34-36.
437. See George Washington, Instructions to the Commissioners for treating with the
Southern Indians, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 65, 65-68 (Walter
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832).
438. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 24.
439. See id. at 24-25.
440. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 22; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE 33 (rev. ed. 2001).
441. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 68-70
(2d ed. 1916).
442. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 37.
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Washington asked his cabinet whether he should consult with the
Senate, and, for secrecy reasons, they advised him not to do so.443
Perhaps most famously, the Washington Administration did not
consult with the Senate before starting to negotiate the Jay Treaty
with Great Britain in 1794. The Administration informed the Senate in
April 1794 that there would be negotiations when it sought Senate
approval of Jay's appointment, but it did not submit Jay's treaty
instructions to the Senate.444 There was a motion in the Senate to
request that the Administration "inform Senate of the whole business
with which the proposed Envoy is to be charged," but the motion was
defeated. 445 More than a year later, in June 1795, Washington
submitted the completed treaty to the Senate for its approval.446 The
treaty generated substantial controversy in the United States, even
after the Senate approved it and Washington signed it.447 After much
debate, the House of Representatives demanded that Washington turn
over to it copies of Jay's negotiating instructions and other materials
relating to the treaty,448 but Washington declined to do so.
By the end of the Washington Administration, it was clear that,
despite the original understanding, the Senate had ceased to have a
substantial advice role in the treaty process.449 Since then, presidents
have consulted with the Senate prior to treaty negotiations only in
isolated instances.450 The shift away from original understanding may

443. See Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Treasury, and the Attorney General (Feb. 17, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 348, 348-49; HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 37-38.
444. See Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Apr. 16, 1794), in 33 THE
WRmNGS OF GEORGE wASHINGTON 332, 332-33 (John c. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); HAYDEN,
supra note 434, at 70-71.
445 . See Journal entry (Apr. 17, 1794), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 151, 151 (1828). There may, however, have been informal
discussions between the Administration and Senate leaders concerning Jay's instructions.
See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 73.
446. See Journal entry (June 8, 1795), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SENATE, supra note 445, at 178, 178.
447. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 209-17; STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE
AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 415-49 (1993). I n
approving the Jay Treaty (by a bare two-thirds majority), the Senate conditioned its consent
on suspension of the twelfth article of the treaty limiting trade between the United States
and the British West Indies, a condition accepted by Washington and Great Britain. This
was the first time that the Senate attached a reservation to its consent to a treaty, something
that is today common practice. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 404-07 (2000); see also SOFAER,
supra note 229, at 96 ("[President Washington] consciously accepted the Senate's power to
approve treaties conditionally, and thereby in effect to advance 'advice' in the form of
proposed amendments.").
448. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 759-60 (1796).
449. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 104-05.
450. See CRANDALL, supra note 441, at 70-72.
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well have been functionally sensible and, perhaps for this reason, the
Senate did not actively resist it. This development provides a useful
reminder, however, that one should not lightly assume that post
ratification practices and statements implemented some sort of
Founding consensus. It also provides a vivid illustration of how, in the
early years of this nation, important separation of powers issues were
worked out at the operational level in the light of practical experience
rather than by reference to essentialist categories.
B.

Washington 's Control of Diplomacy

Upon assuming office, the Washington Administration necessarily
embarked upon a wide range of activities relating to foreign affairs.
Many of the powers the first President exercised appear
straightforward and uncontroversial. Chief among these were
Washington's de facto oversight of the holdover Department of
Foreign Affairs, his direct authority over the newly established State
Department, and his primary role in determining funding levels and
establishing regulations with regard to the diplomatic corps.
Executive power essentialists claim that only the Vesting Clause
Thesis can account for Washington's actions.451 In fact, text and history
offer more specific explanations. As a matter of text, reasonable
constructions of specific foreign affairs clauses, such as those
authorizing the President to appoint and receive ambassadors, make
treaties, and require opinions from the heads of executive
departments, support accepted assertions of presidential authority
more plausibly than treating the Article II Vesting Clause as a general
source of foreign affairs authority. The history of the period,
moreover, indicates that contemporaries both inside and outside of
the Administration followed this more modest interpretive strategy.
Where specific grants reasonably supported those presidential actions
that bore upon foreign affairs, officials and commentators tended
either to accept the Executive's assertions, rely on specific text, make
functional arguments to augment the particular textual claims, or
pursue these approaches together. As we shall show in subsequent
sections, where specific text did not point to a fairly clear answer, as
with regard to the removal of the Secretary of State or the power to
proclaim neutrality, substantial controversy ensued. Yet even here, as
we will further show, participants in the debates continued to
emphasize specific text and functional consequences, making
essentialist arguments comparatively rarely, and - until Hamilton's

451. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 298-31 1.
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Pacificus essays and then only in part - relying on the Article II

Vesting Clause almost not at all.452
1.

Oversight of the Old Department of Foreign Affairs

George Washington took office facing a transitional situation that
no President has had to face since. By the time he was sworn in on
April 30, 1789, much of the rest of the government, including much of
the Executive Branch, had yet to be established. These unsatisfactory
circumstances extended to foreign affairs, one area in which an
institutional vacuum could not long be tolerated. A new Department
of Foreign Affairs was not formally established until late July, with
subsequent legislation altering the name to Department of State in
September.453 Compounding the situation, the first Secretary of State,
Thomas Jefferson, was not confirmed by the Senate until September
26, and since he was in France at the time, did not actually assume
control of the Department until March 1790. Similar to what he did in
other areas, Washington meanwhile chose to make do with the old
Department of Foreign Affairs established under the Articles of
Confederation and the holdover Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John
Jay. Accordingly, the President directed Jay to communicate papers
regarding a pending consular treaty to the Senate, to send an emissary
to Canada, and otherwise to serve as though he were an interim
Secretary of State.
According to executive power essentialists, both Washington's
attitude toward Jay and Jay's ready compliance are "inexplicable"454
absent the Vesting Clause Thesis. Whereas the Confederation
Congress had earlier created a foreign secretary answerable to it, the
very same official immediately came under the supervision of a Chief
Executive, where none had existed before, established by the new
Constitution. As Prakash and Ramsey make the point, the behavior of
these leading Founders could be considered ordinary "only if one
admits that the Constitution created a new executive principal,"455 with
the background assumption that "management of foreign affairs was
an executive function constitutionally conveyed to the President as
part of the executive power. "456
452. See infra Parts IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E.
453. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at
90 & n.56 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds., 1972); 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 693 (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1982); 6 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 1753 (Charlene Bangs Bickford
& Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
454. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 300.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 298.
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As an initial matter, the transition between the Articles of
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution was a unique event, and it is
far from clear that the actions taken in this context reflected more
general conceptions of the proper operations of government. More
importantly, even if these actions illustrated general Founding
understandings, they prove almost nothing. That the President was
viewed as having supervisory authority over officers such as the
Secretary of State hardly shows that he had been granted a residuum
of unspecified powers in the Vesting Clause. Specific textual grants of
power, such as the Appointments Clause, the Treaty Clause, the
Opinions Clause, and the Take Care Clause, plausibly gave the
President a lead role in directing such officers. Not surprisingly,
therefore, there is no reference to the Article II Vesting Clause in any
of the historical materials relating to Washington's oversight of the old
departments, including the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Even on the narrow point relating to Washington's supervisory
authority, the historical materials relating to the transition are more
ambiguous than suggested by Vesting Clause Thesis advocates. In the
first place, the President and "holdovers" such as Jay dealt with one
another not as a matter of constitutional command, but instead
consciously cooperated in an informal way to serve the interests of the
nation during the transition. As Washington explained in the first
letter he wrote to Jay seeking information regarding the nation's
foreign affairs:
Sir: Although in the present unsettled state of the Executive
Departments, under the government of the Union, I do not conceive it
expedient to call upon you for information officially; yet I have supposed
that some informal communications from the Office of foreign Affairs
might neither be improper nor unprofitable.457

When Washington again addressed the subject in more than a passing
fashion, he sounded a similar note of caution. Pressing Gouverneur
Morris to act as an envoy to Britain, Washington explained the
informal, ad hoc nature of his request: "It appears to me most
expedient," he wrote, "to have these Inquiries made informally, by a
private Agent; and understanding that you will soon be in London, I
desire you in that Capacity, and on the Authority and Credit of this
Letter, to converse with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers on these
Points."458 The President added that, "This Communication ought
regularly to be made to you by the Secretary of State, but that office
457. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (June 8, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 343, 343. While Prakash and Ramsey cite this
letter, and otherwise parse it, they omit this key passage. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
14, at 299 & n.281.
458. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Oct. 13, 1789), in 30 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 439, 440.
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not being at present filled, my Desire of avoiding Delays induces me
to make it under my own Hand."459
Jay's understanding of the situation was similar to Washington's.
In an illuminating letter to an acting U.S. agent in Morocco, the
holdover foreign secretary delivered what Prakash and Ramsey rightly
note was a "constitutional lesson."4ro Jay made clear that, since his last
communication, "a great Revolution and change in their
Government" had occurred during which "the attention of the United
States to their foreign affairs necessarily become interrupted."461 Nor,
Jay continued, had the transition been fully completed. Noting that
Jefferson had not yet assumed his duties as the new Secretary of State,
Jay explained that Washington has "directed" him to update the
envoy in the meantime.462 Jay then pointed out that holdover envoys,
like the holdover secretary, might not have a formal status under the
new regime until Congress could act, but should continue to serve for
the best interests of the nation in any case. " In these arrangements,"
he wrote, "proper attention will be paid to the powers of the
American Agents; but as this cannot be done until the ensuing

459. 30 id. Washington and Jay in passing each once employed the compulsory term
"order," and further employed the more ambiguous term, "direct." Writing to the Senate,
Washington stated that Jay "has my orders" to provide papers relevant to negotiations
resulting in certain alterations to the Consular Convention between the United States and
France. See Letter from George Washington to the Senate (June 1 1 , 1789), in 30 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 346, 346. Later, in a letter to
Secretary of War Henry Knox, the President also mentioned that he had "seen fit to direct"
Jay, as "acting Secretary of foreign Affairs," to send a special envoy to Britain to secure U.S.
surveyors to enter Canada. See Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Sept. 5,
1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 394, 394.
Washington's reference to "orders" reflects either a passing slip into the language of
command or, more likely, his desire to ensure ratification of the pending proposals by
demonstrating his desire to provide the Senate further information relevant to the process.
By contrast, to read the reference as indicating both that Washington believed that he had a
constitutional power to command Jay, and that this power was a function of executive
foreign affairs authority, not only places upon it a weight it cannot bear, but further opens
Washington to a charge of inconsistency or hypocrisy in light of his initial explanation to Jay.
Much the same can be said of Jay's language, which appears in a letter that resulted from
the issue Washington mentioned to Knox. Writing to Lord Dorchester of Britain, Jay stated
both that he had been "directed" by Washington and was acting "in pursuance of the orders
of the President." Letter from John Jay to Lord Dorchester (Sept. 4, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 602, 602 n.l (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989).
Given Washington's initial approach, Jay's use of compulsory language is best understood as
reflecting an understandable desire not to highlight the "unsettled" nature of the President's
authority over holdover officials in writing to a British official.
460. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 299.
461 . Letter from John Jay to Giuseppe Chiappe (Dec. 1, 1789), in 28 George
Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 2 Letterbooks 92,
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-binlampage?collJd=mgw2&fileName=gwpage028.db&recNum=0,
images 1 12-16 (last modified Feb. 16, 1999).
462 Id.
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Sessions of the two Houses of Congress, I am persuaded that their zeal
and attachment will, in the meantime remain unabated."463
Jay's letter also expressed his conception of the new President's
constitutional authority. He began by telling the envoy that the first
thing to notice about the new Constitution is that the President "is
vested with powers and prerogatives of far greater magnitude and
importance than any that were confided to the former Presidents of
Congress . . . to whom the great Executive Powers were not
committed; for they were all held . . . by . . . the Congress itself. "464 In
further explaining that the envoy's letters, which would otherwise
have gone to the President of the Confederation Congress, should be
delivered to the new President, Jay stated that the President
"possesses Powers and Prerogatives in many respects similar to those
which are enjoyed by the King of England."465 Jay, in other words,
emphasized the strength that the new office would play in foreign
affairs, indicated that it was analogous "in many respects," but not
identical, to the British monarchy, and throughout referred to
executive powers in the plural, rather than asserting a unified
executive foreign affairs authority, much less indicating that such an
authority came from the Vesting Clause.
Not only was the relationship between Washington and Jay
consciously informal and ad hoc, it is noteworthy that the express,
public orders that Jay received came not from the President but from
the Senate. About the same time that Washington unofficially sought
information from Jay, the Senate " O RDERED that Mr. Jay furnish the
Senate with an accurate translation of the Consular Conventions"
between the United States and France.466 Washington, once more
avoiding unambiguous language of command, responded to this order
by stating that "Mr. Jay has my directions to lay before you [the
relevant papers] at such time as you may think proper to assign."467 To
this the Senate responded that Jay is again " O RDERED, " this time to
"lay before the Senate . . . the Papers referred to in the President's
Message. "468 An executive power essentialist might respond that this
exchange reflects the exception from executive foreign affairs power
that the new Constitution carved out in according the Senate a role in
treaty ratification, or that Washington in any case interposed himself
to convert the Senate's order to Jay into his own. Neither explanation,
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 417, at 8.
467. 2 id.
468. 2 id.
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however, would fully account for the discrepancy between
Washington's careful refusal to treat the "acting Secretary" as an
official subordinate and the Senate's readiness to issue express
commands to the same official directly.
In any event, even if it were clear that Washington believed that he
had constitutional authority over the holdover officials, specific
constitutional text interpreted in the light of pressing functional needs
would provide a more reasonable account for Washington's (and the
Senate's) oversight of the nation's lame-duck foreign affairs apparatus
than would positing a vast and unspecified executive foreign affairs
authority. Washington's request for information from Jay had obvious
grounding in the Opinions Clause. 469 Both his, and the Senate's,
"order" to provide papers relevant to a pending convention likewise
had a plausible basis in the Treaty Clause.470 Even Washington's direc
tions to Jay for sending an envoy, to say nothing of his own resort to
Morris, gesture toward presidential power to appoint "Ambassadors,
other public Ministers, and Consuls" set out in the Appointments
Clause,471 the lack of Senate confirmation notwithstanding. In other
words justifications grounded in specific foreign affairs grants are at
least plausible, making it unnecessary to project all foreign affairs
authority onto the cryptic Vesting Clause, even assuming that all
parties at the time believed that the new Constitution gave the
President authority over holdover officers and departments.472
2.

Creation of the State Department

Specific constitutional text also accounts for the uncontroversial
aspects of the statute establishing what came to be named the

469. "The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
470. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2.
471. "(H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
472. By contrast, Prakash and Ramsey argue, for example, that the Opinions Clause was
"hardly sufficient authority" to authorize Washington's efforts to be updated on foreign
affairs, because "he did not merely seek opinions; he also sought the documents he would
need to review in order to make decisions." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291 n.289.
Instead, they contend, the President's purported "executive prerogatives over foreign
affairs," as granted through the Article II Vesting Clause, supplies the requisite authority. It
is not clear, however, why the Opinions Clause should be read in the narrowest possible way,
and the Vesting Clause read in the most expansive fashion.
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Department of State.473 To address the problems that the transition so
obviously created, James Madison on May 19 introduced a resolution
calling for the creation of three "executive" departments - foreign
affairs, war, and treasury. Anticipating Jay's concerns, Congress
turned first to the proposed department of foreign affairs. The House
passed the bill on June 24, with the Senate following suit on July 18.
The bill's passage is remembered almost exclusively for the epic
debate it ignited over whether Senate approval would be necessary for
removing the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and by analogy, the
other department heads - an issue that we address separately below
in Section C. The Foreign Affairs Act did not otherwise generate
significant controversy.
Executive power essentialists take those parts of the Act that
produced general agreement as confirmation of their thesis. First, they
note that the statute expressly created an "executive" department
that, along with its Secretary, was wholly subordinate to the will of the
President. Second, they point out that Congress assigned no foreign
affairs duties directly to the Secretary, but instead empowered the
President to make such assignments. More generally, they contend
that the organic statute made no attempt to convey foreign affairs
authority to the President but instead "presumed a wide executive
sphere in foreign relations" that was, moreover, "preexisting."474
As before, these claims either lack historical support, are better
explained by the Constitution's text and the experience that preceded
it, or both. While, for example, the statute did not place either the
department or the secretary under any express obligations to
Congress, it directly assigned duties to department subordinates rather
than leave such assignments entirely with the President. 475 More
473. By contrast, where text failed to address an issue, or did so in a manner that invited
opposing interpretations as in the case of removal, the statute would ignite substantial
controversy. See infra Part IV.C.
474. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 301.
475. Specifically, the Act created a "chief Clerk" subordinate to the Secretary and
provided that whenever the office of Secretary stood vacant, the clerk "shall during such
Vacancy, have the charge and custody of all Records, Books, and Papers appertaining to the
said department." Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29, reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at
689, 689.
This provision notwithstanding, it remains true that the Act generally did not directly
assign duties to the department or its personnel, but instead left such assignment to
presidential discretion. The same point also applies to the organic statute creating the War
Department. See War Department Act of 1 789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, reprinted in 6
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at
2028. By contrast, Prakash and Ramsey point to the "stark" differences in the statute
creating the Treasury Department, which both made the Secretary of the Treasury and
subordinate personnel accountable to Congress and did so directly rather than through the
President. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 301-02 n.291. These differences, they
assert, "speak[] volumes," for they "suggest[] that Congress was aware that the President
enjoyed a foreign affairs sphere (albeit limited) that no statute could infringe or limit." Id.
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importantly, a careful reading of the Act reveals that the deference
Congress gave to the President tracks, at points verbatim, Article II's
specific grants rather than some broad and undefined conception of
"executive Power." As an initial matter, at no point does the Act
expressly or implicitly refer to general executive authority as the basis
of its allocations or power. Rather, every version, including the one
enacted, set forth the duties that the President would assign to the
Secretary in almost minute detail:
the Secretary for the department of foreign Affairs, who shall perform
and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on, or
intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the
Constitution, relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions
to, or with public Ministers or Consuls from the United States, or to
negociations with public Ministers from foreign States or princes, or to
Memorials or other applications from foreign public Ministers, or other
foreigners, or to such other Matters respecting foreign Affairs, as the
President of the United States shall . . . from time to time Order or
instruct.476

This list of specific areas of responsibility would have been
surplusage if Congress had assumed that all it was doing was creating a
subordinate officer subject to the President's general foreign affairs
authority. Moreover, these areas of responsibility all echo Article II's
discrete grants to the President. The duty to handle the
correspondence, commissions, and instructions to U.S. "public
Ministers or Consuls" finds a provenance in both the President's pow
er "to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,"477 as
well as the duty to " Commission all the Officers of the United
States."478 Likewise, the same duty as applied to "negociations" with
foreign nations fairly clearly alludes to the President's authority "to
make Treaties."479 The reference to other applications from foreign
public ministers, finally, echoes presidential authority to "receive
·
what these differences instead suggest is the hybrid nature of the Treasury Department that
followed from the Constitution's assignment of relevant specific powers. Just as Article II
accords the President specific powers, including several bearing on foreign affairs, Article I
grants Congress specific powers over public lands and finance. These are precisely the
powers that the Treasury statute tracks in placing the department under certain obligations
to Congress. See Treasury Act of 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 452, at 1975. In sum,
the difference between the statutes creating the Foreign Affairs and War Departments on
the one hand, and the Treasury Department on the other, are better understood as resulting
from discrete textual commitments rather than an essentialist understanding of legislative or
executive authority.
476. Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 29, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 453, at 689, 689 (emphasis added).
477. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
478. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
479. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Ambassadors and other public Ministers."480 Further supporting each
set of obligations is the President's authority to "require the Opinion,
in Writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices."481 To be sure, the list of duties ends with a general
reference to "such other Matters respecting foreign Affairs" that the
President may order. Even aside from the descriptive limitation
"such" other matters, this passage appears to be a classic candidate for
the maxim ejusdum generis
that is, to be read as a catch-all
limited
by
the
class
that
proceeds
it - rather than as a back
provision
door allusion to a general foreign affairs authority not set out
anywhere else.
We are not attempting here to make conclusive arguments
detailing the Act's constitutional basis, or to address all
counterarguments that could have been made either then or now. Our
aim instead is to show that the general agreement that existed with
respect to the Act did not depend on an acceptance of the Vesting
Clause Thesis. Rather, both the statute and the agreement it
generated can be understood as a function of discrete statutory
allocations tracking specific constitutional grants. This view takes the
available texts more seriously and, as we have shown, is consistent
with the general emphasis on particular foreign affairs functions
evident throughout the period. Put another way, there was simply no
extraordinary gap that only an expansive reading of the Vesting
Clause could fill.
-

3.

Management of the D iplomatic Corps

The textual approach that best accounts for the transitional period
under the old Foreign Affairs Department, as well as the creation of
its successor, also explains the day-to-day workings of the new State
Department once it was up and running. As we will explain, a number
of President Washington's more ambitious foreign policy forays, such
as the Neutrality Proclamation, generated substantial constitutional
controversy.482 By contrast, Washington's day-to-day handling of the
diplomatic corps produced no more dispute than either of the matters
just related. The President's generally acknowledged oversight of
foreign affairs had several components. First, Washington for the most
part treated his new Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, as his
subordinate. Second, Washington instructed U.S. diplomats abroad
through Jefferson, and, on rare occasions, directly. Third, the

480. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
481. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
482. See infra Part IV.E.
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President had diplomats both transferred and removed. Finally,
Washington in effect created diplomatic posts, albeit through the
mechanism of appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.
In none of these instances is textual or historical support so wanting
that only the Vesting Clause Thesis can account for them.
According to essentialists, each category of Washington's actions is
unfathomable absent an expansive conception of executive foreign
affairs authority. Professors Prakash and Ramsey in particular assert
that "the Chief Executive directed the nation's foreign affairs subject
to the Constitution's exceptions to his executive power."483 Otherwise,
they suggest, Jefferson as Secretary of State would plausibly have had
a "sphere of foreign relations authority that the President simply could
not breach,"484 a novel assertion that no one then or since appears to
have made.
Once more, this interpretation overreacts what occurred and
overlooks more precise explanations. Consider, first, Washington's
supervision of Jefferson. From the outset, the President asserted his
authority over the Department,485 and the Secretary of State accepted

483. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 307.
484. Id.
485. In a long letter hoping to entice Jefferson from Paris to become the first Secretary
of State, Washington wrote that he had decided "to nominate you for the Department of
State, which, under its present organization, involves many of the most interesting objects of
Executive Authority." Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 13, 1789),
in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 446, 446. Still seeking
Jefferson's assent, Washington followed up, noting that, "The necessary arrangements with
regard to our intercourse with Foreign Nations have never yet been taken up on a great scale
by the Government: because the Department . . . has never been properly organized, so as to
bring the business well and systematically before the Executive." Letter from George
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 21, 1790), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 509, 511. These passing statements are hardly
endorsements of either the Vesting Clause Thesis or executive foreign affairs essentialism.
Fairly read, they show no more than that Washington viewed the State Department and
those foreign affairs matters with which it deals as under the purview of the Executive
Branch.
Conversely, Washington's initial letter to Jefferson suggested that the Secretary of State
would have a certain degree of independence. At one point the President stated that more or
less out of practical necessity he had placed state papers pertaining to foreign affairs in the
custody of Roger Alden, "Assistant Secretary to the late [Confederation] Congress,"
indicating nonetheless that this arrangement should be seen as provisional, "[u]nwilling as I
am to interfere in the direction of your choice of Assistants." Letter from George
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 13, 1798), supra, at 447. We do not argue that
Washington here was indicating anything more than prudential concerns, as opposed to a
belief that his authority over the State Department was in any way limited. To assert
otherwise would be to overreact this passage in the same way that Prakash and Ramsey
overreact Washington's other statements. Rather, our point is simply that Washington's
correspondence confirms only that he believed that he had authority over the State
Department, a point that we do not dispute, rather than that this authority came from an
essentialist conception of executive authority in foreign affairs, or from the Article I I
Vesting Clause.
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it,486 both in often flowery fashion. But why some version of executive
power essentialism must be invoked to account for such authority
remains a mystery. As noted, the Act establishing the Department sets
forth the requisite basis for Washington's actions in the first instance
by making the Secretary subject to presidential command in some
detail. Reliance on the statute - which neither Jefferson nor
Washington would have had any incentive to question - pushes back
the issue to the basis for the Act's assignment of authority. As we have
discussed, the Act's specific and modest language suggests that its
basis was understood to be the Constitution's discrete grants,
functionally applied, rather than an unstated consensus viewing
foreign affairs as an inherently executive matter.487
The same analysis applies to the President's handling of the
diplomatic corps. As the Foreign Affairs Act assumed, Washington
left most diplomatic correspondence to Jefferson, though in isolated
instances he did correspond with diplomats directly.488 But even had
the President corresponded directly with every U.S. diplomat all the
time, exactly how this would prove the case for executive power
essentialism would continue to be elusive. In this case the Foreign
Affairs Act expressly specified the President's authority to entrust the
Secretary of State with duties "relative to correspondences,
commissions, or instructions . . . with public Ministers or Consuls from
the United States."489 It would be an odd interpretation holding that
the Act, in placing the Secretary under these potential duties,

486. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Dec. 15, 1789), in 16
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 34, 34 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to George Washington (Feb. 14, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra, at 184, 184.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 475-481.
488. One of the rare occasions on which Washington did so involved extraordinary
circumstances. In June 1792, Gouverneur Morris assumed his duties as ambassador to
France. As would happen with much else in American politics, the ongoing French
Revolution made the appointment controversial, alienating especially those who believed
Morris was hostile to the new regime. In this context, Washington enclosed a private letter
to Morris along with the official letter from the Secretary of State signifying his nomination
and appointment. The letter informed Morris that his posting had generated opposition, as
well as the grounds for it. See Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Jan.
28, 1792), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 468, 468-70.
Washington had previously vetted the letter with Jefferson, see Letter from George
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 28, 1792), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 467, 467, whose support for the Revolution had already
become evident. In light of the extraordinarily sensitive issues that the French Revolution
would likely present for American foreign policy, Washington evidently took the unusual
step of writing to Morris directly to ensure his evenhandedness, while including Jefferson in
the process to ensure that all the key American players were on the same page. For a
discussion of the relevant background, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 314-22.
489 . Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29, reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at
689, 689.

February 2004]

Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs

647

somehow precluded the President from undertaking them directly.490
This again leaves the matter of the constitutional basis for presidential
correspondence with diplomats. As we have argued, specific text such
as the Opinions Clause and the Appointments Clause offers a more
promising basis, both in requiring a less expansive reading of text than
is required by the Vesting Clause Thesis, and in better comporting
with the contemporary preference for discrete textual arguments.491
Washington's disposition of diplomats is merely a variant on the
same themes. The President on occasion would transfer envoys from
one post to another. Significant here, however, is that this was
ordinarily done with Senate approval, apparently on the theory that a
transfer represented a new appointment that accordingly required
advice and consent.492 Conversely, Washington did unilaterally remove
diplomats, including two U.S. ambassadors to revolutionary France.493
This power, however, would logically appear to be a corollary of the
President's superior authority to remove the , Secretary of State
himself, something expressly contemplated by the Foreign Affairs
Act.494 In contrast to the fairly mundane powers dealt with so far,
Congress's decision to allow the President to remove the Secretary of
State without the advice and consent of the Senate triggered
enormous controversy due in part to the practical stakes involved and
in part because specific text did not reasonably settle the issue.495
Finally, Washington's ostensible creation of diplomatic posts
provides the essentialist interpretation with even less support than the
practices already discussed. Since Congress itself did not establish
490. We take no position on whether the Foreign Affairs Act conferred the foreign
affairs duties it specified, or merely recognized presidential authority with regard to these
matters. Either way, our argument remains that specific constitutional text, rather than
executive power essentialism, offers a more modest and satisfactory foundation for the
President's authority than the Vesting Clause Thesis.
491. See also infra Part IV.C (discussing specific textual arguments made during the
debate on removal of executive officers).
492. See PLISCHKE, supra note 167, at 48 tbl. 2.2. Prakash and Ramsey concede that this
was the usual practice without exploring its significance. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
14, at 309. They might argue, of course, that this was simply an example where specific text
transferred foreign affairs authority away from the President, with the specific text being the
assignment to the Senate of an advice and consent power over appointments. That said, a
thoroughgoing essentialist might argue that precisely since a transfer is not an appointment,
the matter should be left to the President alone. It is noteworthy, therefore, that this was not
the practice that Washington and the Senate worked out. Placed in the larger context of the
period, moreover, the practice is best accounted for by the Founding generation's inclination
for relying on discrete text and functional practicality, as we have noted throughout.
493. The volatile nature of relations with France prompted Washington to remove two
ambassadors; he first removed Gouverneur Morris, and later James Monroe. See PLISCHKE,
supra note 167, at 64 n.25; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 503-04.
494. Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 453, at 689, 689.
495. See infra Part IV.C.
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specific foreign postings, the President did have a principal role in
"creating" such positions by nominating specific individuals for
particular assignments. This principal role, however, was not exclusive
for the simple reason that the nomination of diplomats required
Senate approval, a requirement that was followed in practice.496 An
essentialist might respond that this arrangement merely confirms the
thesis that the Executive controlled foreign affairs absent
constitutional text excepting certain foreign affairs powers to the other
branches. Yet given that the Appointments Clause addresses the
matter directly, the de facto creation of diplomatic posts through
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation is no less consistent
with our view that the Founding generation looked, insofar as it could,
to discrete text.497
4.

The Diplomatic Salaries Dispute

With the issue of how to pay for U.S. diplomats abroad, the
general though largely unstated agreement evident thus far begins to
break down. Funding of the diplomatic corps did not produce the level
of controversy associated with the removal debate a year earlier or the
debate over the Neutrality Proclamation several years later.
Nevertheless, the issue of diplomatic salaries did produce a lively and
significant debate. In resolving this debate, the Founding generation
relied first and foremost on specific constitutional text and functional
practicalities. In this regard, this debate serves as a useful preview of
our consideration below of the larger and more famous controversies.
496. On this point, Prakash and Ramsey bring things almost full circle by arguing that
Washington also "felt free to dispatch unilaterally emissaries to foreign nations without the
advice (and certainly without the consent) of the Senate." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14,
at 309. For this proposition they cite the President's earlier designation of Gouverneur
Morris as a private envoy to Britain in 1789. See id. As discussed above, Washington
expressly viewed this mission as an interim measure adopted out of practical necessity, given
that the nation still lacked a Secretary of State, a situation itself due to the as yet incomplete
transition from the old regime under the Articles of Confederation to the new one under the
Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 459.
497. The establishment of diplomatic posts through presidential appointment and
senatorial nomination raises the related issue of whether and to what extent this can be done
without enabling legislation creating the post itself. As a matter of text, the Appointments
Clause has conventionally been understood to require that officers of the United States
"shall be established by law," whether "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, []
judges of the supreme Court," or "all other officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 309 n.336 (stating that they are "not sure whether the
Constitution permits the President to appoint to a diplomatic post in the absence of a statute
first creating that diplomatic post" in the light of the interpretation of the Appointments
Clause in the domestic context). As we will show in the next subsection, moreover, the
statute establishing a fund for diplomats was widely understood as delegating to the
President the authority to commission persons to serve in foreign postings as well as what to
pay them within certain specified salary grades. See infra Part IV.B.4. In this way, the Act
arguably furnished a statutory basis for the positions.
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In his first annual address to Congress, on January 8, 1790,
President Washington asked Congress to appropriate "a competent
fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of
our foreign affairs."498 Washington also noted in his address that the
"compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed,
should according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by
law." 499 These remarks appear to envision a significant role for
Congress in funding the diplomatic corps and thus, if anything, seem
to weigh against executive power essentialism.
On January 15, 1790, the House resolved that several select
committees be created to generate responses to Washington's address.
Among these was a committee regarding "provision for persons
employed in the intercourse between foreign nations and the United
States."500 Several days later, on January 1 9, Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts reported that the committee "had some doubts on their
mind respecting the extent" of the provision they were to propose.501
In particular, the committee was unsure whether it should make "a
general provision for every grade of foreign ministers, or whether, in
the contrary, they are not tied down to provide for those only who are
now in existence. "502
John Page of Virginia then moved to discharge the committee so
that the issue could be determined in a committee of the whole.503
Page's motion prompted a brief, initial debate over whether the House
should fix diplomatic salaries by law or leave the matter to the
discretion of the President. There was also some discussion at this
point over who had the authority to determine the number of foreign
ministers and where they would be sent.
William Smith of South Carolina argued that it was the business of
the President and Senate, not the House, to appoint foreign ministers,
and that the decision whether to send them to particular places "was a
business clearly within the executive branch."504 Roger Sherman of
Connecticut "[w]as inclined to think that the legislature ought to
determine how many ministers should be employed abroad" and he
"did [not] think it would be any abridgment of the executive power to

498. President George Washington, First Annual Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 491, 492.
499. 30 id.
500. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 23
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994).
501. 12 id. at 34.
502. 12 id.
503. 12 id. at 35.
504. 12 id. at 36.
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do so." 505 Alexander White of Virginia argued that "the most
inconvenient consequences might result" if congressional approval
were needed prior to sending foreign ministers, since " [t]he exigencies
that required such an appointment, might be over before the legis
lature had convened for the purpose of authorising him to make it."506
Moving to the issue of who should set the diplomatic salaries,
James Jackson of Georgia made two arguments in support of
congressional authority. First, he suggested that Congress was better
suited than the President to take account of geographic differences
when setting diplomatic salaries.507 Second, he argued that it would be
embarrassing to the President if he were the one to make salary
distinctions among postings.508 This salary issue would become the
focal point of a more lengthy debate about a week later. At this point,
the House simply instructed the committee that, in providing for
compensation for U.S. diplomats, it should provide for "a
compensation for persons who may hereafter be employed in such
intercourse."509 It is noteworthy, though, that these initial discussions
were focused entirely on functional arguments, and that there was no
mention of either executive power essentialism or the Article II
Vesting Clause.
On January 26, the House resolved itself into a committee of the
whole "on the bill to provide for the means of intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations."5 10 This bill authorized a sum not
exceeding $40,000 to be drawn from the Treasury at the President's
discretion, and it also set maximum salaries for the various diplomatic
grades.5 1 1
Almost immediately, Richard Bland Lee of Virginia moved to
amend the bill by inserting the words "by and with the consent of the
senate" after the word "president." Lee relied on an analogy to the
treaty power, arguing that, "as the constitution had vested in the
president, with the advice and consent of the senate, the power of
appointing ambassadors and other public ministers, he thought they
ought to be equally interested in proportioning the salaries. "512 As The

505. 12 id. at 37.
506. 12 id.
507. 12 id.
508. 12 id. at 37-38.
509. 12 id. at 38.
510. 12 id. at 75.
511. See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791,
supra note 453, at 67.
512. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 500, at 75.
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Daily Advertiser put it, " [a] considerable debate now ensued. "513
Nowhere in this debate was there any mention of the Article II
Vesting Clause. Nor did executive power essentialism play any
significant role in the debate. Instead, in rejecting Lee's motion, the
prevailing view appears to have been that Congress had the authority
to set the diplomatic salaries, but that it was functionally desirable to
delegate some of that authority to the President.
Several House members supported Lee's motion to require Senate
consent, and these House members obviously did not rely on
executive power essentialism. Rather, they relied on a combination of
specific textual grants and functional arguments. For example,
Michael Jennifer Stone of Maryland argued that it was proper to give
the Senate a consent power over diplomatic salaries because "the
constitution has vested [the Senate] with equal authority in every
transaction relative to this business."514 He subsequently elaborated on
this point, noting that the Senate's advice and consent was required
for treaties and arguing that the House would be departing from this
principle if it " [increased] the agency of the president."515 Stone also
complained that allowing the President to determine the salaries
would give him undue influence over the appointments process.516
Roger Sherman of Connecticut invoked both the Treaty Clause and
the Appointments Clause, arguing:
The establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the senate, as
does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business; these
two objects are expressly provided for in the constitution, and they lead
me to believe, that the two bodies ought to act jointly in every
transaction which respects the business of negociation with foreign
powers.5 1 7

As for the opponents of the motion, almost all of them objected to
Lee's motion on purely functional grounds. Smith of South Carolina,
for example, acknowledged that the Constitution was "silent" on the
issue, but argued that a requirement of Senate consent would
"diminish the responsibility of the executive officer" and might "open
513. 12 id. at 69.
514. 12 id. at 76.
515. 12 id. at 78.
516. 12 id.
517. 12 id. at 79. In attempting to discount these pro-Senate statements, Prakash and
Ramsey assert that "a much larger number [of House members] . . . regarded the
'intercourse with foreign nations [as] a trust specially committed to the President.' " Prakash
& Ramsey, supra note 14, at 303-04. Here they quote from a summary of the debate in the
Gazette of the United States, which merely states that this proposition "was contended"
during the debate and does not indicate how much support it received. See 1 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY O F THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 500, at
72. The much more detailed account of the debate in the Congressional Register reveals little
express support for this proposition. See 12 id. at 75-82.
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a door for cabal."518 Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut further
noted that "it might happen that the money might be wanting during
the recess of the senate, and it would hardly be expedient to call them
together for the purpose of making a draft upon the treasury for a
small sum of money" and that "it was also judged prudent to leave it
at the discretion of the executive officer to apportion the salaries."519
And James Madison observed that apportionment of salaries "could
be better performed by the president alone than connected with a
large body. "520
In conjunction with these functional arguments, some House
members emphasized that the proposed bill would sufficiently cabin
presidential power. In response to Stone, for example, Sedgwick
argued that the ceilings imposed by the bill on the salaries for the
various diplomatic grades, along with the Senate's role in the
appointments process, would ensure that the President would not have
"an improper influence. "521 John Laurance of New York made the
same point, while also noting that the power of setting the diplomatic
salaries was a congressional power and thus one that it could delegate
to the President.522
Other House members echoed Laurance's view that Congress had
the ultimate authority to establish the diplomatic salaries. James
Jackson, for example, argued that the power to set salaries should not
be delegated to the President even with the Senate's consent, because
" [t]he appropriation of public money belongs in a peculiar manner to
this house, and I am for retaining the power in our own hands."523
Similarly, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania argued that "disposing of, or
giving away sums of public money, is a legislative, not an executive act;
and cannot be performed in any other way than with all the formalities
of legislative authority." 524 These comments, if anything, suggest
legislative essentialism rather than executive essentialism, although
the speakers also appear to have had in mind the requirement in
Article I, Section 9 that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by law."525
Importantly, this claim by several House members that Congress
had the power to set the diplomatic salaries was not met with denial.
518. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 500, at 75.
519. 12 id. at 76.
520. 12 id. at 81.
521. 12 id. at 77.
522. 1 2 id. at 78.
523. 12 id. at 88.
524. 12 id. at 89.
525. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
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Instead, opponents of Lee's motion simply responded that it was
functionally desirable for Congress to delegate some of this authority
to the President. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, for example, argued
that "we are so circumstanced as not to be able to ascertain the proper
sum required by every diplomatique officer who may be sent to the
various courts of Europe, and other quarters of the globe." 526
Sedgwick similarly acknowledged that Congress could fix the salaries,
but he "feared that the house had not sufficient information for that
purpose. "527
Only one House member, Egbert Benson of New York, espoused
an executive essentialist position. In objecting to Lee's motion,
Benson stated that:
[I]t would be wrong to blend the senate with the president, in the
exercise of an authority not jointly vested in them by the constitution;
and in any business whatever of an executive nature, they had no right to
do it any more than they had the right to associate a committee of this
house with him.528

This comment, although emphasized by Prakash and Ramsey,529 was
sandwiched between the lines of argument described above and
appears to have generated no discussion. Benson's comment is also
substantially outweighed by the numerous statements claiming, or
acknowledging, that Congress had the constitutional power to set the
diplomatic salaries. Finally, Congress's eventual enactment of the
appropriations bill was itself a repudiation of executive power
essentialism, since the bill placed precise limits on the salaries for each
of the diplomatic grades.530
The above debate did not entirely resolve the controversy over
diplomatic appointments. On January 28, 1790, Sherman successfully
moved to table the appropriations bill, arguing that the sum of $40,000
was "too much for the purposes specified in the bill, and that the
house had no measure at present whereby they could ascertain the
sums necessary to be appropriated."531 The House did not return to
the bill until late April.

526. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1 789-1791, supra
note 500, at 89.
527. 12 id. at 90.
528. 12 id. at 81.
529. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 304.
530. See An Act Providing the Means of Intercourse Between the United States and
Foreign Nations, 1 Stat. 128 (1790); see also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 46 ("In prescribing
ceilings for remuneration for various types of officers, Congress rejected the thesis that the
Constitution reserved the matter to the President with or without consent of the
Senate . . . . ).
"

531. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra
note 500, at 97.
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In the meantime, Washington asked Jefferson (who had just
returned from France to assume his duties as the new Secretary of
State) to prepare an opinion addressing whether the Senate, in
exercising its advice and consent power over appointments, could
"negative" the proposed grade of U.S. diplomats. In response to this
request, Jefferson prepared a written opinion concluding that the
Senate did not have the authority to negative the grade.532 Jefferson's
opinion contains some pro-executive language, and Prakash and
Ramsey not surprisingly rely on it.533
Jefferson's opinion begins with the following general claim about
the separation of powers structure of the Constitution:
The Constitution has divided the powers of government into three
branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, lodging each with a
distinct magistracy. The Legislative it has given completely to the Senate
and House of [R]epresentatives: It has declared that the "Executive
powers shall be vested in the President," submitting special articles of it
to a negative by the Senate; and it has vested the Judiciary power in the
courts of justice, with certain exceptions also in favor of the Senate. 534

This passage obviously refers to powers in somewhat essentialist
terms, albeit by reference to constitutional text rather than
preconstitutional theory. Unlike proponents of the Vesting Clause
Thesis, however, Jefferson appears to be assuming here that there is
no difference in the effect of the three vesting clauses in the
Constitution, with the Article I Vesting Clause, for example,
purportedly giving the legislative power "completely to the Senate and
House of Representatives. " Furthermore, Jefferson's reference here
to "the Executive powers" in the plural rather than to the singular
form used in the Article II Vesting Clause, may suggest that he is
referring to the powers specifically listed in Article II rather than some
residuary category.535
Jefferson then proceeds to equate at least one aspect of foreign
affairs with executive power, stating: "The transaction of business with
foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of
that department, except as to such portions of it as are specifically
submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."536 In

532. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 486,
at 378, 378-80 [hereinafter Jefferson Opinion).
533. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 305-07.
534. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, at 378-79.
535. Prakash and Ramsey claim that, in using a plural reference, Jefferson "erroneously
quoted the Vesting Clause," see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 306, and then in a later
discussion they substitute a singular reference in brackets in place of Jefferson's actual
language, see id. at 3 1 1 .
536. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, a t 379.
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context, Jefferson's reference to the "transaction of business with
foreign nations" is almost certainly a reference to negotiations and
other diplomatic interactions between the United States and other
nations, and not to substantive foreign affairs powers. Although
Jefferson does not explain the reasoning behind his claim that such
interactions are to be managed by the Executive Branch, the
remainder of his opinion suggests that he was relying, at least in part,
on the President's designated role in nominating, appointing, and
commissioning diplomatic officers.537 Thus, Jefferson observes that the
Constitution "gives the nomination of the foreign Agent to the
President, the appointment to him and the Senate jointly, and the
commissioning to the President," and he reasons that the Senate's
advice and consent power "does not comprehend the neighboring acts
of nomination or commission, (and the constitution says it shall not, by
giving them exclusively to the President) still less can it pretend to
comprehend those previous and more remote of destination and
grade."538 In other words, Jefferson reasons that the determination of
the destination and grade of the diplomats is related to the President's
assigned powers over nomination and appointment, not the Senate's
advice and consent power.
In sum, although essentialist and pro-executive in its orientation,
Jefferson's opinion did not claim that all foreign affairs powers were
inherently vested in the Executive Branch. Moreover, despite making
an arguable reference to the Article II Vesting Clause at the beginning
of his opinion, Jefferson did not ultimately claim that the
determination of the destination and grade of diplomats was a residual
power encompassed by the Vesting Clause. Rather, in concluding that
the Senate did not have the power to regulate those determinations,
Jefferson relied on the specific language of the Appointments and
Commissions Clauses.539
537. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in relevant part that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Article II, Section
3 provides in relevant part that the President "shall commission all the officers of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Of course, Jefferson also could have relied on the
President's role in making treaties as further support for his control over diplomacy;
regardless of the originally intended role for the Senate in the treaty process, see supra Part
IV.A, the Treaty Clause easily can be read to give the President at least a lead role in
negotiating and concluding treaties.
538. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, at 379.
539. Washington apparently also sought out the views of John Jay and James Madison
concerning the Senate's authority to control the destination and grade of U.S. diplomats.
There is no direct record of what Jay and Madison told the President. In his diary, however,
Washington reported that Madison's view
coincides with Mr. Jays and Mr. Jeffersons - to wit - that [the Senate has] no
Constitutional right to interfere with either, & that it might be impolitic to draw it into a
precedent their powers extending no farther than to an approbation or disapprobation of the
person nominated by the President all the rest being Executive and vested in the President
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The Removal Debate

Congress's establishment of the executive departments in 1789
occasioned a sustained and important debate in the House of
Representatives over the President's power to remove executive
officers.540 This debate is relevant to foreign affairs authority, both
because it concerned the scope of executive power in general, and
because it specifically concerned executive power to remove the
Secretary of State. On May 19, 1789, Madison proposed that Congress
establish three executive departments - a department of foreign
affairs, a department of the treasury, and a department of war.541 He
also proposed that the heads of these departments be "removable by
the [P]resident. "542 There was substantial debate over the removal
provision, after which a vote was taken and a "considerable majority"
in the House (sitting as a Committee of the Whole) favored retaining
the provision. 543 The House revisited the issue on June 16, in
considering the proposed bill for the Department of Foreign Affairs.
At this point, Alexander White of Virginia moved to strike the
presidential removal provision, and a week-long debate ensued over
this issue.544 The House subsequently voted thirty-four to twenty not
to strike the provision. A few days later, however, the provision was
deleted in a complicated vote described below.

by the Constitution.
George Washington, Diary entry (Apr. 27, 1790), in 6 THE DIARIES OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 68, 68 (Donald Jackson & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1979). Although cryptic, this
diary entry appears to suggest that Madison and Jay, like Jefferson, thought that the
Constitution (perhaps through the terms of the Appointments Clause) granted the President
general control over U.S. diplomats, subject only to the Senate's ability to disapprove of par
ticular nominees. There is no suggestion here that Madison or Jay thought that the Article II
Vesting Clause gave the President residual foreign affairs powers. Nor did Madison make
such a suggestion in the House debates over diplomatic funding described above.
540. For detailed accounts of this debate, see 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 317-71
(Richard Loss ed., 1981); JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at
155-89 (1948); and THACH, supra note 122, at 140-65. See also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 3641. This debate is also discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 ( 1926). Prakash and Ramsey make only passing reference to the debate.
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 302.
541. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791,
at 725 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
542. 10 id.
543. 10 id. at 740.
544. When White made the motion, William Smith of South Carolina noted that he
himself had planned to make such a motion, and that he "believed that many gentlemen [on
May 19) neglected to oppose the principle in the bill, under an idea that a further discussion
would take place, and had reserved themselves accordingly." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 842-43 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al.
eds., 1992).
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Both in the May 19 debate and in the debate in mid-June, a
substantial number of House members argued that the heads of
departments could constitutionally be removed only in the same way
that they were appointed - that is, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Theodorick Bland of Virginia argued, for example, that "[t]he
constitution declares, that the president and the senate shall appoint,
and it naturally follows, that the power which appoints shall remove
also."545 Similarly, Alexander White of Virginia stated that "[t]he
constitution had given the power of appointment to the senate, and
most certainly it gave them the power to dismiss."546 William Smith of
South Carolina went further, arguing that the only constitutional basis
for removing heads of departments was through the impeachment
process.547
In response to these arguments, some of the supporters of the
removal provision - including eventually Madison - did invoke the
Article II Vesting Clause. In the May 19 debate, John Vining of
Delaware argued that "there was a strong presumption that [the
President] was invested with [the removal power]; because, it was
declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in
cases where it is otherwise qualified."548 And George Clymer of
Pennsylvania stated that "the power of removal was an executive
power, and as such belonged to the president alone, by the express
words of the constitution, 'the executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States of America. ' "549 At this point in the
debate, Madison, in contrast, relied primarily on functional arguments.
He noted, for example, that a requirement of senatorial advice and
consent for removal "would be found very inconvenient in practice"
and would "tend[] to lessen [the] responsibility" of the President over
his subordinates.550
When the debate resumed in June, Madison added his voice to
those invoking the Vesting Clause. On June 16, he noted that the
Constitution states that the executive power shall be vested in the
President and that, although it contains an exception for senatorial

545. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 541, at 737.
546. 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 544, at 848.
547. lO DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 541, at 727. At times, however, Smith seemed to accept that presidential removal with
the advice and consent of the Senate might be sufficient. See, e.g. , 1 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1 789-1791, supra note 544, at 861.
548. 10 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 541, at 728.
549. 10 id. at 738.
550. 10 id. at 735.
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involvement in appointments, he did not think Congress had the right
to "extend this exception."551 And, on June 17, Madison referred to
the Vesting Clause and argued that the requirement of senatorial
advice and consent for appointments was "an exception to this general
principle; and exceptions to general rules are ever taken strictly."552
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts also invoked the Vesting Clause in the
June debate, noting that the Constitution declares "that the executive
power shall be vested in the president" and that " [u]nder these terms
all the powers properly belonging to the executive department of the
government are given, and such only taken away as are expressly
excepted. "553
Despite these invocations of the Vesting Clause, it is impossible to
find in the removal debates any consensus in favor - or even majority
support for - the Vesting Clause Thesis. This is so for a number of
reasons. First, more than a dozen House members spoke on behalf of
the removal provision in the May and June debates, and most of them
did not invoke the Clause. Instead, they relied on specific textual
grants, such as the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause,
and on functional arguments. Indeed, Madison himself often relied on
these alternative arguments, even after having invoked the Vesting
Clause. Immediately after invoking the Vesting Clause on June 17, for
example, Madison noted that "there is still another part of the
constitution, which in my judgment, clearly favors the construction I
give. The President is required, sir, to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. "554
Second, at least some of the proponents of the removal provision
appear to have believed that the Constitution did not even address the
power of removal, let alone assign this power to the President. These
proponents supported the removal provision not because it followed
from the Article II Vesting Clause, but rather because they thought it
was a functionally desirable legislative measure. John Laurance of
New York, for example, thought that the "constitution was silent with
respect to the time the secretary of foreign affairs shall remain in
office" and that the "only question" was "could the legislature safely
trust the president with this power."555 Similarly, Egbert Benson of

551. 1 1 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 544, at 868.
552. 1 1 id. at 896; see also 1 1 id. at 922 (invoking the Vesting Clause).
553. 1 1 id. at 979; see also 11 id. at 960 (Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts making
arguable reference to the Vesting Clause).
554. 11 id. at 896.
555. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 541 , at 733; see also 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS,
1789-1791, supra note 544, at 908-09 (John Laurance stating that the Constitution "is silent"
on the issue of removal and that Congress can address this constitutional omission); 11 id. at
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New York argued that "there was a power in the legislature of
supplying the omission in the constitution."556 And Fisher Ames,
despite having invoked the Vesting Clause, expressed the view that
the power of removal "not being distributed by the constitution, it will
come before the legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must
be supplied by law."557
At times, Madison also suggested this view. He acknowledged that
" [p]erhaps this is an omitted case" in the Constitution,558 and he
argued that "there was no impropriety in the legislature settling this
question."559 In a letter to Edmund Randolph, he noted that, "The
Constitution has omitted to declare expressly by what authority
removals from office are to be made. Out of this silence four con
structive doctrines have arisen . . . . "560 Moreover, Madison confessed
that his view regarding a presidential power of removal "does not
perfectly correspond with the ideas I entertained of [the Constitution]
from the first glance."561 These statements suggest that Madison was
not necessarily claiming that the constitutional Founders had resolved
the removal issue in favor of the President.562 Indeed, Smith pointed
911 (Laurance referring to "declaring a legislative opinion in cases where the constitution is
silent").
556. 11 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 544, at 902.
557. 1 1 id. at 882; see also 1 1 id. at 886 (Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania arguing that if
the Constitution was "silent" on the issue of removal, Congress had the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to address it); 11 id. at 873 (Elias Boudinot of New Jersey
referring to the removal provision as "a legislative construction of the constitution necessary
to be settled for the direction of your officers"); 1 1 id. at 939 (Vining suggesting that
Congress has the power to give the President the power of removal by virtue of the
Necessary and Proper Clause); 11 id. at 963 (Richard Lee of Virginia making a suggestion to
the same effect); 11 id. at 983 (Sedgwick stating that "the legislature were at liberty to
determine that an officer should be removable by the president, or whom they pleased").
558. 1 1 id. at 927.
559. 11 id. at 845.
560. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 251, 252 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). Madison also
described Congress's decision on this matter as a "legislative construction" of the
Constitution, see 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1 7891791, supra note 544, at 987, and expressed the view that Congress's resolution of this issue
would become "the permanent exposition of the constitution." 11 id. at 921. As Professor
Caleb Nelson explains, Madison believed that the meaning of uncertain provisions of the
Constitution could be "liquidated" or "fixed" by the post-Founding practices and
interpretations of the federal branches. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 19, 525-29 (2003).
561. 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 544, at 867; see also 1 1 id. at 846; 1 1 id. at 896; 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 541, at 735 (stating that "[t]he
constitution at the first view, may seem to favor" the requirement of senatorial advice and
consent for removal).
562. At least this is true during much of the debate. At the end of the debate, in arguing
for Benson's motion (described below), Madison claimed: "Gentlemen have all along
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out during the debate that Federalist No. 77 had stated that senatorial
advice and consent would be required for removal, and neither
Madison nor anyone else disagreed.563 This idea - that Congress was
addressing something not resolved at the Founding - helps explain
the frequent reliance by Madison and other proponents of the removal
provision on functional rather than textual arguments. As Smith
accurately observed, many supporters of the removal provision "have
gone mostly on the point of expediency."564
Third, a number of the opponents of the removal provision directly
contested the Vesting Clause Thesis. Alexander White, for example,
argued that, although the executive power is vested in the President,
"the executive powers so vested, are those enumerated in the
constitution." 565 Similarly, Smith argued that the Vesting Clause
argument "proves too much, and therefore proves nothing; because it
implies that powers which are expressly given by the constitution
would have been in the president without the express grant."566 And
James Jackson of Georgia argued that even if it could be proved that
the power of removal was executive in nature, "it does not follow that
it vests in the president alone because [the President) alone does not
possess all executive powers."567

proceeded on the idea that the constitution vests the power in the president; and what
arguments were brought forward respecting the convenience or inconvenience of such a
disposition of the power, were intended only to throw light upon what was meant by the
compilers of the constitution." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 544, at 1029.
563. 1 1 id. at 861. Federalist No. 77, written by Hamilton, states that the consent of the
Senate "would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint." THE FEDERALIST, supra note
2, No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), at 459.
564. 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 544,
at 985; see also 1 1 id. at 849 (Smith noting that the supporters of the removal provision were
"inconsistent with themselves," with some arguing that the Constitution gave the President
the power of removal and others arguing that Congress should give the President this
power). Not surprisingly, Smith and other opponents of the removal provision denied that
Congress had the power to fill in a constitutional omission in this way. See, e.g., 11 id. at 850
(Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stating that he "feared that the House were about making
a breach in the constitution, by treating the subject as a meer question of expediency"); 1 1
id. a t 943 (Smith stating that "[s]ome gentlemen have supposed that the constitution has
made no provision for the removal of officers; and they have called it an omitted case, and a
defect. They ask, if we may not supply that defect. I answer, No."); 1 1 id. at 901 (recording a
statement by Gerry that "[a]n attempt to supply such a case might appear an attempt at an
amendment to the constitution"). They also argued that the removal provision was
unnecessary if the Constitution in fact already gave the President the power of removal. See,
e.g. , 1 1 id. at 986 (documenting remarks made by Smith).
565. 11 id. at 872; see also 11 id. at 952-53 (White contesting the Vesting Clause Thesis).
566. 1 1 id. at 936-37; see also 11 id. at 843 (Smith stating that "[i]f one reads the
[Constitution] with attention, one would see that the powers of the different departments of
the government were defined expressly").
567. 11 id. at 912; see also 11 id. at 1013-14 (Michael Stone of Maryland contesting the
Vesting Clause argument). White and Gerry also pointed out that a number of state
constitutions had not given the governors the powers of appointment and removal, which
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Fourth, the House members who invoked the Vesting Clause did
so in a limited way. None of them suggested that the Article II Vesting
Clause gave the President a package of unenumerated foreign affairs
powers, even though the mid-June debate occurred in the context of
discussing the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs.568 In fact, one
of the opponents of the removal provision - Samuel Livermore of
New Hampshire - stated that he did not think anyone would claim
that the President had the implied power to terminate treaties,569 and
no one did. Instead of seeing the Vesting Clause as conveying a
package of foreign affairs powers, the House members who invoked
the Clause may have simply believed that the Clause gave the
President a general power to execute the laws, and that removal of
subordinate executive officers was included within such a power.
Fisher Ames, for example, closely tied his views regarding the vesting
of executive power to the President's responsibility for executing the
laws, stating:
The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the president,
and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion
for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human
nature in one man, demands the aid of others. . . . [H]e must therefore
have assistants: But in order that he may be responsible to his country,
he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them,
with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which
induced their appointment cease to exist. 570

This strong functional argument does not depend on the acceptance of
unenumerated foreign affairs powers.
Madison also appears to have been invoking the Vesting Clause in
this limited, "execution of the laws," way. Unlike the typical
formulation of the Vesting Clause Thesis, Madison made no
distinction in his statements between the three Vesting Clauses,
instead referring to the legislative, executive, and judicial Vesting
Clauses as if they had similar effect. He stated, for example, that "the
legislative powers shall be vested in two houses, and the executive in a

shows, they argued, that these powers were not viewed as inherently executive in nature. See
1 1 id. at 877-878, 930.
568. As Professor Powell notes, there was a reference to foreign affairs by Vining, see
POWELL, supra note 17, at 39, but the reference is vague and does not claim that the Vesting
Clause grants foreign affairs powers to the President. See 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 544, at 870 (stating that the
President "executes the duties of foreign affairs"). Although Thomas Hartley of
Pennsylvania did not refer to the Vesting Clause, he did state at one point that, "The
business of the secretary of foreign affairs is of an executive nature, and must consequently
be attached to the executive department." 11 id. at 905.
569. See 1 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791,
supra note 544, at 884.
570. 11 id. at 880.
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President. "571 In addition, Madison made no reference to an executive
power over foreign affairs, and the only textual exception Madison
mentioned with respect to the Constitution's vesting of executive
power in the President is the requirement of senatorial advice and
consent for appointments.572 Thus, to the extent that Madison viewed
the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power, the power he
appears to have had in mind was something like a power to execute
the laws - not a package of substantive foreign affairs powers. This
reading of his statements is consistent with the Helvidius essays he
wrote several years later regarding the constitutionality of the 1793
Neutrality Proclamation (discussed below in Section E). In those
essays, he distinguished the Proclamation from the President's power
of removal, arguing that "the powers of war and treaties" implicated
by the Proclamation cannot be classified "within a grant of executive
power. "573 Madison argued:
[No analogy] can be traced between a power in the supreme officer
responsible for the faithful execution of the laws, to displace a subaltern
officer employed in the execution of the laws; and a power to make
treaties, and to declare war, such as these have been found to be in their
nature, their operation, and their consequences.574

Finally, the ultimate vote on the removal provision was too
complicated and uncertain to show even a consensus in favor of an
Article II power of removal, let alone a consensus in favor of the
Vesting Clause Thesis. On June 19, the question was called, and the
vote was thirty-four to twenty to retain the removal provision.575 Three
days later, however, Benson, who had voted for the removal provision,
made two motions - first, to add a provision in the bill stating that the
duties of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be assumed by his
assistant "when ever [the secretary] shall be removed from office by
the president of the United States"; 576 and second, to delete the
removal provision that had occasioned so much debate. Benson
explained that the removal provision might look too much like a grant
of power from Congress, whereas his new proposed language "would
evade that point, and establish a legislative construction of the con-

571. See 11 id. at 896.
572. 11 id.
573. JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS NO. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 72.
574. 15 id.; see also Prakash, supra note 26, at 794-97 (noting consistency between
Madison's position in the removal debate and his position as Helvidius).
575. 1 1 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra
note 544, at 1024.
576. 1 1 id. at 1028.
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stitution."577 In two separate votes, Benson's motions were approved.
As Professor Currie explains, however, different House members
voted for the two motions, making it impossible to infer majority
support for an Article II power of removal:
The members first voted thirty to eighteen to add Benson's "whenever"
language. All those who voted in favor of presidential removal voted aye,
whether they thought that Article II settled the question or left the
matter to Congress. The House then voted thirty-one to nineteen to drop
the phrase "to be removable by the President." The numbers were
virtually identical, but it was a different majority. For on this question
the proponents of Article II power prevailed only because they were
joined by a substantial number of members who had opposed
presidential removal altogether.578

A fortiori, one cannot infer majority support from this vote for the
Vesting Clause Thesis, even in the limited form it was presented
during the debates.579
Although the bill for the Department of Foreign Affairs was then
sent to the Senate, there is unfortunately no official record of the
Senate discussions. It is clear from Senator Maclay's diary that there
was a debate in the Senate over the "whenever" clause that had been
added pursuant to Benson's motion, and that Maclay and certain other
Senators spoke out against it.580 We also know from the Senate Journal
that the clause narrowly survived defeat, when there was a ten to nine
vote on July 18 to retain it, with Vice-President Adams casting the tie
breaking vote.581 Although it appears from Maclay's diary and from
Adams's (very sketchy) notes that there was disagreement over the
implications of the Vesting Clause - between Oliver Ellsworth and

577 . 11 id. In support of Benson's motions, Vining expressed the view that the
substitution made it "more likely [that they would] obtain the acquiescence of the senate."
11 id. at 1035-36.
578. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 40-41; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 28485 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting this uncertainty in the votes); Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 36, at 645 (describing the "sea of conflicting congressional views").
579. See also 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 540, at 332 (noting that "a
mere fraction of a fraction, a minority of a minority, of the House, can be shown to have
attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of executive prerogative").
580. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791,
supra note 426, at 109-16.
581. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791,
supra note 453, at 86. An earlier vote apparently had been taken on July 16, and it was 11-10,
with the Vice-President breaking a tie. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 426, at 1 15. "Two days later (July 18) those who
were against the bill asked for the yeas and nays in the same form as originally voted, with
the casting vote of the Vice President. Butler had been for striking out, but was now absent.
So Ellsworth withdrew to preserve the tie." HART, supra note 540, at 188.
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William Johnson, for example582 - it is impossible to reconstruct the
precise nature of the Senate's discussion from the materials we have.
As a result, the same ambiguities that exist with respect to the House
vote exist with respect to the Senate vote. As Professor Currie notes,
" [I]t was the considered judgment of a majority in both Houses of
Congress that the President could remove the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, but there was no consensus as to whether he got that authority
from Congress or the Constitution itself."583
In sum, what we find in the first major debate in Congress over
executive power is uncertainty and disagreement, not consensus. The
idea that the Article II Vesting Clause conveys unenumerated power,
far from being an understood feature of the recently ratified
Constitution, was instead simply one of many contested arguments in
the debate, and not the dominant one. If any approach could fairly be
said to claim preeminence in this debate, it was the focus on functional
consequences that had been so evident earlier in the Founding
debates. Moreover, even those who invoked the Vesting Clause did so
in the limited context of a presidential power to execute the laws and
made no claim that the Vesting Clause conveys unenumerated foreign
affairs powers.
D. Reception and Recall of Genet
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis invoke the Washington
Administration's handling in 1793 of the controversial ambassador
from revolutionary France, Edmond Genet, as support for the Thesis.
On their view, only a general foreign affairs power understood as
executive can explain the Administration's dealings with this reckless
emissary.584 In fact, the Administration's actions with respect to Genet
can all reasonably be tied to the President's enumerated powers to
receive ambassadors and to execute the laws. Moreover, although the
handling of Genet generated significant debates within the
Administration and in the country, it is noteworthy that the Article II
Vesting Clause was never invoked during these debates.

582. See William Maclay, Diary entry (July 18, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 426, at 117-18; 3 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 409, 412 (1851).
583. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 41; see also JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION, 1783-1789, at 215 (1969) ("Since the matter was
so closely contested even with the prestigious Washington in the executive chair, it is hard
to doubt that if anyone else had been elected President, the vote would have gone the
other way.").
584. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 312-17.
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Chronology of Key Events and Statements

We begin this section with a detailed account of the key events and
statements in this period, and we then assess the implications of these
events and statements for the debate over the Vesting Clause Thesis.
The Genet episode concerned, in part, two treaties between the
United States and France concluded during the Revolutionary War.
Among other things, these treaties required the United States to help
protect French possessions in the Americas (such as the French West
Indies), allowed French warships and privateers to bring prizes into
U.S. ports, and disallowed the use by France's enemies of U.S. ports
for outfitting privateers and selling prizes.585 In 1789, the same year
that the United States began operating under its new Constitution, a
violent revolution was initiated in France. The monarchy was
subsequently abolished in September 1792, and King Louis XVI was
executed in January 1793. The French government was controlled by a
National Convention, dominated until the spring of 1793 by the
Girondins, and thereafter by the Jacobins. In conjunction with its
abolition of the monarchy, France began declaring war on various
countries. In April 1792, it declared war on Austria and soon found
itself also at war with Prussia (which had earlier formed an alliance
with Austria). In early 1793, France declared war on Great Britain and
Holland, and then against Spain. The French-U.S. treaties raised the
prospect that the United States might be drawn into the European war
on the side of the French.
In November 1792, the National Convention appointed Genet to
serve as the new French Minister to the United States. Genet set sail
for the United States in late February 1793 and arrived in Charleston,
South Carolina, on April 8, 1793, where he was greeted by enthusiastic
crowds. Soon thereafter, before he had even been officially received
by the U.S. government, he began commissioning and arming
privateers, manned largely by American sailors, to prey on British
ships. He also began establishing French prize courts on U.S. soil to
oversee the condemnation and sale of captured prize vessels, planning
raids into Spanish-controlled Florida, and plotting the "liberation" of
Louisiana and Canada.
President Washington wanted to keep the United States out of the
European war. As he explained in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, the
U.S. Minister to France, " unwise should we be in the extreme to
involve ourselves in the contests of European Nations, where our
weight could be but small; tho' the loss to ourselves would be

585. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3-44 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
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certain."586 Upon hearing of France's declaration of war on Great
Britain and Holland, Washington cut short his stay at Mount Vernon
and returned to Philadelphia (then the national capital) to discuss the
matter with his cabinet.587
On April 18, Washington gave his four cabinet officers (Alexander
Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry Knox)
a list of thirteen questions he wanted to discuss with them the
following day.588 The questions included whether to issue a neutrality
proclamation, whether to receive the new French minister, whether to
renounce the 1778 treaties, and whether to call Congress into special
session.589 That same day, Genet left Charleston by land en route to
Philadelphia. Genet made frequent stops, such that the trip took
almost a month.
In the meantime, Washington met with the cabinet on April 19. At
that meeting, it was agreed unanimously that Congress should not be
called into special session, that a neutrality proclamation should be
issued, and that the minister from the Republic of France should be
received.590 In letters to Madison and Monroe, Jefferson stated that he
had initially opposed the issuance of the proclamation because he
believed that, given the Constitution's assignment of the power to
declare war to Congress, the Executive Branch did not have the power

586. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Mar. 25, 1793), in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 402, 402.
587. See Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee (May 6, 1793), in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 448, 448-49; Letter from George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 12, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 314, 314-15 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969).
588. See Questions Submitted to the Cabinet by the President (Apr. 18, 1793), in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 419, 419-21.
589. Jefferson, apparently for good reason, believed that the thirteen questions had
been formulated by Hamilton. See 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 569 n. (John
Catanzariti ed., 1992); Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality
and the Alliance with France (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra, at 665, 665-66; see also 3 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON
AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 68 (1962) (stating that the questions "almost certainly" were
drafted by Hamilton). It is clear that Hamilton had already been discussing similar questions
with John Jay. See 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 297-300
(reprinting two letters from Hamilton to Jay, both dated April 9, 1793). Indeed, at
Hamilton's request, Jay had drafted a sample neutrality proclamation prior to the April 18
meeting. See Letter and Enclosure from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1793), in
14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 307; CHARLES MARION
THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT 43-45
(1931).
590. See Cabinet Opinion (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 589, at 570; Notes on Washington's Questions (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 665-66; Notes on Cabinet Meeting (Apr. 19,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 328.
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to declare neutrality.591 In response to this concern, Jefferson said that
it was agreed in the cabinet meeting that the word "neutrality" would
not be used in the proclamation.592
There was debate in the meeting, however, over whether to receive
the French minister with or without qualifications. 593 If he were
received without qualifications, it might signify that the United States
accepted the continuing effect of the 1778 treaties between the United
States and France, notwithstanding the change in France's
government. A receipt with qualifications, by contrast, might allow the
United States the option of suspending or renouncing the treaties.
Hamilton and Knox thought the minister should be received with
qualifications, whereas Jefferson and Randolph thought he should be
received without qualifications. Washington asked his cabinet
members to prepare written opinions on this issue. There is no
indication that the constitutional powers of the Executive Branch were
discussed at the April 19 meeting.
While the cabinet officials were preparing their written opinions,
Randolph drafted the Neutrality Proclamation, which was issued on
April 22, 1793. Copies of it were sent to the foreign ministers from
France, Great Britain, and Holland.594 The Executive Branch's power
to issue this Proclamation became the subject of the Pacificus
Helvidius debate between Hamilton and Madison, discussed below in
Section D.
Jefferson submitted his written opinion to the President on April
28.595 He argued that, under the law of nations, the 1778 treaties
between the United States and France were still in effect,
notwithstanding the intervening change in the French government. As
he explained:
[T]he treaties between the US. and France, were not treaties between the
US. and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of America and
France, and the nations remaining in existence, tho' both of them have
591. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra, at 403; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 501.
592. See CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE FIRST AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: A STUDY OF
THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF NEUTRAL OBLIGATIONS DURING THE YEARS 1792
TO 1815, at 12-13 (1934); THOMAS, supra note 589, at 46.
593. Even before the meeting, Washington had decided to receive Genet. See 3
MALONE, supra note 589, at 69; 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at
469-70.
594. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant, George Hammond,
and F.P. Van Berckel (Apr. 23, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 589, at 583, 583-84.
595. See Letter and Enclosed Opinion from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington
(Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 607, 607-18.
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since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by
these changes.596

Jefferson also argued that compliance with the treaties would not
unduly threaten U.S. neutrality. In addition, he argued that the
reception of Genet was, in any event, a separate matter from the
continuing effect of the treaties: "There is not a word, in either of
them, about sending ministers. This has been done between us under
the common usage of nations, and can have no effect either to
continue or annul the treaties."597 There is no discussion in Jefferson's
opinion of constitutional issues. Rather, the focus is on international
law, with references to the leading international law commentators of
the time, such as Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf - each of whom, it
will be recalled, had little or nothing to say concerning how nations
constituted those parts of their governments responsible for
conducting foreign affairs.598
Hamilton and Knox submitted their opinion on May 2.599 They
argued that, in light of the substantial changes in the French govern
ment, the United States had a right to suspend the 1778 treaties and
consider whether the changes in the government warranted a renun
ciation of the treaties.6()() Like Jefferson's opinion, the Hamilton/Knox
opinion contains an extensive discussion of the law of nations, with
references to Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf. Hamilton apparently
gave Washington another opinion on May 2 concerning whether,
under international law, the war in which France was engaged was
offensive or defensive.6()1 There is no discussion of executive power in
either opinion.
Randolph submitted his own opinion on May 6. In this opinion
(which is quoted at length in the footnotes to the Hamilton/Knox
opinion in the Hamilton papers), Randolph agreed with Jefferson that
Genet should be received without qualifications.6()2 Once again, there
was no discussion of executive power.

596. 25 id. at 609.
597. 25 id. at 612.
598. See supra Part II.A.
599. See Letter and Enclosed Answer from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to
George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
note 587, at 367, 367-96.
600. 14 id. at 372.
601. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 398, 398-408.
602. See Letter and Enclosed Answer from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to
George Washington, supra note 599, at 368 n.4, 374 n.12, 375 n.13, 388 n.22, 396 n.26.
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Washington agreed with Jefferson and Randolph and decided, on
May 6, to receive Genet without qualifications.603 Genet arrived in
Philadelphia on May 16, and Washington met with him on May 18.
Initially, Jefferson was very supportive of Genet, telling Madison that
"he offers every thing, and asks nothing."604
Despite the Neutrality Proclamation, Genet continued with his
privateering and other activities. This prompted vigorous complaints
from the British Minister to the United States, George Hammond,
starting in May with complaints about the capture of the British ship
Grange in U.S. waters.605
Genet's activities were the subject of numerous cabinet meetings,
and the Administration repeatedly, through Jefferson, asked Genet to
cease his activities, to no avail.606 At times, Genet suggested that if the
Administration continued to thwart his activities, he would appeal to
Congress and the American people. Not surprisingly, Washington
became increasingly frustrated with Genet. For example, Washington
wrote a letter to Jefferson on July 11, 1793, asking, "Is the Minister of
the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance,
with impunity? and then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the
People?"607 Jefferson, despite his initial support for Genet, became

603. Prakash and Ramsey claim that, even though Washington did not attempt to
suspend or terminate the French treaties, the discussion of that possibility by his cabinet
shows that they understood that the President had the unilateral constitutional power to
terminate U.S. treaties. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 324-27. However, there
was never any discussion by the cabinet (let alone by the Senate or Congress), of either the
President's constitutional authority with respect to this issue, or how a suspension or
termination would be accomplished. As a result, the evidence here is much too thin to
support any claim of constitutional consensus, especially one tied to the Article II Vesting
Clause, which was never even mentioned. Furthermore, as Prakash and Ramsey appear to
acknowledge, President John Adams, in the "quasi-war" with France in the late 1790s, acted
as if he did not have the unilateral power to terminate treaties with France. See Prakash &
Ramsey, supra note 14, at 326 n.409.
604. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 19, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 61, 62.
605. See Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 2, 1793), in 25
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 637, 637-38; Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 591, at 38, 38-40; see also Edmund Randolph's Opinion on the Grange (May 14,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 31, 31-35 (concluding
that the Grange "has been seized on neutral ground" and thus restitution should be made to
the British).
606. Jefferson's initial letters were addressed to the outgoing French minister, Jean
Baptiste Teman!. See, e.g. , Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Temant (May 3,
1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 649; Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Teman! (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 676; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Teman!
(May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 42.
607. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July 1 1, 1793), in 33 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444 , at 4, 4.
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disenchanted with him. For example, in a letter to Madison dated July
7, 1793, he stated:
Never, in my opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, as that of
the present minister of F[rance] here. Hotheaded, all imagination, no
judgment, passionate, disrespectful and even indecent towards the
P[resident] in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of
appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the most
unreasonable and groundless propositions, and in the most dictatorial
style . . . 608
.

The Genet episode reached a boiling point in July, when word
reached the cabinet that Genet's ship, the Embuscade, had captured a
British merchant ship, Little Sarah, and had fitted her out in the port
of Philadelphia as a privateer, under the new name Petite Democrate.
Governor Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania reported that the ship now
had fourteen guns and appeared ready to sail. Despite the Neutrality
Proclamation, and despite requests by both Mifflin and Jefferson that
the Petite Democrate stay in port, Genet allowed the ship to sail. He
informed Jefferson that, "When treaties speak, the agents of nations
have but to obey."609
As a result of these events, the cabinet began considering in July
whether and how to have Genet recalled.610 In early August, it was
decided that a letter would be sent to Gouverneur Morris detailing
Genet's conduct and asking Morris to lay this information before the
French government and ask for Genet's recall.611 Jefferson drafted the

608. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 443, 444. For a lively account of Jefferson's
initial support for Genet and eventual disenchantment with him, see CONOR CRUISE
O'BRIEN, THE LONG AFFAIR: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 17851800, at 152-90 (1996).
609. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (July 9, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 163, 163 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke
eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833).
610. See Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet (July 23, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 553; Notes of Cabinet Meeting on
Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 2, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 591, at 601.
611. See Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 1, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 598; see also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 591, at 606 (stating that "[w]e have decided unanimously to require the recall of
Genet"). The cabinet also considered again whether to call Congress into early session.
Jefferson was the only cabinet member who favored doing so, and Washington decided not
to take this action. See Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 608 (covering rules developed in a meeting on the same day);
Opinion on Convening Congress (Aug. 4, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 591, at 615 (suggesting that Congress be called). Washington eventually did agree
with Jefferson that Congress should be called into special session, but he allowed himself to
be voted down by Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph. See JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREWELL, 1793-1799, at 85 (1972).
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proposed letter to Morris, and, after revisions by the cabinet, the letter
was sent on August 23.612 Morris delivered the recall request to the
French government on October 8, and they made a decision to recall
him three days later, on October 11. News of this decision did not
reach Philadelphia, however, until January 1794.613
Also in July, the Administration sent twenty-nine questions to the
Justices of the Supreme Court concerning, among other things, the
meaning of the 1778 treaties with France.614 Jefferson's letter to the
Justices explained that the war in Europe had generated questions "of
considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the
US," and that "their decision is so little analagous to the ordinary
functions of the Executive, as to occasion much embarrassment and
difficulty to them."615 Washington's cabinet also agreed to inform the
British and French ministers that "the Executive of the US., desirous
of having done what shall be strictly conformeable to the treaties
of the US. and the laws respecting the said cases has determined to
refer the questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws."616 A
letter to this effect was sent to Genet and Hammond.617 The Supreme
Court subsequently declined to answer the questions, on the ground
that the Court was not empowered to issue advisory opinions.618 As a
result, the cabinet formulated its own rules of neutrality, addressing,
among other things, the arming and equipping of foreign vessels in
U.S. ports.619
As Genet became increasingly frustrated with the Administration's
neutrality policy, he began to raise the issue of executive power in his

612. See Cabinet Opinions on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 23, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 745; 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 747-50 (covering the letter to Gouverneur Morris and some
cabinet notes).
613. See HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION 155-56 (1973); ELKINS & MCKITRICK,
supra note 447, at 369.
614. See Questions Proposed to be Submitted to the Judges of the Supreme Court (July
18, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444, at 15, 15-19.
615. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 520, 520.
616. Cabinet Opinion on Consulting the Supreme Court (July 12, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 484, 484.
617. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet and George
Hammond (July 12, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591,
at 487.
618. See Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note
184, at 488, 488-89. See generally STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY
ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997).
619. See Rules on Neutrality, supra note 611, at 608-09. The rules adopted by the
cabinet were largely embodied, in the spring of the following year, in the Neutrality Act
of 1794.

672

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:545

correspondence and discussions with Jefferson.62° For example, in a
letter dated June 8, Genet objected that "every obstruction by the
Government of the United States, to the arming of French vessels,
must be an attempt on the rights of man, upon which repose the
independence and laws of the United States" and was contrary to "the
intention of the people of America. " 621 Similarly, Jefferson in a
memorandum describes a conversation he had with Genet in July
about the respective powers of Congress and the President. 622 In
response to a suggestion by Genet that U.S. policy towards France
should be decided by Congress rather than by the President:
[Jefferson] explained our constitution to him, as having divided the
functions of government among three different authorities, the
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary, each of which were supreme in all
questions belonging to their department and independent of the others:
that all the questions which had arisen between him and us belonged to
the Executive department, and if Congress were sitting could not be
carried to them, nor would they take notice of them. 623

Jefferson further explained that Congress was "sovereign in making
laws only, the Executive was sovereign in executing them, and the
Judiciary in construing them where they related to their
department."624 When Genet asserted that Congress should at least
decide the proper interpretation of the 1778 treaties, Jefferson "told
him No, there were very few cases indeed arising out of treaties which
they could take notice of; that the President is to see that treaties are
observed" and that "the constitution had made the President the last
appeal. "625
Genet continued along these lines in a vitriolic letter dated June
22, complaining that the Washington Administration had acted
without waiting for Congress, and asserting that the Administration's
actions were contrary to the will of the American people.626 Jefferson
620. Genet also was frustrated by the Administration's decision not to accede to his
request to pay off the entire U.S. debt to France. See, e.g. , Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Edmond Genet (June 1 1 , 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591,
at 252, 252.
621. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 8, 1793), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 151, 151.
622. See Memorandum of a Conversation with Edmund Charles Genet (July 10, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 463, 463-67.
623. 26 id. at 465.
624. 26 id.
625. 26 id.
626. See Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 155, 155-56. Hamilton
later referred to Genet's June 22 letter as "the most offensive paper, perhaps, that ever was
offered by a foreign Minister to a friendly power, with which he resided." Reasons for the
Opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary at War Respecting the
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drafted a response, which he showed to Washington but never sent
to Genet:
When you shall have had time to become better acquainted with the
constitution of the US. you will become sensible that this question can
only arise between him and the legislature: that the Executive is the sole
organ of our communications with foreign governments; that the Agents
of those governments are not authorized to j udge what cases are to be
decided by this or that department; but to consider the declarations of
the President conclusive as to them, and sufficient evidence that the
proper department has pronounced on the case.627

Genet apparently did not accept Jefferson's views about executive
power. In mid-September, for example, upon receiving a copy of the
letter that had been sent to Morris, Genet sent Jefferson an angry
letter asserting, among other things, that "the Executive power is the
only one which has been confided to the President of the United
States" and that the President does not have "the power to bend
existing treaties to circumstances, and to change their sense."628 In
December, Genet asked the Administration to present to Congress a
translation of his instructions and other papers. Jefferson replied that
"the communications, which are to pass between the Executive and
Legislative branches, cannot be a subject for your interference, and
that the President must be left to judge for himself what matters his
duty or the public good may require him to propose to the
deliberations of Congress. "629
One specific issue that came up concerning executive power was
the proper organ of government for approving and revoking the
commissions of foreign consuls. In a letter on October 2, Jefferson
informed Genet that, "by our constitution all foreign agents are to be
addressed to the President of the US. no other branch of the
government being charged with the foreign communications."630 Genet
responded on November 1 4 that the French government "will adopt

Brigandine Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
note 5, at 74, 75.
627. Unsent letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 510, 513; see also Unsent letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 378, 378-79 (John Catanzariti ed., 1997) (explaining that the Constitution assigns
the power of corresponding with foreign nations to the executive, not to the states).
628. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 18, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 172, 172.
629. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Dec. 31, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 649, 649. As Harry Ammon explains,
neither the National Convention nor Genet fully understood the role of the President in the
U.S. constitutional system. See AMMON, supra note 613, at 25-26, 129.
630. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Oct. 2, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 175, 176.
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the alterations of which this matter appears susceptible, agreeably to
the text, spirit, and basis, of your constitution" and that, in his view,
the Constitution appeared to give the President only the ministerial
duty "to verify purely and simply the powers of foreign agents
accredited to their masters."631 Jefferson responded in a letter dated
November 22 that he was "not authorized to enter into any discussions
with you on the meaning of our constitution in any part of it, or to
prove to you that it has ascribed to him alone the admission or
interdiction of foreign agents. I inform you of the fact by authority
from the President."632 Genet then sent Jefferson a letter on December
3 questioning the requirement that consular commissions be addressed
to the President and arguing that the U.S. government did not have a
right to revoke consular commissions.633 This letter was considered by
the cabinet on December 7, where it was agreed that consular
commissions could be addressed "either to the US. or to the President
of the US. but that one of these should be insisted on."634 Jefferson
subsequently wrote Genet arguing that governments have the right to
determine whether to accept particular consular officials and whether
to permit them to continue exercising consular functions.635 Jefferson
also stated:
By what member of the government the right of giving or withdrawing
permission, is to be exercised here, is a question on which no foreign
Agent can be permitted to make himself the Umpire. It is sufficient for
him, under our government that he is informed of it by the Executive.636

On at least a couple of occasions, Jefferson pointed out that the
President lacked power over a particular matter. Thus, in a letter
dated June 1 , 1793, Jefferson informed Genet that Gideon Henfield,
who was charged with violating U.S. neutrality, "appears to be in the
custody of the civil magistrate, over whose proceedings the Executive
has no controul."637 Similarly, in a letter dated June 17, 1793, Jefferson
explained that the President could not interfere with judicial decisions
exercising jurisdiction over certain vessels and cargoes taken by a
631. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 14, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 184, 184.
632. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 414, 414.
633. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 3, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 479, 479-80.
634. Cabinet Opinion on Edmond Charles Genet and James King (Dec. 7, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 489, 489.
635. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Dec. 9, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 500, 500-01.
636. 27 id. at 500 (footnotes omitted).
637. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (June 1, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 160, 160.
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French vessel as prizes. Jefferson stated that " [t)he functions of the
Executive are not competent to the decision of Questions of property
between Individuals. "638 And, in responding to complaints by Genet of
threats to French consuls and other concerns, Jefferson informed him
that most of his complaints, "being beyond the powers of the
Executive, they can only manifest their dispositions by acting on those
which are within their powers. "639
In November 1793, while awaiting word back from France
concerning Genet's recall, the Administration considered dismissing
Genet on its own authority.640 This proposal was opposed by Jefferson
and was never implemented. Nor was there any discussion of the
source of the President's authority, if any, to dismiss a foreign
ambassador.
On December 5, 1793, Washington presented Congress with a
report concerning Genet's conduct, attaching much of the
correspondence and other papers relating to what had occurred since
Genet's arrival.641 At the outset of the report, Washington stated:
As the present situation of the several nations of Europe, and especially
of those with which the United States have important relations, cannot
but render the state of things between them and us matter of interesting
inquiry to the Legislature, and may indeed give rise to deliberations to
which they alone are competent, I have thought it my duty to
communicate to them certain correspondences which have taken place. 642

Genet continued to engage in problematic conduct to the very end.
For example, on December 8, he wrote to Randolph demanding that
Chief Justice Jay and Senator Rufus King be prosecuted for libel,
based on their published allegation that he had threatened to appeal
to the people of the United States to override the actions of the
President.643 In mid-January 1794, news of Genet's recall by France

638. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 301, 301.
639. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 30, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 458, 458 (footnotes omitted); see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Sept. 9, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 67, 68 ("The Courts of Justice exercise the
sovereignty of this country in judiciary matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to
controul nor opposition from any other branch of the Government.").
640. See Notes of Cabinet Meetings on Edmond Charles Genet and the President's
Address to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
627, at 399, 399-401 .
641. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at
141-243.
642. 1 id. at 141.
643. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph enclosing letter from
Edmond Genet (Dec. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627,
at 587, 587. For a description of the circumstances surrounding the allegation made against
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reached Philadelphia. On January 20, Washington informed Congress
that Genet's conduct had "been unequivocally disapproved" by the
French government and that the French Government had given "the
strongest assurances . . . that [Genet's] recall should be expedited
without delay."644 Genet's successor, Jean Fauchet, arrived in the
United States on February 20. Genet did not wish to return to France
(where he might have been executed by the now-Jacobin controlled
government), and Washington decided to grant him political asylum in
the United States. In a truly American conclusion, Genet settled down
as a gentleman farmer in New York and married Governor Clinton's
daughter.
2.

Assessment

While there is nothing in the Genet episode that contradicts the
Vesting Clause Thesis, there is also nothing there that provides
significant support for it. First, the assumptions and assertions
concerning executive power during this episode were all made by
Executive Branch officials, at a time when Congress was out of session
and the Administration was understandably trying to prevent Genet's
conduct from drawing the United States into war. There is no reason
to believe that these officials were objectively trying to apply
Founding intent. Second, although the scope of executive power came
up in the discussions between Genet and Jefferson, there was almost
no internal discussion by Washington's cabinet of this topic, so it is
difficult to draw inferences from this episode about the constitutional
theory underlying the Administration's actions. Third, the
Administration's effort to obtain answers from the Supreme Court on
the treaty questions, and its presentation of the Genet materials to
Congress once Congress was in session, undermine the strong
executive control story presented by Prakash and Ramsey.645 Fourth,
notwithstanding Jefferson's broad statements about the executive in
his discussions with Genet, there is no documented reference in any of
the correspondence or cabinet meetings relating to the Genet episode
that refers to the Vesting Clause. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, all of the Executive Branch actions during this episode
could reasonably have been based on specific constitutional provisions
rather than on the Vesting Clause. Thus, the assumption that the
Executive Branch could decide whether and how to receive Genet,
Genet that he would attempt to appeal to the American people, see JOANNE B. FREEMAN,
AFFAIRS OF HONOR 93-97 (2001).
644. Letter from George Washington to Congress (Jan. 21, 1794), in 33 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444, at 245, 245-46.
645. See also FLEXNER, supra note 611, at 26 ("Washington would undoubtedly have
consulted the Senate in the [neutrality] crisis had Congress been in session.").
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and then could decide to ask for his recall, could reasonably have been
based on the President's power to "receive ambassadors and other
public ministers."646 And the Administration's belief that it had the
power in the absence of a judicial decision to interpret the 1778
treaties could reasonably have been based on the President's power to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."647
Prakash and Ramsey argue, however, that the Ambassador
Receipt Clause cannot explain the Washington Administration's
practice of issuing and revoking "exequaters" to consuls, that is, the
formal permission to set up consular functions. Consuls are mentioned
in the Ambassador Appointment Clause and in the Article III
jurisdictional provisions, but not in the Ambassador Receipt Clause.648
At best, this appears to be a minor point. If one accepts the
proposition that the Ambassador Receipt Clause includes a power to
determine which foreign diplomats to receive (which is at least
plausible), then the exequatur practice was at most a modest extension
of that power to a class of diplomats not specifically included within
the Clause. In other words, Prakash and Ramsey have at most
identified a minor example of where the Administration's practice
may have strained the constitutional text, not any confirmation or
acceptance of the Vesting Clause Thesis.
In any event, it is possible that the Founders intended the
Ambassador Receipt Clause to encompass consuls but inadvertently
left out an express reference to those officials. This conclusion is
supported by Federalist No. 42. There, Madison explains that,
although the Articles of Confederation gave the national government
" the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . sending and receiving
ambassadors," the Constitution improves upon the Articles by adding

646. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Courts have long construed the Ambassador Receipt
Clause as giving the President the power to determine whether to accredit foreign diplomats.
See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 361 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971) ("The
constitution of the United States having vested in the president the power to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers, has necessarily bestowed upon that branch of the
government, not only the right, but the exclusive right, to judge of the credentials of the
ministers so received . . . . "). Courts also have relied on the Ambassador Receipt Clause as
support for a presidential power to determine whether the United States should recognize
particular foreign governments. See, e.g., Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 1 1 8 F.3d 76, 79
(2d Cir. 1997) ("Because the Constitution empowers only the President to 'receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers,' the courts have deferred to the executive branch
when determining what entities shall be considered foreign states." (quoting Iran Handicraft
& Carpet Exp. Ctr. v. Marjan Int'I Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 868
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988))). Although not noted by Prakash and Ramsey, in Federalist No. 69,
Hamilton suggested a narrow reading of the Ambassador Receipt Clause, stating that the
President's power to receive ambassadors "is more a matter of dignity than of authority" and
would be "a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the
government." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at 420.
647. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
648. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 316.
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"a power of appointing and receiving 'other public ministers and
consuls.' "649 Thus, Madison seemed to believe that the Ambassador
Receipt Clause, unlike the equivalent clause in the Articles of
Confederation, encompassed consuls. He went on to explain that:
The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the
second of the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade
only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States
will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary.
And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend
consuls.650

Importantly, Madison also noted that, despite this textual problem, "it
has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to
employ the inferior grades of public ministers and to send and receive
consuls."651 Thus, the Washington Administration's practice, even if
not encompassed by the Ambassador Receipt Clause, was a less
dramatic extension of this Clause than what had already occurred
under the Articles of Confederation, likewise on grounds of
expediency.
On the other hand, although Prakash and Ramsey do not examine
the Founding history on this point, a close reading of the Federal
Convention proceedings suggests that the omission of consuls from the
Ambassador Receipt Clause might have been intentional. The
Committee of Detail's draft of the Constitution assigned the power to
appoint ambassadors to the Senate and the power to receive
ambassadors to the President.652 Neither of these clauses mentioned
other public ministers or consuls, although those diplomats were
mentioned in the federal court jurisdiction provision.653 On August 23,
1787, the Ambassador Appointment Clause was modified to include a
reference to "other public Ministers."654 On August 25, the same
change was made to the Ambassador Receipt Clause.655 On September
7, the Ambassador Appointment Clause was further modified to
include a reference to consuls.656 Somewhere along the way, a similar

649. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264.
650. Id. at 264-65. Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation provided: "Each state
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
,
assembled. , ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
651. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 42 (James Madison), at 265.
652. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
183, 185.
653. See 2 id. at 186.
654. See 2 id. at 394.
655. See 2 id. at 411, 419.
656. See 2 id. at 533, 539.

supra
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February 2004]

Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs

679

modification must have been made to the Ambassador Receipt
Clause, because both clauses contained a reference to consuls in the
draft sent to the Committee of Style.657 The draft reported out of the
Committee, however, did not contain a reference to consuls in the
Ambassador Receipt Clause, although consuls were still referenced in
the Ambassador Appointment Clause (and in the federal court
jurisdiction provision).658
The Committee of Style's deletion of the reference to consuls in
the Ambassador Receipt Clause, but not in the Ambassador
Appointments Clause, makes it harder to argue that the lack of a
reference to consuls in that Clause was accidental. That said, it is not
clear why the deletion was made. The disparity between the two
clauses could still have been inadvertent, especially since the
Committee of Style was not charged with making substantive changes.
Alternatively, the Framers may have wanted to give the President the
power to appoint all U.S. representatives abroad, but may not have
wanted to burden him with the duty of receiving low-level foreign
diplomats. Of course, if that was the reason for the deletion, the
Framers would not necessarily have wanted to deny to the President
the power over exequaturs, so Washington's practice still might have
been consistent with the overall Founding intent. The key point,
however, is that the Administration's practice concerning consuls was
at most a minor deviation from the constitutional text, and one that
was never linked to the Vesting Clause.
E.

The Pacificus-Helvidius Debate

In contrast to the Genet affair, the Neutrality Proclamation did
famously produce what in many ways was the first sustained
articulation of the Vesting Clause Thesis, from no less than the pen of
Alexander Hamilton. In late June 1793, Hamilton began publishing
newspaper essays, under the pseudonym "Pacificus," to defend the
Proclamation against Republican criticisms. He ultimately wrote seven
Pacificus essays, but only the first one focuses on the constitutionality
of the Proclamation.659 In late August and early September, James
Madison published five essays, under the pseudonym "Helvidius,"
responding to Hamilton's constitutional arguments.
657. See 2 id. at 574-575.
658. See 2 id. at 599-600.
659. The other essays address the validity of the Proclamation under international law
and the Proclamation's policy implications. See LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 2
(July 3, 1793), at 55-63; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 3 (July 6, 1793), at 65-69;
LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 4 (July 10, 1793), at 82-86; LETTERS OF
PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 5 (July 13-17, 1793), at 90-95; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra
note 5, No. 6 (July 17, 1793), at 100-06; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 7 (July 27,
1793), at 130-35.
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Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis sometimes describe
Hamilton's constitutional defense of the Proclamation as if it rest
ed entirely on the Vesting Clause Thesis. 660 Prakash and Ramsey
emphasize, for example, that "the leading contemporaneous defense
of Washington's Proclamation, that of Hamilton as Pacificus, directly
identified Article II, Section 1 as its constitutional basis."661 Indeed,
Prakash and Ramsey go so far as to suggest that the Vesting Clause
Thesis was the only possible constitutional argument that could have
been made in support of the Proclamation and that "the only
alternative explanation is that Washington simply seized powers not
granted to him by the Constitution. "662 In fact, although Hamilton
does invoke the Vesting Clause Thesis, he begins and ends his
constitutional analysis by relying on specific textual grants of power
rather than on the Vesting Clause. Furthermore, Hamilton expressly
notes that resort to the Vesting Clause may not have been necessary in
order for the Proclamation to be constitutionally valid.
Hamilton begins his analysis by noting that " [i]t will not be dis
puted that the management of the affairs of this country with foreign
nations is confided to the Government of the [United States]."663 He
then goes on to argue that, within the national government, the
Executive Branch is the "organ of intercourse between the [United
States] and foreign Nations."664 As support for this claim, he notes that
it is the Executive Branch, not the Legislative or Judicial Branch, that
is charged under the Constitution with making treaties and executing
the laws. 665 Hamilton thus begins his constitutional analysis by
referring to two enumerated powers in Article II.
At this point in his essay, Hamilton advocates a version of the
Vesting Clause Thesis. He contends that the Vesting Clause is a
comprehensive grant of executive power to the President and that this
grant is not limited by Article II's specific grants of power, except to
the extent that those grants are themselves specifically limited. As
support for this claim, he notes the difference in wording between the
Article I Vesting Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause. According
to Hamilton, the specific grants of power in Article II merely "specify
and regulate the principal articles implied in the definition of
Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of
that power, interpreted in conformity to other parts [of] the
660. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 329-30.
661. Id. at 330.
662. Id. at 331. But cf Prakash, supra note 26, at 793-94 (noting Hamilton's reliance on
the Take Care Clause as an alternative argument).
663. LETIERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 1 (June 29, 1793), at 33, 36.
664. Id. at 38.
665. Id. at 37-38.
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constitution and to the principles of free government."666 Since issuing
the Neutrality Proclamation was an "Executive Act," says Hamilton, it
fell within the powers granted in the Vesting Clause.
Immediately after making this Vesting Clause argument, however,
Hamilton returns to the specific textual grants of power. He
acknowledges that Congress has the power to declare war, and that
this power may include the power to determine whether the United
States "is under obligations to m[ ake] war or not."667 But he contends
that, in the absence of a declaration of war by Congress, the Executive
Branch has a concurrent power to make this determination. As
support for this claim, Hamilton relies on the Take Care Clause. His
explanation is worth quoting at length:
If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one hand - it is on
the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared;
and in fulfilling that duty, it must necessarily possess a right of judging
what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the Country
impose on the Government; and when in pursuance of this right it has
concluded that there is nothing in them inconsistent with a state of
neutrality, it becomes both its province and its duty to enforce the laws
incident to that state of the Nation. The Executive is charged with the
execution of all laws, the laws of Nations and well as the Municipal law,
which recognizes and adopts those laws. It is consequently bound, by
faithfully executing the laws of neutrality, when that is the state of the
Nation, to avoid giving a cause of war to foreign Powers.668

Thus, according to Hamilton, Washington had the power to issue the
Neutrality Proclamation by virtue of his Article II responsibility to
execute "the Laws," which, Hamilton argued, included U.S. treaty
commitments and the customary international laws of neutrality.669
Hamilton goes on to argue that this power is confirmed by the
Ambassadorial Receipt Clause, which, Hamilton contends, necessarily
entails the power of interpreting U.S. treaty commitments.670 Im
portantly, Hamilton concludes his essay by suggesting that the Take
Care Clause may by itself be enough to support the Neutrality
Proclamation: "That clause of the constitution which makes it his duty
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' might alone have
been relied upon, and this simple process of argument pursued."671
666. Id. at 39 (alteration in original).
667. Id. at 40 (alteration in original).
668. Id.
669. See also id. at 41. We take no position here on whether Hamilton correctly
interpreted the word "Laws" in Article IL For evidence suggesting that the word "Laws"
may have been intended to encompass treaties, but not the law of nations, see Curtis A.
Bradley, The A lien Tort Statute and Article Ill, 42 VA. J. lNT'L L. 587, 602 n.65 (2002).
670. LErrERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 1 (June 29, 1793}, at 41-42.
671. Id. at 43; see also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 178 (noting Hamilton's reliance on the
Take Care Clause).
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A close reading of the Pacificus essay shows, therefore, that the
Vesting Clause Thesis was less central to Hamilton's analysis than
proponents of the Thesis typically acknowledge. Moreover, Hamilton
was defending only the limited argument that the President had the
power to declare the default position of the United States under
international law in the absence of congressional or judicial action.672
Hamilton was not defending any of the presidential powers sometimes
linked by modern commentators to the Vesting Clause, such as treaty
termination, offensive war powers, or sole executive agreements.
Although the Washington Administration controversially sought to
prosecute individuals who violated U.S. neutrality, Hamilton's essay
does not defend the constitutionality of that practice (which, among
other things, might have violated Congress's power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations), 673 let alone link the
practice to the Vesting Clause. And it is doubtful that others in the
Administration thought that the Neutrality Proclamation itself (as
opposed to the common law, treaties, or the law of nations) could
serve as the basis for the prosecutions.674
In any event, it is difficult to see how the Pacificus essay can serve
as evidence of the original understanding of the Article II Vesting
Clause. The essay was an advocacy piece, written four years after the
Constitution took effect, by a particularly pro-executive member of
the Founding generation. The Pacificus essay was sharply contested by
James Madison as well as by Thomas Jefferson, who urged Madison to
write the Helvidius essays. · rn addition, Hamilton's reliance on the
Vesting Clause Thesis in Pacificus contradicted his own statements
about executive power made during the Founding. 675 If one is
672 . As reported in Jefferson's diary, President Washington himself viewed the
Proclamation in these narrow terms: "The (President] declared he never had an idea that he
could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything contained in his (proclamation]
could look beyond the first day of [Congress's] meeting . . . . " Notes of Cabinet Meetings on
Edmond Charles Genet and the President's Address to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), supra note
640, at 400. In a speech to Congress on December 3, 1793, Washington explained that, in
light of the war in Europe, he had issued the Proclamation "to admonish our Citizens of the
consequences of a contraband trade, and of hostile Acts to any of the parties; and to obtain
by a declaration of the existing legal state of things, an easier admission of our right to the
immunities, belonging to our situation." President George Washington, Fifth Annual
Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra
note 444, at 163, 164. In describing the specific acts he had taken to give effect to U.S.
neutrality, he further noted that "(i]t rests with the wisdom of Congress to correct, improve
or enforce this plan of procedure." 33 id.
673. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 178-79.
674. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 343-45 (documenting this point). At
President Washington's request, Congress enacted a neutrality statute in 1794 that provided
a statutory basis for prosecuting violations of the law of nations concerning neutrality. See
An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United
States, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).
675. The constitutional plan that Hamilton presented at the Federal Convention would
have limited the President to certain enumerated powers. See supra Part III.A. In the
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attempting to discern the Constitution's original meaning, surely
Hamilton's Founding statements should be given more weight than
what he later said in Pacificus.
Seeking to assign broader historical significance to the Pacificus
essay, proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis typically suggest that
Hamilton "won" the debate with Madison. Prakash and Ramsey state,
for example, that Madison's arguments were "incoherent" and that
" Helvidius was no match for Pacificus."676 The implication apparently
is that Hamilton's arguments were so overpowering that they must
have reflected Founding intent.
As others have noted, there are certainly weaknesses in Madison's
Helvidius essays.677 Logically, however, the fact that Madison's re
sponse may have been less than convincing does not show that
Hamilton's views were correct, since Madison may have simply failed
to make the best arguments. This would not be surprising, given that
he wrote the Helvidius essays quite reluctantly, while he was
preoccupied with other business, and he apparently was dissatisfied
with his performance.678 Moreover, even if Hamilton was right about
Federalist Papers, Hamilton repeatedly implied that the President would have only the
powers recited in Article II. See supra Part III.B. And in the New York ratifying convention,
Hamilton stated that the Constitution entrusted the management of foreign relations to the
Senate and President together. See supra Part 111.C. See also Raoul Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1972-73) ("The magic of Hamilton's
name must not obscure the fact that he had executed a volte-face [in Pacificus], repudiating
assurances he had made both in The Federalist and in the New York Ratification Convention
to procure adoption of the Constitution.").
676. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 336, 339.
677. See, e.g. , EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 28 (1917); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 362; SCHLESINGER, supra
note 18, at 20; SOFAER, supra note 229, at 114-15. But cf LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 527
n.18 (1995) (stating that Helvidius "decimates the logic of Hamilton's argument that the
executive possesses something like a concurrent right with the legislature to determine
whether treaty obligations compel war or peace"); LEVY, supra note 384, at 52 ("Madison
demolished [Hamilton's] argument by showing that the Constitution had rejected the British
theory of executive prerogative and by quoting The Federalist against Hamilton.").
678. Madison wrote the Helvidius essays after being urged to do so by Jefferson. In a
June 30 postscript to a June 29 letter, Jefferson complained that "heresies" in the first
Pacificus essay might "pass unnoticed and unanswered." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (June 29, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591,
at 401, 404. On July 7, Jefferson wrote to Madison, "Nobody answers [Hamilton], and his
doctrine will therefore be taken for confessed. For god's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen,
select the most striking heresies, and cut him to peices in the face of the public." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 608, at 444. For a number of reasons,
Madison was reluctant to take on this task. He agreed with Jefferson that Hamilton's
argument "ought certainly to be taken notice of by some one who can do it justice." Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 2, at 44, 44. But he felt that he did not have either the necessary
factual information or the requisite legal materials, and he hoped to find out "that some one
else has undertaken it." Id. Madison also was in a difficult political situation, given the need
by this time to distance the Republicans from Genet and the importance of not challenging
Washington directly. On the latter point, he expressed concern to Jefferson that he did not
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the constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation, it may have been
because of his specific textual arguments rather than his Vesting
Clause argument. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an
examination of Madison's argument shows that its weaknesses are
similar to weaknesses shared by the Vesting Clause Thesis itself.
Madison's argument has two principal components. First, he
contends that the powers of declaring war and making treaties are
inherently "legislative" in nature and thus "can never fall within a
proper definition of executive powers. "679 The exercise of executive
power, rather, "must pre-suppose the existence of the laws to be
executed."680 Hamilton's suggestion to the contrary, Madison con
tends, is improperly borrowed from the example of British
monarchy.681 Consequently, Madison argues that the Constitution's
grant of the war declaration power and the treaty power should not, as
Hamilton argues, be construed strictly to preserve the maximum scope
for presidential power. Here, Madison argues that the Constitution did
not adopt the purported Locke/Montesquieu conception of executive
power, noting: "Both of [these writers] too are evidently warped by a
regard to the particular government of England, to which one of them
owed allegiance; and the other professed an admiration bordering on
idolatry. "682 Once it is concluded that the war power and the treaty
power are legislative in nature, argues Madison, it becomes clear that
the Constitution could not have assigned them to the President, since:
[T]he constitution cannot be supposed to have placed either any power
legislative in its nature, entirely among executive powers, or any power
executive in its nature, entirely among legislative powers, without
charging the constitution, with that kind of intermixture and

know "how far the [President] considers himself as actually committed with respect to some
doctrines." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 22, 1793), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 46, 46-47. Nevertheless, Madison "forced
[himself] into the task of a reply," a task that he described as "the most grating one I ever
experienced." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 30, 1793), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 48, 48. Years later, Madison expressed
dissatisfaction with his essays, describing them as a "polemic tract." James Madison,
Detached Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet ed., Madison's "Detached Memoranda, " 3 WM. &
MARY Q. (3d Series) 534, 567 (1946). He continued to be critical of the Pacificus essays,
however, noting that they represented "a perverted view of [President] Washington's
proclamation of neutrality, and [were] calculated to put a dangerous gloss on the
Constitution of the U.S." Id. at 567-68.
679. LEITERS OF HELVJDIUS, supra note 573, No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), at 66, 69. Given the
expressions of legislative foreign affairs essentialism that appeared during the state
ratification debates, see supra Part 111.C, this tack was neither new nor unique to Madison.
680. LEITERS OF HELVIDIUS, supra note 573, NO. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), at 66, 69.
681. Id. at 72.
682. Id. at 68.
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consolidation of different powers, which would violate a fundamental
principle in the organization of free governments.683

Second, Madison contends that the Constitution does not allow for
the concurrent exercise of powers that are purely legislative or purely
executive. He notes that Hamilton acknowledged that Congress's
power of declaring war, even when strictly construed, includes the
power of judging whether the United States is under an obligation to
make war. This acknowledgment, Madison argues, means that the
President cannot also have such a power, since concurrent powers are
"contrary to one of the first and best maxims of a well organized
government, and ought never to be founded in a forced construction,
much less in opposition to a fair one."684 As for Hamilton's argument
that the executive has the power under specific textual grants, such as
the Take Care Clause, to act in the absence of a congressional
declaration of war, Madison contends that:
Whenever then a question occurs whether war shall be declared, or
whether public stipulations require it, the question necessarily belongs to
the department to which these functions belong - And no other
department can be in the execution of its proper functions, if it should
undertake to decide such a question.685

Madison also denies that the President's power to execute the laws
gives him any discretion in interpreting and applying those laws,
stating that " [t]he executive has no other discretion than to convene
and give information to the legislature on occasions that may demand
it; and whilst this discretion is duly exercised the trust of the executive
is satisfied, and that department is not responsible for the
consequences. "686
There are a number of weaknesses in Madison's analysis. These
weaknesses, however, do not confirm the persuasiveness of the
Vesting Clause Thesis. Indeed, these weaknesses are similar to
weaknesses in the Vesting Clause Thesis itself. First, Madison,
atypically for him, relies on essentialist reasoning instead of functional
arguments. Madison talks as if there are pure categories of executive
and legislative power, and he simply disagrees with Hamilton about
what those categories should look like. Madison's argument is also
unpersuasive in rejecting the possibility of concurrent powers. In
doing so, Madison (again, atypically for him) espouses a formal,
categorical approach to the separation of powers. Yet, like the Vesting
Clause Thesis, Madison's approach appears to be at odds with the
mixing of powers so evident in the Constitution, a feature defended by
683. Id. at 70.
684. LETIERS OF HELVIDIUS, supra note 573, No. 2 (Aug. 31, 1793), at 80, 83.
685. Id. at 82.
686. Id. at 86.
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Madison himself in Federalist No. 47.687 Madison's approach also has
the problem of being unworkable in practice, since it ignores the
interpretive role necessarily entailed in executing the laws. Finally, his
approach is functionally problematic, since it might mean that the
national government would be unable to respond to many foreign
relations problems when Congress was out of session. As Hamilton
himself appeared to recognize, however, the specific textual grants
may be sufficient to address these functional concerns, without any
need for the Vesting Clause Thesis.688
In sum, the Pacificus-Helvidius debate neither provides Founding
support for the Vesting Clause Thesis, nor demonstrates its inherent
persuasiveness. Instead, the debate serves to highlight the fact that
there were disagreements in the 1790s over the nature and scope of
executive power. It also tends to confirm the possibility (as Hamilton
himself acknowledged with respect to the Neutrality Proclamation)
that the specific textual grants of power in Article II may give the
Executive Branch sufficient authority over foreign affairs without the
need for the Vesting Clause Thesis. To the extent that one can read
anything into the lack of persuasiveness in the Helvidius essays, it is
simply that essentialist reasoning about categories of power does not
advance the constitutional analysis. The constitutional Founders
(including Hamilton, at least before the Pacificus essays) were aware
of this problem, which is why they spelled out the President's powers
in Article 11.689

687. See supra text accompanying notes 256-259.
688. Although Madison's response to Pacificus suffered from some of the same
analytical problems as the Vesting Clause Thesis, it is not accurate to suggest that Madison's
response implicitly accepted the Thesis. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 335-37;
William R. Casto, Pacificus and Helvidius Reconsidered, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 612, 631-32
(2001). Madison appeared to conceive of the category of "executive power" as simply a
power to execute the laws, not as a package of independent substantive powers, and he
construed the President's enumerated foreign affairs powers narrowly vis-a-vis Congress an approach directly at odds with the Vesting Clause Thesis. It is possible, however, that
Madison shied away from a direct assault on the Vesting Clause Thesis because of earlier
statements he had made in connection with the 1789 removal debate. See supra Part IV.C.
689. Early post-Founding treatises also appear to confirm that the Article II Vesting
Clause was not understood as conveying substantive powers. See, e.g., 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 281 (1836) (stating, after a discussion of the Vesting
Clause, that "(h]aving thus considered the manner in which the president is constituted, it
only remains for us to review the powers with which he is invested," and then referring only
to powers specified in the Constitution); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 135-49 (1825) (equating executive power with the
power to execute the laws, and then discussing only powers specified in the Constitution);
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356 (1822) (discussing Article II Vesting
Clause and not mentioning any substantive powers); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 340 (1833) ("Having thus considered the
manner, in which the executive department is organized, the next inquiry is, as to the
powers, with which it is entrusted. These, and the corresponding duties, are enumerated in
the second and third sections of the second article of the constitution."); ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE

February 2004]

Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs

687

CONCLUSION

Elegant theories can often obscure shaky foundations, especially in
constitutional law. Among the most venerable constitutional theories
is the Vesting Clause Thesis, which is also among the most newly
popular. This Thesis posits that the Founders, in vesting the
"executive Power" in the President, delegated an unspecified but well
understood bundle of foreign-affairs powers, so well understood that
the label served as mere shorthand for what everyone knew to be the
essential attributes of an executive department. The Thesis further
holds that, by virtue of this delegation, the President properly wields
all foreign affairs authority not expressly granted to the other
branches.
The Vesting Clause Thesis has a number of attractions. It offers a
straightforward textual solution to a number of vexing questions about
foreign affairs authority. It also helps reconcile the spare list of powers
in Article II with the reality of vast presidential authority in foreign
relations. And it hearkens back to a purported age when the
boundaries separating the executive, legislative, and judicial were
clear and precise. For many, of course, the Thesis has the added
attraction of justifying a broad view of unilateral presidential power in
foreign affairs. This aspect of the Thesis has helped attract adherents
going back at least to Alexander Hamilton. It is perhaps no
coincidence that this presidentialist orientation currently attracts
advocates in an era in which the nation's security faces threats that
create pressure for sure and swift response.
History, especially constitutional history, may at times be elegant
as well, but it is rarely so simple. As a description of what the
Founding generation intended, understood, or meant, both the
Vesting Clause Thesis and the broad view of executive power
essentialism on which it rests are untenable. European political theory
offers support for these views that is at best vague and overstated. A
closer examination reveals that the leading theorists wrestled with
specifics, disagreed among themselves, and in some cases reached
what to modern expectations are surprising conclusions. The practices
of the Washington Administration likewise offer some support, if not
so much for the Vesting Clause Thesis expressly, at least for the idea
of broad presidential power in foreign affairs. Yet it was precisely
when such practices ventured beyond a plausible basis in specific text
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 329-50 (1803) (stating that "[t]he powers, or more
properly, the duties, of the president of the United States, are various and extensive; though
happily abridged of many others, which are considered as inseparable from the executive
authority in monarchies: of these last, we have had frequent occasion to notice such as are
transferred by the constitution to the congress of the United States; and of those which are
assigned to the president," and then analyzing only Article II's specific grants of power).
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that they ran into substantial opposition. Most of all, neither the
Vesting Clause Thesis nor executive power essentialism find any
significant support - and indeed, barely any plausible mention - in
the materials on which originalists typically rely - that is, materials
from the Founding and from the experiences of the national and state
governments in the years leading to the Founding. To the contrary,
these materials make clear what the Constitution's text suggests: the
Founders settled upon a specific, and in certain regards
unprecedented, set of executive powers by listing them in Article II.
To the extent that the phrase "executive Power" conveyed any widely
understood independent meaning, it encompassed simply a power to
execute the laws.
Neither the Vesting Clause Thesis, nor executive power
essentialism, provide the only arguments that can be made for broad
presidential power in foreign relations. It is arguable, for example, that
the President's delegated powers should be construed liberally to
account for the changing and unanticipated responsibilities of his
office. It is also arguable that the President has acquired constitutional
powers not specified in Article II by virtue of the longstanding
practices and interactions of the political branches. Indeed, it may be
difficult to j ustify some features of modern foreign relations law, such
as congressional-executive agreements and certain presidential
authorizations of military force, on any other basis.690 We do not,
therefore, take a position here on the scope of the President's modern
foreign affairs authority. Our goal, rather, is to put to rest one
especially sweeping claim that typically appeals to history, but in fact
lacks any substantial historical basis. In this way we hope to have
cleared the path for a more nuanced and constitutionally defensible
approach to the topic of presidential power, whether the approach
rests on text, structure, custom, political theory, or indeed, history.

690. Prakash and Ramsey simply beg the question of how the Constitution should be
interpreted when they assert that reliance on post-constitutional practice or other nontextual
materials involves "giv[ing] up on the Constitution." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at
233. The Supreme Court has often relied on longstanding practice when interpreting the
Constitution. Indeed, such reliance has long been thought to be the most defensible part of
the Court's famous foreign affairs law decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). See, e.g. , THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS I JUDICIAL
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 14-15 (1992); Sarah H.
Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127,
1133-34 (1999); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1973-74).

